



Transnational Terrorism: Theoretical approaches and policy discourse

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'Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society'



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INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this study is to compare the findings of Deliverable 1 (“Notions of Security: Shifting concepts and perspectives”) with the results obtained from the analyses of national media discourses on terrorism in EU countries for Deliverable 2 (“The evolving threat of terrorism in policymaking and media discourse”), and to further complement these results with qualitative research.

Using quantitative PARANOID outcomes (Deliverable 2), we identified the main trends in the media discourse on terrorism in order to better understand the underlying security issues, based on the assumption that the media mirrors the political and social discourses of the day and so serves to reflect political and social perceptions of terrorism. By pinpointing the main trends in the media’s coverage of terrorism in the sample countries, we tried to identify avenues where theoretical knowledge has - or has not - been incorporated into policy discourses and how they have been represented in the media. This was our main objective.

Following 9/11, terrorism became a major global security concern, and this is reflected in the European media discourse on the subject. We identified the main aspects of this discourse, contextualized it and compared it to new theoretical developments in the academic field.

The aim of this study, as stated above, has been to determine whether the discourse on terrorism found in different European countries reflects new conceptions and dimensions of security (referring primarily to the matter of terrorism) as analyzed in Deliverable 1. This deliverable studied the nature of security and how its conception has evolved since the end of the Cold War, identifying three important aspects: new dimensions of security; the central role of the state as the main security actor; and the emergence of transnational terrorism as a security issue.

In relation to the new dimensions of security, we sought to determine whether terrorism features on the different states' security agendas and in the discourses of the main political powers. We also analyzed whether military and judicial issues in relation to terrorism have been discussed in the media and assessed whether media discourses have tended to reflect a classical understanding of security, in which military considerations constitute the core element, or whether new, non-military security dimensions have also been a feature. To this end, we focused our work on the security agenda of each state to determine whether terrorism is present and consider the way in which it is framed.

A second aspect of the new conceptualization of terrorism, according to Deliverable 1, is the centrality of the state as the principal security actor. This aspect has been analyzed by comparing whether the media discourse on terrorism has been considered in national terms (classical approach) or in European terms (beyond the nation-state paradigm).

Finally, the extent to which transnational terrorism has emerged as the main post-Cold War security threat in a post-9/11 world has been gauged by what we have described as "the sense of urgency vis-à-vis this phenomenon" as it is reflected in the media. We sought to identify whether terrorism is considered a threat by the media and, if so, whether it has been reported as a primarily national or international issue.

All of these elements have been combined in this deliverable in order to analyze and identify gaps in security discourses in relation to terrorism. Our intention is to determine whether new conceptions and dimensions of security are reflected throughout the European media and the policy discourses of each state, or whether they are largely absent. Using the detailed information about the media discourse on terrorism obtained in Deliverable 2 (complemented with qualitative information) and the theoretical findings of Deliverable 1, we intended to determine whether theoretical developments in this field were reflected in the media when they refer to terrorism as a security threat.

This study is based on a country-by-country approach in order to reach both specific (state level) and general conclusions (European level or cross-country analysis). 11 European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have been analyzed and three Quick Scans (Australia, Canada and the United States) have also been carried out.

Terrorism features prominently on the security agendas of some states (such as Spain, the United Kingdom or France), while in others (such as Portugal, Sweden or the Czech Republic), it is a peripheral issue. In some European countries, the military dimension has considerable impact on the framework of counterterrorism policy (for example, in the United Kingdom), while the legal approach constitutes the basis for other national counterterrorism policies (for example, in Spain). There are states that treat terrorism as a national issue (Spain, The Netherlands and France, among others), while others (including Italy, Portugal and Poland) deem it to be a transnational issue.

It is thus clear that terrorism is a complex policy phenomenon in Europe and so a simple, monolithic approach to the topic would be insufficient.

CZECH REPUBLIC

This section discusses the perception of terrorism in the Czech Republic, according to the framework developed in the deliverable 1 of the TTSRL project. In particular, the dimensions of security, the centrality of the state, and the transnationality in terrorism perception will be analyzed. In answering the questions, both quantitative (TTSRL deliverable 2) as well as qualitative research methods are used.

Dimensions of security

Terrorism has not been elevated into the realm of the securitized issues in the Czech Republic (TTSRL, 2007: 44). Documents produced by the government and related bodies, however, address terrorism extensively and regard it as a serious threat. Indeed, the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic of 2003, the basic document for all Czech security policy-making, considers international terrorism together with WMD proliferation 'the most serious threats of the present' (Government of the Czech Republic 2003: 2). It is argued that terrorism and counterterrorism prove the interconnectedness of internal and external security in today's world and require a complex approach (Ibid.: 5). Accordingly, the updated National Action Plan for the Fight Against Terrorism, adopted by the Government in February 2008, expects a number of ministries and state agencies to take part in counterterrorism, including the ministry of defense, interior or justice (Government of the Czech Republic, 2008). However, it is the ministry of interior, which has been tasked with the co-ordination of the state action. We can therefore argue that although seen as a complex issue, terrorism remains a primarily internal security threat from the Czech Government's point of view.

The media debate, however, has connected terrorism predominantly with military (external security), instead of the rights/law (internal security), as the quantitative research in the framework of TTSRL revealed (TTSRL 2008: 51). This was the case in all the years analyzed with the only exception of 1999. The difference between the Government's approach and the media reflection can be explained by the absent securitization of

terrorism in the Czech society. Whereas the Government takes the steps necessary to prevent a possible terrorist attack on the Czech territory, the society does not consider such threat as serious enough and focuses on the war on terror abroad. This war is being conducted in Afghanistan and in Iraq with military means, thus explaining the media context of the terrorism debate.

Centrality of the state

Counterterrorism in the Czech Republic is almost entirely a centralized state-governed and state-conducted issue. The National Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism (Government of the Czech Republic, 2008) sets down a number of concrete measures, but the overwhelming majority of them are tasks for state authorities. In some policies, the assistance of regional and local authorities is required, such as in preventing radicalization of immigrant communities or in drafting emergency plans. The private sector does not play any significant role in the Czech counterterrorism, with the only exception being the critical infrastructure protection where the co-operation of the critical infrastructure operators is indispensable.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

As already noted, terrorism does not belong among securitized topics in the Czech Republic. With no major terrorist attack on the Czech territory so far, the issue does attract much attention neither among the population nor, consequently, among the political parties, as an analysis of their program documents suggests (cf. ODS, 2006; ČSSD, 2006; KDU-ČSL, 2006; Strana zelených, 2006; KSČM, 2006).

In the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, the Government made clear that it is the 'international terrorism' (Government of the Czech Republic, 2003: 6) that poses a threat to the Czech security and which should be fought as a matter of Czech strategic interests. Similarly, international co-operation constitutes one of four major sections of the Czech national counterterrorism action plan (Government of the Czech Republic, 2008).

The media discourse reflects the perception of terrorism as an international issue. As the quantitative analysis revealed, terrorism has been framed as a 'European' rather than a 'national' issue in all years observed (TTSRL, 2008: 52).

Conclusion

Comparatively low level of securitization of terrorism in the Czech Republic explains much of the findings of this analysis. Terrorism is regarded as an international issue by the Czechs, which leaves the Government fully in charge, shapes the debate towards external security problems and tools, and discourages political parties to address it more thoroughly in their programs. Although the Government pursues all paths to counter terrorism, such adopting judicial or internal security measures, this does not show up in the public discourse, which is preoccupied with the external dimension of the phenomenon.

DENMARK

Like its neighbor Sweden, Denmark has, generally, had very little experience with terrorism. Until recently, Denmark had historically only had experiences with terrorism where Denmark was the scene of the act but not the target of it – in 1985 three bombs directed against American and Israeli interests exploded in Copenhagen. Nonetheless, Denmark has since a total of four terror-cases since 2005. These cases represent an entirely new set of challenges for Denmark, a country whose security perceptions like most of the rest of Europe's until the early 1990's were closely linked to the dynamics of the Cold War.

Dimensions of security

After 9/11 and the subsequent Framework Decision by the EU, however, changes in Danish legislation with regards to counterterrorism were initiated. In 2002 the first version of a new and stricter law on terrorism, which became known as the 'terrorism packet', was presented by the Danish government. On the basis of these suggestions and a 2005 task group report, final suggestions for changes in Danish law in order to counter terrorism were passed in June 2006 (Vestergaard, 2006). The new law allowed the two Danish security services – PET (police intelligence services) and FE (defense intelligence services) – to communicate with each other and exchange information relevant to counterterrorism, which was not possible prior to the passing.

9/11 and the subsequent changes in EU cooperation on terror was also the starting point of a major change in the Danish perception of the threat of terrorism. Only months later, and after a change of government in late 2001, Denmark decided to take part in the 'war on terrorism' in Afghanistan. Later Denmark joined the US-led coalition in Iraq in March 2003. Overall, Denmark regards it self as an activist country with regards to international cooperation on security matters and has signed and ratified all major international treaties concerning counterterrorism.

As regards the sense of urgency vis-à-vis the phenomenon of terrorism in Danish media discourse, it was profoundly elevated, but also peaked in the years following the attacks in New York and Washington on 9/11. However, after the initial effects wore off, the sense of urgency found a level considerably higher than before 2001. And even though the focus on terrorism in relation to Denmark has increased in the years after 2001 and there has been an increase in the focus on and feeling of urgency in relation to terrorism, terrorism is still primarily reported on as foreign news in the Danish media debate. This possibly stems from the Danish 'cartoon crisis', where events to a large extent took place outside Denmark, and from the first Danish cases related to charges on terrorism, where the alleged links to al-Qaida was at the forefront of the cases.

Centrality of the state

Concerning the discussion in Danish media discourse related to judicial issues and/or legal texts, this has generally not received much attention in the period analyzed according to PARANOID. However, in 2002 and 2005 discussions of judicial issues in relation to terrorism received heightened attention in Danish media according to the PARANOID results which analyzed the use of the term 'law' in articles related to terrorism. This increase was probably caused by the introduction of the first suggestions for changes to Danish legislation in relation to terrorism in 2002 and the first arrests related to terrorism in Denmark and possibly also the London bombings in 2005.

Finally, PARANOID results seem to indicate that a general increase of the term 'government' is visible in Danish media discourse from 2000 onwards and particularly after 2002. This increase might be explained by the debate about the war in Iraq, where the Danish government for apparent reasons played a central role, as well as by the bombings in Madrid and London.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

As regards the debate in Danish media on terrorism, the PARANOID results of deliverable 2 seem to indicate that terrorism mostly has been discussed in military terms in Danish media from 2001 until 2005. The Danish

involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq may explain the focus on military matters in relation to terrorism until 2005. Further, the fact that Denmark, until 2005 had had no experiences with terrorism directed towards Danish soil, could also be a viable explanation. 2005 saw the first Danish cases related to terrorism and these cases as well as the terrorist bombings in London may have served to draw attention towards the risk of terrorism coming from within Denmark rather than from outside. This change could be the cause of a decrease in the focus on military responses and a focus on other responses since military responses are generally not accepted as a response to threats coming from within the Danish society.

Conclusions derived from deliverable 2 indicate that terrorism is discussed as much in relation to Denmark as in relation to the EU. In the years immediately after September 11 the focus seemed to be tilting slightly towards the EU in the Danish media debate, which could be caused by an aspiration in Denmark for international cooperation on the issue of terrorism. From 2005 onwards, however, the discourse shifted and focused more on Denmark and less on the EU. This change is likely to have been caused by the first Danish court cases related to terrorism that year.

FRANCE

The French government has been familiar with terrorist attacks for several decades. The anti-colonial violence of the 1950s marked a significant take-off in this field, whereas the presence of small, but self-conscious ethnic minorities within its borders formed an important premise for the emergence of separatist groups, who did not eschew the use of violence. Basques, Bretons and Corsicans were each involved in some sort of terrorist action throughout the years. In the 1970s separatist terrorism was accompanied by other forms, who sought their motivations in Marxism-Leninism. The religious terrorism of the current era has also struck on French soil.

This section will base itself on the findings of deliverable 1 and the quantitative and qualitative research results in deliverable 2. The following lines will be discussed: dimensions of security, centrality of the state and the role of transnational terrorism as a security issue.

Dimensions of security

In the French case, Islamist terrorism is closely linked to the anti-colonial violence carried out by Algerian separatist movements. Although Algeria had gained independence in 1962, French influence on the country remained considerable. This is clearly visible in the support France lent to the Algerian secular regime in the beginning of the 1990s. As a result of this policy, the *Groupes Islamistes Armées* (GIA) combined its struggle for an Islamist Algeria with attacks on French soil (Cettina, 2005: 73-74).

Due to Al-Qaida's successful infiltration of the leadership of the GIA, France was the main European area of operation of the former in the 1990s (Gunaratna, 2002: 121). Currently, France regards Islamist terrorism as the country's largest terrorist threat (Archik et al., 2006: 9). Quantitative research results show that terrorism is framed in military terms after 2000. The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provide the main causes (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 79).

On the legal level, the French government still applies an anti-terrorism act from 1986, which created special judicial and police authorities and provided for the persecution of all terrorist acts (Block, 2005). Quantitative research shows that the concept of terrorism was especially coupled to rights in the 1990s, when both a Corsican separatist movement (FLNC) and the GIA were highly active. The fact that many suspects were arrested shortly after these attacks has contributed considerably to the link of terrorism with its judicial aspects. It is therefore that terrorism was often coupled with 'rights' in the 1990s (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 79).

Centrality of the state

France has been relatively successful in combating terrorism. In fact, its counterterrorism policies have been recognized as one of the most effective in Europe (O'Brien, 2005: 37; Block, 2005: 6). One of the key factors that have contributed to this efficiency is the fact that counterterrorism policy has always been conducted from a state level (Gregory, 2003: 143) as a logical consequence of France's centralized state model in general.

Another important factor has been the intensive international cooperation that evolved throughout the years. This reached its peak in the aftermath of 9/11, when France intensified its cooperation with both its EU-partners and NATO-allies. It also committed itself to an increased intelligence-sharing with neighboring states (Gregory, 2005: 140). As a result of a shared preoccupation with ETA-terrorism, France even went so far as to create a joint anti-terrorism investigation team with Spain, which permitted both countries to operate on each other's territory (Block 2005).

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

As mentioned in the previous section, France has shown a strong tendency to recognize the transnational nature of the current terrorist attacks. After 9/11 the government was even more inclined to improve its coordination with other possible target states. Apart from the aforementioned joint investigation team with Spain, an Alliance Base with the United States intensified the scale of international cooperation (Block 2005).

Nevertheless, quantitative research on media coverage of transnational terrorism presents a different situation. Although 9/11 and its immediate aftermath received the attention one might expect, given the seriousness of the attacks, the attacks in Madrid and London were attributed much less relevance in the articles. This could be due to the increasing urgency of domestic problems, especially the inflammable situation in the French *banlieus*. The fact remains, however, that quantitative research contradicts the results of its qualitative counterpart, by showing a country that has turned inward, instead of confirming the image of a country that increases international cooperation in order to combat terrorism (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 76, 77).

The results also show an increased attention for domestic terrorism, especially at those instants that a serious terrorist attack occurred abroad (Ibid.: 77, 78). An explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the fact that an internalization of external threats took place (Ibid.: 78). France may acknowledge the transnational character of terrorism, but directly relates its importance to its own domestic experiences with terrorism. The EU being underrepresented in media coverage on terrorism fits into this picture (Ibid.: 80).

Conclusion

France has had a long tradition of terrorism after the Second World War, due to its preoccupation with anti-colonial violence in the 1950s. Since the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the phenomenon has been increasingly linked to the military.

Its centralized state structure allowed the country to conduct a national counterterrorism policy, whereas it deliberately increased its cooperation with other states.

Quantitative research confirms the link with the military, but shows a more inward counterterrorism policy when it comes to international cooperation. This discrepancy can be explained by pointing out that France might have had a strong preference for international cooperation, but only in order to prevent a possible attack on its own soil.

GERMANY

German policy towards terrorism can be traced back to the turbulent 1970s, when the Federal Republic was plagued by numerous terrorist attacks carried out by the left-wing *Rote Armee Fraktion* (Red Army Faction, hereafter: RAF) and its sister organizations. This is the reason that a general counterterrorism script, taking into account the different forms of terrorism, has existed for several decades by now.

This particular section will mostly be based on the findings that have already been presented in the deliverables 1 and 2. The following aspects will be discussed below: dimensions of security, centrality of the state and, finally, a general overview on the nature and threat of transnational terrorism as a security issue and how Germany reacts to this. Most assessments are presented from a qualitative perspective, but quantitative research results will be used in addition to this.

Dimensions of security

As mentioned above, the emergence of radical left-wing terrorism in the 1970s formed a major incentive to the federal government to develop a counterterrorism strategy. When the attacks by the RAF became less frequent in the beginning of the 1990s, the necessity of such a strategy did not diminish; a series of attacks, carried out by right-wing organizations and individuals, kept the problem on the agenda. In 1992, the German government reported more than 800 attacks by these groups (Watts, 2001: 601). Since juvenile perpetrators were overrepresented, the authorities decided to combine repression with the creation of a number of pedagogical and social preventive programs for local youths (Malthaner and Waldmann, 2003: 121). The necessity to take such measures became especially clear in the *Länder* that had belonged to GDR territory prior to the German reunification. There might be a correlation between the hollow 'anti-fascist' rhetoric that had always been displayed by the GDR authorities and the abundance of incidents inspired by racism after 1989 (Melching, 2004: 310). Social concerns were clearly taken into account in the assessment of

countering terrorism, which in itself was considered as a serious threat to German security (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2006: 3).

After the attacks of 9/11, it is the threat of Islamist terrorism that dominates the security agenda. The measures that the federal government took involve the so-called *Rasterfahndung*, which implies the ability to search through and link different databases. Beforehand, a profile is created of pre-fixed terrorist. Then, this profile is applied to individuals that display its typical characteristics. *Rasterfahndung* was regularly used in the 1970s as a means to tackle terrorism from the RAF, and is currently used again against the Islamist threat. However, the method is controversial, because it immediately targets immigrants from Muslim countries as possible terrorists. Accusations of discrimination were the result. The fight against terrorism became interlinked with immigration- and integration-related issues (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 85, 86).

Quantitative research shows that the military is occasionally linked to terrorism, especially when terrorist violence abroad (the attacks in Dar-as-Salam and Nairobi in 1998 and the attacks of 9/11) provides incentives for such a linkage (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 89).

Centrality of the state

In this case the state is not the only actor in counterterrorism, since Germany has a federal state model and is a member of the EU. This membership has stimulated the German government to cooperate with several international organizations in order to combat terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, willingness to coordinate counterterrorism policy with other states increased even more (Katzenstein, 2003: 733). This eventually led to the first deployment of German troops since the Second World War in Afghanistan.

Alongside this strong tendency to international cooperation, Germany has also emphasized its domestic views on counterterrorism, which may differ from the view of other states. The Schröder administration held the view that war was less suitable for defeating global terrorist networks than

paying attention to the underlying social and economic causes of terrorism (Ibid.).

Due to Germany's federal structure, the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (Germany's main intelligence service) operates on a federal level, which means that there is one state agency alongside sixteen federal agencies. However, a joint coordination center under the ministry of the interior was established in order to develop a more national coordination (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 86).

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

Prior to 9/11, the German government did not have a particular preference to combat transnational Islamist terrorism. Although it paid considerable attention to attacks in the domestic field, from a left-wing and right-wing signature, transnational terrorism was relatively neglected (Malthaner and Waldmann, 2003: 123).

This attitude changed significantly after the attacks in New York and Washington. Especially Germany felt a strong urge to contribute to combating transnational terrorism, because the attacks of 9/11 had for a large part been prepared in Germany (Burleigh, 2008: 444). The attacks in Madrid and London increased the willingness to acknowledge the (often) transnational character of Islamist terrorism and to make a German contribution to its defeat. An attack on German soil is considered a likely possibility (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2006: 3). Although such an attack has not occurred yet, the death of 14 German tourists in Tunisia as a result of an attack on a synagogue, supported the statement that German citizens might be targeted as well, within or without Germany's borders (Malthaner and Waldmann, 2003: 116).

As a result of the altered international situation after 9/11, a new law was established, the New Terrorism Act (1 January 2002). This new law took the transnational nature of Islamist terrorism into account by preventing terrorists from entering Germany and by improving information exchange between different authorities (Linde et al., 2002: 66).

Quantitative research seems to reflect the results of its qualitative counterpart, because it also indicates an abrupt shift after 2001, when Islamist terrorism, previously designated as foreign news, was depicted as a domestic problem (TTSRL Deliverable 2: 88). From 1999 until 2004, terrorism was often framed in EU-terms as well (Ibid.: 90).

Conclusion

We can conclude that the fight against terrorism in Germany is linked with other political and social issues. Whereas right-wing terrorism is countered by focusing on the lack of adequate education (especially in the eastern *Länder*), Islamist terrorism is linked to migration-related problems. This is shown clearly in the collision between *Rasterfahndung* on the one hand, which targets immigrants beforehand, and the anti-discrimination laws that protect immigrants on the other.

Concerning the centrality of the state, we see a clear tendency to tackle terrorist attacks at a high level. This implies both a limitation of the independence of the several *Länder* on the national level and an increase in transnational cooperation, especially on the EU-level.

And even though international terrorism existed in Germany prior to 9/11, transnational terrorism as such is now regarded as a serious security issue. This emphasis on the transnational aspect of terrorism is also reflected in the results of quantitative research.

ITALY

Throughout the 70s and 80s, Italy faced a leftist terrorist campaign (the most important group was the "Red Brigades") and also had to deal with the ensuing reactions from right-wing and paramilitary groups. Italian counterterrorism institutions and laws were originally designed to deal with this particular form of terrorism, hence they needed to be modified and updated after the 9/11 attacks.

Dimensions of security

Terrorism is deemed to be a criminal offence in Italian legislation, which takes a classical approach towards terrorism as politically-motivated violence. However, terrorism does not feature on the Italian security agenda or in the political discourses of the main political powers.

As Italy has not suffered from any attack on its own soil, Italian CT policy is entirely preventative in nature. When discussing domestic terrorism, the Italian media tend to make special reference to the radicalization of Muslim immigrants and the problems involved in this process, thus lending support to the notion that the Italian media are generally more focused on domestic terrorism (and its relationships with organized crime groups) than on international terrorism.

In relation to the above, it may be argued that the perceptions of the media (and, consequently, social perceptions) differ from those of the official security forces. While Italian officials repeatedly insisted on the significance of the threat of international terrorism during 2004 and 2005, the results of our quantitative analysis based on PARANOID outcomes reflect a decrease in media attention on the issue. For example, Prime Minister Berlusconi publicly announced that Rome's airspace was closed over Christmas in 2003 due to the possibility of a terrorist attack, as the Italian authorities feared that an attack on the Vatican was highly probably at the time (see, for example, <http://www.borrull.org/s/noticia.php?id=25478&id2=1349>).

Aside from declarations of this kind, terrorism does not feature heavily on the Italian political agenda, for as we have stated above, it tends to be treated as a peripheral issue related to immigration and therefore comes under the remit of the police (Human Rights Watch, Letter to the Italian Government Regarding the Expulsion of Sami Ben Khemais Essid, 9 June 2008).

Centrality of the state

Like many European countries, Italy also had to deal with terrorism before 9/11, but it was terrorism of a different kind. Throughout the 60s and 70s, right-wing and left-wing groups were active, thus constituting a threat to the Italian security forces and society, and Italian legislation on terrorism was primarily intended to deal with this particular problem. After 9/11 and the Madrid attacks, major changes therefore needed to be made to adapt this framework to deal with international terrorism. Owing to its internal political situation after 9/11, Italy focused on increasing its level of cooperation with the United States in the international fight against terrorism, but sometimes this cooperation did not recognize basic guarantees and procedures (CIA flights).

As a consequence of the way in which the Italian institutional system is organized (the territory is divided into 20 regions and each region into a number of provinces), the security and intelligence system is highly centralized. There are no provincial or regional forces that deal with terrorism; the National Police and the "Carabinieri" (a militarized police) share law enforcement responsibilities (military forces do not have any anti-terrorism function in the Italian territory).

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

Italy was one of the European countries that supported the US in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not experienced transnational or Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks on their own soil. Italian troops were, however, attacked in Iraq from the beginning of the operations in 2003. From 2003 to 2006, 31 Italian soldiers and 7 civilians were killed in Iraq (http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2006/06_Giugno/05/scheda38.shtml).

From 2000 to 2005, terrorism was, to some extent, associated with the armed forces in Italy – a factor which could be explained by 9/11 and its global consequences, i.e., Italian participation in Afghanistan and Iraq. We cannot conclude that the Italian approach to terrorism is exclusively a military one, but the military dimension was undoubtedly important during those years. At the same time, however, proxy “rights” are also present in the PARANOID results, as are other proxies such as the “Law” and “Senate”. For the period analyzed, these proxies reflect the debates generated in the Italian legislative bodies in order to update the existing legal framework and develop new laws to bridge legislative gaps in relation to terrorism (for example, new legislation on the financing of terrorism), as well as the efforts made to reach an equilibrium between rights (such as privacy) and security (Privacy e sicurezza l'equilibrio possibile, GNOSIS n. 1 ottobre - dicembre 2004 (available at <http://www.sisde.it/Gnosis/Rivista1.nsf/ServNavig/13>)). Thus, Italian anti-terrorism policies were generally conceived of in the context of external and defense-related threats and perceived from a domestic rather than a European view throughout the period 2000-2004.

Conclusion

Our findings can be summarized as follows: terrorism is not an issue on the Italian political agenda, and our analysis of the impact of terrorism on the media indicates that the latter was influenced more profoundly by 9-11 than by the Madrid attacks in 2004 or the London attacks in 2005. Since no major terrorist attack took place on national territory, terrorism did not attract much attention and media attention was focused, rather, on the attacks suffered by Italian troops abroad (in Iraq and Afghanistan). In the Italian case, terrorism was mainly treated by the media throughout the period analyzed as a domestic issue, with particular importance being granted to the legal framework (and the ways in which it needed to be developed and updated). The state also included military power as a potential tool to fight terrorism.

THE NETHERLANDS

As has been noted, the Dutch policy in the field of counterterrorism has changed markedly over the last couple of years, following the adoption of the EU Framework Decision of June 2002. This section will explore what areas or venues should still be included in the present debate and development of security discourse in order to offer a balanced view. This section will base itself on the findings of deliverable 1, and the qualitative and quantitative research results on the Netherlands contained in deliverable 2. The following lines will be discussed: dimensions of security, centrality of the state, and finally a general overview on the nature and threat of transnational terrorism as a security issue.

Dimensions of security

In the context of the fight against terrorism, this section will look at what other dimensions of security have been included in the debate. Questions that arise are whether judicial and social concerns for instance, have also been taken into account in the assessment of countering terrorism while providing security. In this aspect, the research results for the Netherlands differ in terms of qualitative and quantitative assessments.

Studying governmental sources such as AIVD publications (BVD, 2001; AIVD, 2006) and governmental plans of action (Higher Chambers 2003/2004) it would appear that the government focuses on security in the broad sense. When this is taken in combination with the quantitative research results, a clear focus on the military in the years 2001, 2005 and 2006 can be seen. Rights in the assessment of counterterrorism only show in 2004 and even then, these results are still lower than the emphasis put on military rights.

Regarding the issue of terrorism being one of the many threats to security, amongst which could also be included environmental and immigration issues (Notions of Security, 2007: 35-37), only qualitative analysis took place. The AIVD stated that the Islamist terrorist threat 'will

continue to dominate the security agenda of the national and international political arena during the next few years' (AIVD, 2006: 55). Yet, this statement only pertains to the political arena and when analyzing the organizational implementation of threat assessments, it is clear to see that the Dutch government focuses on other threats as well (see for instance: Dutch program on National Security).

Centrality of the state

In contemporary society, the Dutch state is not the only actor in the security domain. Other players include several international organizations and institutions, such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as local players and individuals. In the context of terrorism and counterterrorism, the Dutch government and most other political actors have rightly emphasized this component (see for instance: NCTB, Nederland tegen terrorisme, national campaign against terrorism). In terms of international cooperation, the results will be more elaborately discussed in section 10.3, but regarding the inclusion of other national and local actors, this has clearly been contained within Dutch counterterrorism policy.

Two concrete examples of this are the public-private partnership institution for critical infrastructure protection (See TTSRL, Deliverable 9 on Protecting European Vulnerabilities) and the attention given to the development of programs for teachers and other educational facilities in order to recognize radicalization (Dutch government: Programma eerstelijns medewerkers). Both initiatives open the development and creation of providing security by more and other players than the state and governmental agencies. Unfortunately, no assessment from a quantitative perspective can be given, as this question could not adequately be assessed.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

When overseeing the national debate on transnational terrorism, it is clear that a sense of urgency for the terrorist threat originated from the attacks on September 11, 2001 (Dutch government: *Actieplan Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*). This was further exacerbated by the

attacks on Madrid and London (AIVD, 2006: 51). The quantitative research results do not, however, fully support this statement, as the only year where threat was significantly increased appears to be 2006.

It is to be expected that a fight against transnational terrorism would require international cooperation and thus the aforementioned emphasis on international organizations in order to regulate this. Qualitative analysis shows that the Dutch government pays attention to this international aspect, in the form of mentioning it in governmental plans of action (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2006). In letters to Parliament by the government the actions of counterterrorism in international context are separately detailed (Look up number and quote sources). It should be noted that these letters usually detail the actions of Dutch military forces in Afghanistan or elsewhere outside the Netherlands, and that the European actions against terrorism are usually contained within the letters discussing national counterterrorism efforts (see for instance introduction of Law on Terrorist Crimes which makes explicit mention of the EU FD of June 2002).

Unfortunately, the quantitative analyses do not support this qualitative assessment. The quantitative results show an emphasis on this debate in relation to the EU only in 2000 and 2001, so before the introduction of specific national legislation or action plans. From 2003 onwards, a very small, yet growing number of articles is related to the EU.

Conclusion

In the Netherlands, the changing aspects in the policy discourse on security and the attention of the media for the concept of terrorism and how this has been reported, appear to be reasonably balanced. Even though at times qualitative and quantitative research results appear to contradict each other, this is not the case. Especially when taken in conjunction with the findings of deliverable 1, the case of the Netherlands appears to be fairly balanced. Following both the academic as well as political debate and discourse, with certain areas open for exploitation by politicians. These opportunities for politicians do not appear to have massively affected the policy in the sense that other threats were overlooked. If anything, from the research results stated above, the Netherlands appears to have attempted a

broad approach in terms of conceptualization of security. This meant that it has focused on other threats than terrorism alone. Additionally, the Netherlands appears quite aware of the fact that multiple players of various sorts, both at the local and the international level, are needed for an effective fight against terrorism.

POLAND

This section discusses the perception of terrorism in Poland, according to the framework developed in deliverable 1 of the TTSRL project. In particular, the dimensions of security, the centrality of the state, and the transnationality in terrorism perception are analyzed. The analysis is based on the comparison between quantitative and qualitative research results.

Dimensions of security

While not very pronounced before, terrorism became one of the most important security threats in the Polish National Security Strategy of 2003. The strategy argued that Poland was directly facing this risk as a member of the Euro-Atlantic community (Government of the Republic of Poland, 2003). The newest strategy of 2007 continues to label terrorism as a 'threat to Europe, including also to Poland' (Government of the Republic of Poland, 2007: 9). Terrorism is seen as a multifaceted phenomenon that shall be fought with various tools. It is mentioned almost 30 times in the National Security Strategy, in literally all contexts: national defense, internal affairs, external relations, intelligence, public administration, justice, financial matters, transportation, or health (Government of the Republic of Poland, 2007). This broad range of ways to tackle terrorism is not, however, reflected in the media debate in Poland. According to the quantitative research conducted in the framework of the TTSRL project, terrorism is connected to rights/law rather than to military in the media (TTSRL, 2008: 142). This disproportion is difficult to explain, especially in the light of Polish participation in the operation Iraqi Freedom and Polish presence in Iraq. A plausible explanation might be offered by taking into account the name of one of the strongest political parties (Law and Justice, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość), which may have distorted the results.

Centrality of the state

Polish counterterrorism policy has been dispersed among many state bodies and agencies. The Inter-Departmental Centre for Combating Organized Crime and International Terrorism established in 2002 did not change much in this respect. Sub-state actors do not take part in Polish counterterrorism

- a public-private partnership is expected in critical infrastructure protection, but the plans have not been drafted (National Security Office, 2008).

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

The National Security Strategy of Poland addresses terrorism overwhelmingly as an international phenomenon. The strategy recognizes the threat of terrorism as an external problem, which is currently urgent not least because of the Polish involvement in the anti-terrorist campaign (Government of the Republic of Poland, 2007: 9). The internal effect of the external events is not seen as pressing by the political parties, though. Among the main Polish political parties, only several mention terrorism in their 2007 programs at all (cf. LiD, 2007; PiS, 2007; PO, 2007; PSL, 2007). And even among those that do, only the Civic Platform has conceded that it is not possible to rule out attacks on Polish soil (PO, 2007: 81). For the rest, terrorism is at most an abstract international threat that is good to mention, but not necessary to elaborate upon (cf. PiS, 2007: 9).

The quantitative analysis reveals that when comparing the context of the Polish media debate on terrorism, the national dimension always overrides the European framework. This can be explained by the attention paid to the Polish participation in Iraq. Therefore, it can be interpreted neither as a contradiction to the low profile of counterterrorism in Polish parties' programs, nor as an evidence of a Polish concentration on Poland-based terrorism.

Conclusion

Our analysis has revealed a mixed record of terrorism-related debates in Poland. Whereas the Government regards terrorism as a multifaceted phenomenon, which should be addressed by almost all components of the state power, political parties do not pay much attention to it. An analysis of the media shows out confusing results that cannot be easily interpreted without further research. In conclusion, we can argue that terrorism does not belong to securitized issues in Poland, but it plays an important role in Government's deliberations at the same time.

PORTUGAL

Even though Portugal faced certain problems regarding terrorism in the 1970s, public perception before 9/11 was that terrorism did not feature on Portugal's political agenda. After 9/11, the government made a considerable effort to develop a legal structure to counterterrorism and, as this structure was almost non-existent prior to 2001, new laws were developed and based on EU parameters.

Dimensions of security

As terrorism was not perceived as a real danger in Portugal before 9/11 and the country lacked a comprehensive legal framework for anti-terrorism measures, the increased focus on terrorism after 9/11 did not entail a need to update Portuguese laws to meet the new security threat, but rather to establish an almost completely new framework.

After 9/11, as in other European countries, terrorism became a key issue on the security agenda. The bombings in Madrid also had an impact on Portugal in this regard, but in comparison with other European countries, the attacks on the US influenced Portugal to a greater degree than those on European soil. Our analysis indicates that, as a result, the Portuguese media accepted the idea that terrorism is an international as well as a domestic threat. Nevertheless, terrorism was not the most important issue on the security agenda.

Centrality of the state

Over the last five years, Portugal has had to face two new terrorist challenges, the first being that of ETA's terrorist activities, as the Basque group has used Portugal to carry out various operations that they have been unable to perform in Spain (such as renting cars that were later used in bomb attacks in Spain). The second challenge has been to address the need to prevent Islamic-inspired terrorist activities in Portugal, which have been a growing danger since the Madrid attacks.

According to SIS (Security and Information Service), the main Portuguese Intelligence agency, there has been an increase in Islamic-

inspired terrorist activities in Portugal over the last five years, and security measures have therefore been taken (Grupos terroristas islámicos aumentaron su actividad en Portugal durante 2005, <http://cyberterrorism.blogspot.com/2006/03/grupos-terroristas-islamicos-aumentaron.html>).

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

As in other countries, two approaches to the debate on how to fight terrorism were considered: the "legal" vs. the "military". The Portuguese case is very interesting in this regard. The importance of the legal approach was twofold: not only was attention focused on the need to pass new laws to develop a legal framework for counterterrorism, but also on the rights of the victims of terrorist attacks conducted in Portugal during the 1970s. As for the military approach, the Portuguese participation in international operations (Afghanistan and Iraq) and the internal tasks given to the military were reflected in the strong presence of this particular proxy (the military) throughout the period analyzed.

Conclusion

In the Portuguese case, terrorism does not occupy a central place in the media discourse because Portuguese society does not currently consider terrorism a threat to its system. One of the assumptions of our study is that the media reflects social concerns and perceptions, and the analysis of Portugal seems to confirm this, as is reflected in the PARANOID outcomes, where terrorism is almost absent before 9/11.

SPAIN

Spain has had to deal with terrorism over the past 30 years and the threat of separatist ethno-nationalistic terrorism is very central to the Spanish perception of security. Consequently, terrorism and the policy options available to address it constitute one of the most important issues on the Spanish political agenda. What is more, the Madrid attacks in 2004 marked a turning point for Spanish counterterrorism policy, widening its scope to incorporate not only domestic, separatist terrorism, but also transnational, Islamic-inspired terrorism.

Dimensions of security

The Spanish experience with ETA and the consequences of the Madrid attacks served to put terrorism at the top of the security agenda, as confirmed by the PARANOID outcomes, which indicate the Spanish media's degree of interest in and sense of urgency with regard to terrorism. This is clearly true for the whole period analyzed, though it is necessary to differentiate between two time frames, the first of which runs from 1997 to 2003, when ethno-nationalistic terrorism was the main concern, and the second from 2004 to 2006, when Islamic terrorism became the main security issue. Just after 9/11, the Spanish media reflected the increasing attention paid to international Islamic-inspired terrorism, as in many other countries.

The results of our quantitative analysis show the prominent status in media discourses of proxies such as the "Law" and "Congress", thus reflecting the legal approach that was developed in Spain to fight terrorism. Parliament members and officials from political parties often appear in the media discussing national counterterrorism policy, which is also reflected in the PARANOID outcomes, as stated above.

In 2004, the Atocha terrorist attacks in Madrid served to draw attention to the transnational face of terrorism, particularly Islamic jihadist terrorism, and the media reflected this change. Spain implemented many measures to modify its ETA-oriented counterterrorism policy to address

Islamic-inspired terrorism too. Not only were new laws passed and international cooperation improved, but the security system also established new branches devoted to jihadist terrorism.

The near absence of the “military” proxy in the results stems from the fact that the military approach was never emphasized in Spain. On the contrary, a legal approach was developed and followed up. Spain supported the war in Iraq and sent troops that were withdrawn by Prime Minister Zapatero after he won the March 2004 elections because his party established a relationship between the Spanish involvement in Iraq and the Madrid attacks. The al-Qaida leadership alluded on many occasions to the fact that Spain is the main target of this jihadist movement because “Al Andalus” was once an Islamic territory and the jihadists therefore see it as their responsibility to re-conquer it. As we can see, the terrorist threat exists independently of the Spanish involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Centrality of the state

Even though the Spanish political system has a high degree of decentralization (national level, autonomic level, provincial level and local level), the security and intelligence systems do not reflect the same pattern. The National Police and the Guardia Civil are the main security forces that deal with terrorism issues (gathering intelligence and conducting law enforcement operations). These forces are part of the Ministry of the Interior, the main antiterrorist institution in Spain.

One of the main antiterrorism problems after 2004 was how to include jihadist specialists to fill the existing institutional gap, as since the main terrorist threat had been ETA, there were not many Islamic specialists or Arabic speakers working on the security apparatus. A considerable effort was made to develop this area over that period. The National Intelligence Center (CNI – Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) was also reorganized according to these lines.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

From our analysis, we can also conclude that terrorism was treated as a national or internal problem up until 2003. In 2003, Spain supported the US

intervention in Iraq and Spanish troops also participated in operations in Afghanistan, so the national framework evolved into an international one.

However, there was a drastic change in March 2004 when an Islamic-inspired terrorist attack caused 191 deaths in Atocha Central train station. As a consequence, important changes were made to the security and intelligence systems and Basque terrorism was put to one side throughout that period. The Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista (National Counterterrorism Coordination Center) was established to centralize and analyze information gathered by different national and autonomic security institutions, and the level of cooperation between Spain and some Arab countries (mainly Morocco) was improved.

Conclusion

Having analyzed the main characteristics of Spanish media discourse on terrorism, we can conclude that terrorism is a central issue on Spain's political agenda. Until 2004, the focus was mainly on ethno-nationalistic terrorism, but from then on, the crucial concern became Islamic-inspired terrorism. Spanish CT policy is mainly based on a legal approach which has a significant impact on parliamentary discussions; the EU's impact on this issue is primarily related to the efforts made by Spain to adapt its legal framework to the European one.

SWEDEN

Dimensions of security

Sweden has had very few experiences with terrorism. The experiences they have had have largely been due to conflicts between non-Swedish groups who carried out attacks against each other on Swedish soil. Two such cases took place in 1971 and 1972, the murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador and the hijacking of a domestic airplane by Croat activists. These events had a direct effect on Swedish legislation. Thus, in 1973 the parliament passed a law, which was made permanent in 1975, that facilitated the expelling of foreign citizens and refusing of admission into Sweden in case of suspicion or presumption of connections to terrorism. As such, since 1973 Sweden has had law aimed at protecting Sweden against political terrorism.

These developments entailed that the emphasis on terrorism as a security issue increased during the 1970's, but it later declined again. However, as in most other countries, a major change in focus arose in Sweden after September 11 2001. The attacks had a major impact on policy-making and threat perception in Sweden.

Centrality of the state

Sweden does not have a National Counterterrorism Policy and Swedish responses to terrorism have, primarily, been focused at avoiding that the country became a safe haven for terrorist groups. As such, Sweden has also increasingly transferred the formulation of policies on counterterrorism from the national level to the international level. In this sense, it seems clear that international cooperation is considered an important aspect of counterterrorism in the case of Sweden.

As regards the sense of urgency vis-à-vis the phenomenon of terrorism in Swedish media discourse, it was profoundly elevated, but also peaked in the years following the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11 2001. And, after the initial effects wore off, the feeling of urgency found a level considerably higher than before 2001.

In addition, it seems that terrorism in Sweden is still primarily reported on as foreign news. Thus, despite a brief elevation in the reporting

focusing on terrorism related to Sweden immediately after September 11, levels seem to be much the same as before 2001. This indicates that the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 did not affect the general focus in Swedish media discourse.

Concerning the debate in Swedish media on terrorism it is striking to what extent it seems to be discussed in military terms rather than judicial terms according to the PARANOID scans. This could be explained by the potential change from a 'criminal justice' to a 'war' model, as discussed above. It seems likely, however, that it could also be explained in relation to the fact that Sweden, unlike Denmark, has not had any experiences with terrorism since the early 1970's and that society, as a consequence, does not perceive terrorism as a threat directly to Sweden. This might entail that terrorism in Swedish media discourse, therefore, is perceived as a foreign affair to be solved through military means rather than judicial. For example, the strong presence of the term 'military' in articles related to terrorism in 2001, might be explained as a response to the US reactions in the aftermath of September 11 and the decision to go to war in Afghanistan.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

Conclusions derived from deliverable 1 and 2 also indicate that terrorism was discussed primarily in relation to the term 'Sweden' from 2001 through 2003, while from 2004 onwards the focus shifted and terrorism was discussed slightly more in relation to the term 'EU'. The change that occurs in 2004, when 'EU' becomes the dominant term, could be explained in relation to the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London 7/7 bombings in 2005 as well as by "The European Commission action paper in response to the terrorist attacks on Madrid", the publishing of which gave new attention to the EU as the primary actor in countering terrorism. Although these events did not have any direct effect on the Swedish debate on terrorism, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that they had an effect on how terrorism is framed in this specific context. The events in Madrid and London led to a greater focus on the risk of similar events occurring in other European countries. This, thus, led to greater focus on the individual country's own role in countering terrorism in some countries.

In Sweden, however, it is possible that the renewed awareness of the threat, instead, could have led to a greater emphasis on the need for more cooperation among the EU-countries. This might help explain the emphasis on the EU in Sweden after 2003 and underline Sweden's long time focus on countering terrorism in international terms rather than national terms.

Concerning the discussion in Swedish media discourse related to judicial issues and/or legal texts, this has, according to PARANOID, generally not received much attention in the period analyzed. However, in 2001 and 2002 discussions of judicial issues in relation to terrorism received heightened attention in Swedish media according to the PARANOID scans which analyzed the use of the term 'law' in articles related to terrorism. This increase in 2001 and 2002 might be explained as a reaction to the events of September 11 and a general increase in the focus on countering terrorism in the Swedish media debate.

Finally, turning to the presence of articles on terrorism related to governmental issues, PARANOID scans indicates that a general increase in the use of the term 'government' is evident in Swedish media discourse from 2001 onwards with the notable exception of 2003. This increase may be explained by the debate following September 11 2001 and the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.

UNITED KINGDOM

In the United Kingdom (UK) the debate on dealing with the consequences inherent to terrorism has changed after 9/11. Public and political debate on societal security became externally focused whereas before only domestic threats dominated the political security. This section will provide which areas should still be included in the present debate and development on security discourse in order to offer a balanced view. The sections below are based on the findings of deliverable 1, and the qualitative and quantitative research results on the United Kingdom contained in deliverable 2. The following issues will be discussed: dimensions of security, centrality of the state, and finally a general overview on the nature and threat of transnational terrorism as a security issue.

Dimensions on security

Historically the United Kingdom experienced various forms of political violence. For three decades the UK has been involved in the effort to suppress terrorism in Northern Ireland and its spill-over to the British mainland. The valuable experience gained in this struggle shaped a significant part of British anti-terror policymaking and its security perception (Chatham House 2005). In the context of combating terrorism this section will look at what other dimensions of security have been included in the debate.

Qualitative research shows that the security perception in the UK changed dramatically after September 11th, 2001 and especially after the attacks on the London subways in 2005. Previously, the focus was aimed at national separatist terrorist threats from the IRA. Preoccupied with internal affairs, the UK diverted attention away from international terrorism. 9/11 Changed this perspective. The UK government developed a broad and more externally based approach on combating terrorism. Taken in combination with quantitative research, a clear focus on the military in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 can be seen (see TTSRL Deliverable 1: 198). These statistics on countering terrorism show that rights are given less attention than the military. Moreover, the attention to rights appears to be absent in the year

2003. In contrast with this, after the attack on London this image changes. Studying the quantitative results learns that in the assessment significantly more attention is given to rights than to military in the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Regarding the issue of terrorism being one of the many threats to security, amongst which could also be included environmental, immigration and animal rights issues (Pearl 2006), only quantitative analysis took place. Official government documents show that although the threat is constantly changing, the security agenda will mainly be dominated by Islamist terrorist threats (HM Government, 2008).

Centrality of the state

In contemporary society, the UK is not the only actor in the security domain. Other players include several international organizations and institutions, such as the European Union. As mentioned, security threats to the UK were perceived as being mainly national separatist in character. But as it has become apparent that terrorist threats manifest themselves in transnational networks, unilateral counterterrorism appears to be ineffective. Internal consequences of terrorism became externalized through actors in the international security domain. The attacks on 9/11, and especially the terrorist attacks on London and Madrid generated a 'common security identity' (See TTSRL deliverable 1: 52). In terms of international cooperation the UK government participates in a bilateral cooperation with the US, the so-called Joint Contact Group (JCG). Established in June 2003, the JCG discusses issues of joint US and UK security including border protection, transportation security and scientific and technological advances related to security. In addition, the UK tightened the relations with other EU member states. European integration and cooperation included, for instance, harmonization of legislation, intelligence sharing and the protection of critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, no assessment from a quantitative perspective can be given as this question could not adequately be assessed.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

Overseeing the national debate on transnational terrorism, it is clear that a sense of urgency for external threats of terrorism originated from the

attacks on September 11, 2001 (HM Government 2006: 16). The 9/11 events appeared to be an impetus for moving UK legislation and police in relation to terrorism further from purely domestic concerns to a broader basis with international dimensions. This was further exacerbated by the attacks on London. A continuous increase in the number and powers of the successive counterterrorism laws indicate that the threat perception regarding national security was expanding beyond the scope of violence that related to the decades of national separatist terrorism. The quantitative research results seem to support this view to a certain extent. Statistics show that the years following 9/11 and the attack on London are the years where the perceived threat had significantly been increased (TTSRL Deliverable 1). Moreover, an interesting trend can be discovered. The attacks on New York, Washington, and London created an increased threat to domestic security perceptions in the subsequent years, in which the latter caused a relatively larger impact than the former on public security perceptions (TTSRL Deliverable 1: 198). This is also reflected by the agenda setting in the UK nowadays. As mentioned, the policy discourse remains to be dominated by the threat of transnational terrorism.

Conclusion

As can be seen, the UK has a tradition of terrorism dominating the political security agenda. The attention given by the media to the policy discourse on the perceived security seems to be balanced. Quantitative and qualitative research results give a fairly balanced view on the linkages between military activities, the emphasis on rights and the perceived threat in relation with security.

If anything, the research results show that the government attempted to conceptualize security in a broad sense, meaning that although terrorism dominates the agenda, focus has also been on other threats. In addition, as it has become apparent that transnational terrorism can only be fought effectively at the international political arena, initiatives have been implemented to cooperate with other international actors.

Quickscan: Australia, Canada, and the US

This section summarizes the discussion on terrorism and security in our three quickscan countries Australia, Canada, and the United States. We have explored the differences in the discussion within this group as well as positioned the general observations against the discourse in the EU member states. The structure of this section follows the following dimensions: dimensions of security, centrality of the state, and a general overview of transnational terrorism as a security issue. For the results, we have relied both on qualitative observations and the quantitative results from our textmining efforts.

Dimensions of security

Each of the countries in our quickscans have produced major national security strategy and underlying policy documents (Australia's National Security, A Defence Update 2007; Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy (2004); The National Security Strategy of the USA (2006). Each of these has an important focus on (counter)terrorism, although the Canadian approach tends to be much broader and all hazard than the others. At the same time, the intense focus on terrorism tend to decrease in each country to a certain extent.

From the quantitative results, there is reasonable ground for the assumption of a transatlantic gap in strategic thinking in the media. This gap is characterized by the highly militarized and securitized character of the discussion in the quickscan countries. The importance and prominence of the words 'threat', 'military', 'rights' and law reflect the differences between EU and the non-EU countries in the ways in which terrorism is framed. The most striking example is the difference in the salience of the word 'military' itself. In the discourses of all three quickscan countries, the word 'military' was more important than in the European countries, primarily because of their considerable military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The word 'threat', which we took as representing the extent to which terrorism was framed as a threat, confirmed this impression. Again, the orientation of the quickscan countries puts much more emphasis on a term

that implies a hostile framing of the phenomenon. The word 'threat' is much lower in the EU than in Australia, the United States and, less significantly, Canada. While the concept of 'threat' rises dramatically in the EU discourse in 2002, it is not significantly affected by later attacks on European soil.

The word 'rights', on the other hand, is relatively speaking more significant in the EU discourse. This is not to say that the term is more important in EU countries, but the emphasis on 'military' over both 'rights' and 'law' is overwhelming in Australia, Canada and the US and virtually non-existent in EU countries. These findings could be indicators of the fact that EU member states generally adopt 'softer' and broader approaches to security, which might be explained by the kind of terrorist threats these countries face.

Another notion that we can back up by our research result is the perception that Canada is more inclined to European thinking than the US. In the scores for 'military' and 'threat', Canada was somewhere between the US and Australia on the one hand and the European countries on the other. Also, the impact of 9/11 on the salience of terrorism in the Canadian media was about the same as in the European media.

A specific result derived from the analysis of the Australian and Canadian dataset is that the Australian media seem to be shifting the focus of their coverage from the military to the civilian side of counterterrorism and from the international to the national scene. The results for the US are an accurate reflection of the important terrorism-related news in the US over the last ten years.

Centrality of the state

Given the existence of the major security documents that are initiated at high levels of government in the three countries, the state as a central actor in dealing with terrorism comes clearly forward. At the same time, the pivotal role of private actors and organizations is also explicitly mentioned.

In US media coverage, 'government' is important ('Bush', 'President', 'administration'), although many other issues receive coverage equally intense. The Canadian and Australian discourses are focused more exclusively on governance. Terms related to governance get the highest

scores in all three countries, but the US media seem to divide their attention more evenly than their Canadian and the Australian counterparts.

The Canadian media discourse does score high on the term 'government'. This proxy does not necessarily refer to the Canadian government and is rather a proxy for governance. It is clear that Canada perceives terrorism as a policy challenge.

US media are more likely to value the role of the legislative. More so than Canadian and Australian media, they perceive terrorism as something involving the voice of the elected representatives. Perhaps this reflects the perception of terrorism as an American problem. This perception may be stronger in the US as are more likely to feel that they specifically are under attack. It is obvious that Canadian media do not consider their elected officials as very important in the fight against terrorism. This reflects aforementioned rather aloof stand that Canadians often takes vis-à-vis terrorism: it is not in the first place their parliamentarians who have to do something about it.

However, what we can say, is that Australian media are about as likely as Canadian media to discuss governments and terrorism in one article. This finding is not devoid of meaning. It suggests that both countries have a like tendency to discuss terrorism as something that involves a government, i.e. something that needs governing.

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

Two main observations can be distilled from the development of the discourse on terrorism in Australia, Canada, and the US over the past decade.

First, a clear awareness that terrorism is a transnational issue that needs to be tackled in the international arena. For example, Australia indicates that while the terrorist threat to its territory is very small, "terrorism that ignores borders and has no frontlines" does impact the Australian national interests and needs to be tackled.

Second, concomitantly with the first observation, there is a general shift in the discourse in the recent years that stresses the domestic components of the debate more so than the international aspect.

Finally, we should make some observations about what the analyzed discourses do not reflect. For instance, all three national discourses in our quickscan are virtually devoid of references to the European Union or even to Europe. The term 'European' has some results, but 'Brussels', 'Barroso', 'EU' and 'European Union' yielded no results at all. Also absent are references to the UN. 'Annan', 'Secretary General', 'General Assembly', 'UN' and 'United Nations' played no role at all in either of the discourses. 'Security Council' got only four scores between the three countries.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the analysis of the three dimensions identified above of terrorism as a security issue, and of their reflection in the media discourse on the subject, the following conclusions can be reached:

Dimensions of Security

The results of this part of the study confirm the conclusions of Deliverable 1 and Deliverable 2, namely, that 9/11 has proved to be a turning point and has had significant impact on the perceived threat of terrorism. After 9/11, terrorism became the main issue on the security agenda of European states.

One of the most interesting findings is that the two biggest European terrorist attacks (March 2004 in Madrid and July 2005 in London) did not generate a growing sense of urgency in European media discourses. No straightforward explanation can be given for this. Perhaps the setting of the European security agenda is excessively influenced by the US equivalent, and its sense of urgency stems primarily from there. Another possible explanation is that, following 9/11, terrorism had already become such an important issue that the attacks which followed in Europe did not constitute a real change in essence, which would explain why the media discourse remained unchanged. What is clear is that the attacks in the US were more important (in terms of the perceived threat) than the attacks which took place in Europe.

Once the problem had been identified, the next step was how to address it. In this regard, the media debate reflected two extreme positions: counterterrorism policies based mainly on military tools (an external security approach) or policies based on the development of a legal counterterrorism system (internal security approach). We are not talking about pure systems, but rather a combination of both approaches with one element prevailing over the other.

According to the PARANOID outcomes, the “transatlantic gap” is clear in the counterterrorism approach: The word “rights” plays a much greater part in the discourse within the EU, whereas it plays no substantial role in non-EU countries (Australia and the US), where a military-based discourse is much more important. Canada is more inclined to adopt the European way of thinking than that of the US.

Centrality of the state

If we understand the term “state” as a society’s central political institutional decision-maker, we can argue that a “new state” is currently emerging in European society: the European Union bodies are increasing their responsibilities in many fields such as economy and finance, society and culture, and security.

In this regard, based on the results obtained in this study, it can be argued that even though levels of international cooperation between EU member states are reaching new dimensions, we cannot assert that terrorism is a wholly European issue because each state intends to preserve its functions. To clarify, we are not pushing for a European approach if this is understood in terms of an absence of national responsibilities. What we are doing is, rather, trying to determine if the European institutions are taking on those responsibilities in the context of integration. Currently, the prerogatives and capabilities of member states are combined with those of Europe.

What is clear is that the “Euro-approach” seems to focus on a strategic level, establishing the general lines and defining the problem, such as the EU Counterterrorism Strategy (European Union, 2005) and Action Plan (European Council, 2007). Over the last seven years (after the attacks of 9/11), Europe has developed (or tried to develop) a common legal framework to aid counterterrorism, as well as establishing international cooperation mechanisms. At the same time, national legislations have been harmonized.

On the other hand, the member states (the classical approach) are the leading institutions in functional and operational fields because the new

European institutions are just beginning their work on those issues (for example EUROPOL or FRONTEX).

Transnational terrorism as a security issue

During the Cold War, security concepts were understood as pertaining to possible national threats, not transnational threats. In addition, the military component of such analyses was particularly important. From the results obtained, we can assert that this outlook is still pertinent in the sense that terrorism is still viewed mainly as a national threat and the military element remains important. Terrorism as a common threat with a transnational dimension is accepted in theoretical discourses, but is absent from those of the media.

To organize our findings, European countries can be divided into two groups: those countries where terrorism is largely considered an internal security issue (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and United Kingdom); and those where it is considered an external issue (The Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden).

Accepting that terrorism is an external issue does not mean that the transnational dimension of the problem is accepted as well. One of the important findings of Deliverable 1 was that policy perceptions of terrorism have also been moving away from state-based terrorism to transnational terrorist networks, but this is yet to be reflected in the discourse of the national media.

The quantitative results suggest that those countries which view terrorism as an internal security issue tend to emphasize the “legal approach”, while those that see it as a foreign security matter emphasize the “military approach”. What we have identified is a trend, which does not mean that one approach excludes the other, but rather that a given country is more prone to developing policies in one of the two directions. Nevertheless, the two kinds of policies can coexist. In the Dutch case, for example, the Netherlands is facing a growing internal terrorist threat (after the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh and the activities of

jihadist cells) but, at the same time, measures have been taken to include the military in case of a terrorist attack. The same can be said of France.

Not all the countries that conceptualize terrorism as an internal issue have the same reasons for doing so. We have identified two cases: those countries that face extremist, separatist terrorist movements at home (Spain, France, The United Kingdom) on the one hand; and those, on the other, where internal Islamic-inspired terrorism has become the main security threat after 9/11. Russia is a special case because it faces an Islamic-inspired separatist movement in Chechnya.

The first kind of terrorism (separatist or ethno-nationalistic) is still the most important in Europe. According to EUROPOL's "TE-SAT: EU terrorism situation and trend report 2008", there were 583 terrorist attacks in 2007 (532 separatist attacks, 21 extreme radical left-wing attacks, 4 radical Islamist attacks).

Another important piece of data reveals that 88% of the terrorist attacks in Europe occurred in France and Spain, with Corsican and Basque terrorists largely responsible. In light of this, it is quite understandable that European policymakers generally approach terrorism as a domestic phenomenon that needs to be countered by police work and law enforcement (soft-approach) rather than by military means (hard-approach).

In those countries where terrorism is considered an internal issue, Parliament has a stronger presence in the media. This can be explained at least in part by two factors: first of all, when political parties put terrorism high on the agenda, it is reflected in the media mainly through parliamentary debates and briefings. Secondly, in the aftermath of 9/11, every European country made a considerable effort to update national counterterrorism legislation in line with EU standards, and the parliamentary debates which followed were reflected in the media.

In countries where terrorism is seen as a foreign security issue, the executive power has a stronger presence in the media than the legislative power (Parliament).

Countries which have been taking part in international military operations (in Afghanistan and Iraq) tend to consider terrorism as a security problem related to national defense and military issues (for example, Denmark, Italy, Poland and Portugal). There is some overlap in the cases of Spain and the UK because they face an internal terrorist threat but also participate in international operations.

It seems clear that every country views terrorism primarily as a national concern despite the adoption of EU norms and regulations relating to the matter, seeing it as an issue that must be dealt with at a national level using national tools. It is interesting to note that while terrorist organizations are evolving into transnational networks, governments continue fighting mainly at the national level.

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