



Euroterrorism

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1. INTRODUCTION

The current wave of international terrorism, involving transnational collaboration between groups that have different geographical and ideological origins, is not a new phenomenon. The transnational nature of terrorism has arguably always been a feature. Nevertheless, this study focuses solely on the period from the 1970s to the 1980s. This focus provides the opportunity to compare early and current (transnational) links between terrorist groups.

This study distinguishes between international and transnational terrorism. The former poses a threat to international peace and security: its perpetrators aim at causing international disturbance. With regard to the latter this feature does not necessarily apply, it merely defines the fact that one or more aspects of terrorism are crossing borders. Transnational terrorism is defined as terrorist acts 'that include perpetrators, victims, targets, or interests from two or more countries' (Enders and Sandler, 2006: 369). The phenomenon is discussed by many scholars who define the term in numerous ways. This case study focuses on a specific form of transnational terrorism in Europe in the 1970s and the 1980s or so-called "Euroterrorism". In general the term Euroterrorism describes a network of European terrorists working together in various ways and for different reasons. Different scholars refer to the following groups as being part of the Euroterrorism network: the *Irish Republican Army* (IRA)¹, from Spain the *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), the German *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF, also known as Baader-Meinhof group or -gang), the *Brigate Rosse* (BR) from Italy, the French *Action Directe* (AD), and from Belgium the *Cellules Communistes Combattantes* (CCC).

These groups acted both independently and in joint action with each other to achieve their goals and assure their existence (Jenkins, 2005: 124). According to Dartnell, an expert on the French AD, the Euroterrorism network becomes a nuisance to political Europe conducting bombing, kidnappings and other attacks in the mid 1980s: 'it is affecting the security of the western European countries greatly. The Euroterrorism network is made up of French, West German,

¹ In the 1960s the IRA split into the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Official IRA (usually named IRA). The PIRA used a more militant way to achieve its goals than the Official IRA. Martin states that '[t]he Provisionals became the most notorious armed Catholic dissident group' (Martin, 2003: 153-154). In this study only IRA is used but indicates the actions of both groups.

Spanish, Greek, Belgian and Portuguese terrorists who claim they fight against the materialization of the international proletarian society' (1995: 117 and 123).

1.1 Two strands: ETA/IRA and RAF/BR/AD/CCC

Literature studies and the *RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base* define two strands of transnational links within Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. These strands illustrate the effects that transnational terrorism in Europe can have.

The first strand contains the link between the Irish IRA and the ETA from the Spanish Basque region, both nationalist-separatist movements. They belong to the oldest terrorist organizations in Europe, according to Rapoport (2003: 37). The IRA and ETA are in origin groups with solely domestic territorial grievances – respectively the strife for independence from Great Britain, and the struggle for an independent Basque nation - and generally operate within their home countries. The fact that both also engage in transnational activities, for example supplying each other with weapons or financing, makes both organizations interesting and suitable for this study.

The second strand is the link between the RAF, the BR, the AD and the CCC. Over time, the RAF, the AD and the BR received support and assistance from, and even cooperated with the Belgian CCC, forming a wider European network than the IRA-ETA strand. This transnational link between RAF, BR, AD and CCC can be defined as a connection between leftist ideological organizations, in other words a connection based on ideological motivation. All four groups had leftist (revolutionary) ideologies and anti-American sympathies. They apply "New Left"² theories justifying terrorist acts committed by middle-class terrorists in prosperous democracies, and a nihilistic dissident activism, without a clear vision for the new post revolutionary society. The creation of this new society can be achieved by the adaptation of strategies of urban guerrilla warfare, like those used by Latin American rebels to provoke the democratic state and politicize the working class. (Martin, 2003: 150).

Based on a literature study the above-mentioned organizations belong to the Euroterrorism-network. It can also be derived from that literature study that

² The "New Left" groups of the 1960s and 1970s focused on social activism, while the earlier leftist movements' centre of attention traditionally was union activism (see e.g. Bendle, 2006: 12).

these terrorist organizations are strongly linked to one another.³ The connections between the terrorist organizations even within one strand can vary in frequency, goal, execution and motivation. Furthermore, these organizations have a rich transnational past, which makes them excellent examples to illustrate transnational relationships between terrorist groups.

1.2 Demarcations

Firstly, this case study focuses on the *links* between the organizations. Besides the brief description of the organizations in Annex I, a description of the organizations used is not provided for in this research.⁴ Secondly, literature has shown that some of the terrorist groups have connections with groups outside Europe. These connections are not discussed in depth in this case study. As the TTSRL objective is limited to European developments of terrorism and to preserve the quality of this case study, these links are only reflected upon in the figures in Annex III.

1.3 Methodology and theoretical approach

In short, it can be questioned whether increasing attention for transnational terrorism in Europe is justified. Arguably the threat of transnational terrorism has always been present, but manifestations of this can clearly be seen during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period it has been suggested that terrorists were implicitly forced to work together in order to achieve the clandestine goals they pursued. This argument is based upon the hypothesis that the logistical and practical aspects confronting terrorist organizations in that period would have led to their natural demise, were it not for the exchange in methods and best practices that took place by many terrorist organizations, in order to overcome these burdens. This study focuses on these specific relationships within Euroterrorism. Questions that rise are: Why do these transnational connections within Euroterrorism exist? What are the benefits of the specific connections? How do these connections arise and evolve? By investigating more thoroughly the nature and size of this cooperation, it is possible to test this hypothesis.

³ Dobson and Payne (1982: 222) even state that the close cooperation between the RAF and BR gave cause to allegations that they almost formed branches of the same organization.

A preliminary literature study and a quick scan of the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base have resulted in the methodology to focus on joint operations executed by two or more terrorist groups (a narrow explanation of transnational terrorism). The RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base shows that there are few incidents that can really be seen as joint operations between the groups of the Euroterrorism network. As there is a lack of other trustworthy sources, joint actions are not considered in this case study.

This case study is based on two approaches frequently used in terrorism studies: the three Rs and the distinction between hard and *soft* links. Desouza and Hengsen touches upon the theory of the three Rs for transnational terrorist cooperation by stating that 'Terrorist groups seldom operate in isolation as the economics of the situation [in which the groups find themselves] will not allow for strictly independent actions' (2007; 594). The three Rs include *Resources*, *Reciprocity* and *Reach* and are a terrorist group's limitation. *Resources* stand for means, *reciprocity* is exchanging ideas in an open and mutual way, and *reach* embodies effective, reliable, and like-minded contacts (Ibid.). Concerning the *reach*, the underlying thoughts on what these terrorist are trying to achieve are relevant. Means to accomplish terrorist attacks, like funds, technology, and knowledge, are scarce and therefore terrorists seek allies in order to be effective.

A second distinction is to be made between hard and soft links. Desouza and Hengsen state that '[p]revious studies have identified the following *hard* links between terrorist organizations: financial support, information sharing, coordinated activities, safe havens and sharing materials, resources, and/or personnel' (2007: 595). In other words, hard links are the most concrete features of collaboration between terrorist groups. *Soft* links between terrorists include shared ideologies and beliefs, opportunities and chances, and even media strategy. *Soft* links can more or less be defined as intangible while *hard* links are tangible. The following section further elaborates on the soft and hard links. These *hard* and *soft* links are addressed throughout the case study in order to discuss the levels of connections between the groups.

⁴ See for more information on the ETA and the IRA the TTSRL ETA and IRA case studies.

1.4 Overview of transnational connections

The transnational connections between the terrorist groups are complex. Within the distinction between hard and soft links various types of connections can be distinguished in different categories.

Soft links

Solidarity – This includes all actions that express solidarity with the cause or actions of another terrorist organization.

Ideology – This category contains the connection between different organizations with an ideological resemblance or an ideological influence.

Strategy – This category covers the overall strategy of a terrorist organization based on or influenced by another organization's strategy. It also contains strategy developed in conjunction with other organizations.

Media strategy – This category includes in particular the media strategy that terrorist organizations undertake together with another organization, under influence of, or as a tribute to that other organization.

Hard links

Alliance – This category contains all alliances through declarations (communiqués, statements etc.) of forming an alliance and in addition all declarations of the existence of an alliance, between two or more terrorist organizations.

Methods and tactics – This category describes the methods and tactics that organizations use based on or influenced by the methods and tactics of others. It can be closely linked to the category AOBO (see below). For example: hijacking airplanes.

Organizational assistance – This category includes providing the necessary logistics and supplies (other than weapons and finance) for another terrorist organization.

Joint attacks – This covers all the attacks and operations in which more than one terrorist organization participated.

Action on behalf of (AOBO) – This category covers all the actions that are conducted on behalf of another organization.

Training – All the trainings that are given or received by another organization fall into this category.

Protection – This category includes, for example, providing safe houses for other organizations.

Weapons – This category covers all the weapons that were distributed to or shared by other terrorist organizations. This includes for example the explosives stolen by CCC and used by CCC, RAF and AD.

Finance – This category includes the flow of money to other terrorist organizations.

Based on a literature study and the MIPT database it has been possible to draw a diagram of these soft and hard link categories between the two ideological strands of RAF, BR, AD and CCC, and IRA and ETA. This diagram (see Annex II) shows the transnational links between terrorist organizations on different categories. It gives a first superficial view of the phenomenon Euroterrorism and the complexity of the connections between the organizations. The diagram and its categories are the starting point of this case study. This study primarily searches for the connections of one or more of the organizations of the two strands of Euroterrorism. Other non-European groups entered the figures because of their connections with the Euroterrorism groups. The linkages between the non-European groups are also touched upon.

A second set of figures reflects the transnational connections of the organizations per organization (Annex III). In these figures connections outside Europe are also included. The connections between the various organizations are also listed in Annex I.

Both the diagram and the set of figures illustrate the complexity and large scale of the transnational connections between terrorist organizations in Europe during the 1970s and the 1980s. It is foreseeable that these figures are not even complete for some links and connections have been kept hidden and never been brought out in the open.

The most interesting and relevant connections between the organizations are described in more depth in the main part of this study.

1.5 Outline

After this introduction to the case study, the second chapter focuses on the discourse, the context and the historical background of Euroterrorism. It also touches upon the external factors found, namely the state sponsorship enabling

Euroterrorism to develop, and Carlos Marighella, the international terrorist who joined in attacks with organizations of the two strands. The third chapter gives an autopsy of Euroterrorism. This chapter consists of five sections. The chapter first describes the root and trigger causes. The second section gives examples of the most interesting soft and hard links found between the organizations. The third section presents the development or process of professionalization of the connections. The fourth section describes the responses to Euroterrorism. The fifth and last section addresses the factors of decline. The fourth chapter provides the conclusions of this case study.

2. EUROTERRORISM IN FOCUS

This section discusses the concept of Euroterrorism. It should be stressed here that some of the academic discourse refers to Euroterrorism solely as the cooperation between leftist terrorist groups that formed during the late 1960s and lasted on European soil throughout most of the 1970s and 80s (Karmon, 2005: 157). One should also take into account that much of the contemporary literature of that time pays more attention to the international aspect of terrorism, emphasizing and pointing for instance to the connection between European and non-European groups, such as the Japanese Red Army or the Palestinian group *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (PFLP) (see for instance Bowyer Bell, 1975). This section focuses on the transnational aspects between the organizations within the two strands of the Euroterrorism network. As a result, the section is structured chronologically along the lines of the academic debate.

2.1 Euroterrorism in Discourse

One of the first and foremost reactions shared among citizens, governments, and scholars alike is the remarkable shift from dialogue and compromise into brutal terrorist violence. Such violence was considered to only take place in societies that were less open and free than the European countries.⁵ Latin-America, for example, by that time had already experienced more than a decade of revolutionary violence, which some had termed guerrilla, while others had called it terrorism.

Conspiracy theories emerged on how and why the free and open societies of the European continent were under leftist attack. Since some of the leftist groups believed in one single world revolutionary organization (Bell, 1975: 74) and considering the powerful political presence of the Soviet Union in world politics, the (communist) Soviet Union was seen as the main instigator of all this violence, aided by Cuba, Communist China and Libya (Francis, 1978: 15)⁶. Thus,

⁵ It should be noted that dictators ruled until mid-1970s in Spain and Greece.

⁶ The reference mentions for instance the testimony of Dr. Brian Crozier, then Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict in London, who testified before the Senate International Security Subcommittee on May 14, 1975 stating "By far the greatest subversive center in the world is the U.S.S.R., which is tactfully supported by Eastern

in these preliminary reactions and analyses, the transnational aspect is mostly viewed as an ideological link, analyzed in combination with the facilitation by several state actors, the biggest catalyst of which is considered to be the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1970s, more attention within academia is paid to the transnational side of physical and technical assistance and cooperation between the Euroterrorism organizations (Russell *et al*, 1979: 7) although the flow of information is still seen as both a cause, a facilitator, and an instigator for terrorism (Sands Redlick, 1979). One could argue this to be of special interest and encouragement for those operating on European soil, since society there had become particularly connected with its own advanced technological settings for information gathering and dissemination. Thus presenting more possibilities for Euroterrorists to cooperate and learn from each other, sometimes by simply reading the newspapers.

Within the nexus of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there is a trend to accumulate all of the information printed during the 1970s, and as such, many more interesting transnational connections gain focus and attention. As such, it is noted that even without help – or interference – of state parties, many terrorist groups establish growing contacts amongst themselves for training facilities, and are even holding worldwide meetings (Mickolus, 1980: 57). The training is also noted for its high technical qualities and what appears to be unhindered continuance throughout the 1980s of state-sponsored terrorism, in which the Soviet Union for instance openly supported the IRA (Laqueur, 1987: 272). O’Sullivan summarizes the prevalent attitudes of the early 1980s as scholars overreacting to the phenomenon of terrorism as such in the 1970s going ‘to the opposite extreme and display a more blasé attitude in their assessment of its significance’ (O’Sullivan, 1986: 3). Increasing focus on the state-sponsored side of terrorism prevails in much literature, especially regarding the Euroterrorism concept. Laqueur notes that the attacks of almost all leftist Euroterrorism groups⁷ are clearly aimed against NATO, culminating in a meeting in Frankfurt in 1986 financed by the Libyan government and noted for its supportive manifestos of the murdering of American soldiers (Laqueur, 1987: 290). Interestingly though, he also notes ‘the emergence of contacts between the terrorist scene and the Green parties in West Germany, Austria and Switzerland’ as a potential

Europe, especially by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria....The U.S.S.R. spends enormous, but obviously incalculable sums, on subversion all over the world.”

⁷ Those included are: BR, RAF, AD, and CCC.

new threat of Euroterrorism (Ibid.), which in retrospect, fortunately, never fully materialized.

Retrospectively writing in the 1990s, scholars have also been able to make some poignant observations on the – sometimes substantially⁸ – differing governmental policies regarding the phenomenon of Euroterrorism, although as a result of the academic focus on the different organizations, not on the transnational ties, these studies often consisted of case-studies concluded with comparative insights (see for instance Della Porta, 1992). Through a combination of factors, such as the ending of some terrorist groups, the end of the Cold War and the opening of previously classified material – from Soviet as well as American side – even more room was offered to critically evaluate the past. Excellent examples of such a gathering of information can be found in *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations* by Alexander and Pluchinsky published in 1992 and *Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations* by Ely Karmon published in 2005, both of which examine all facets of cooperation one could think of. Both books effectively list a cumulative conclusion of ten levels on which cooperation existed, namely: “ideological alliances, propaganda, support, diplomatic assistance, geographic sanctuary, financial help, training, organizational assistance, intelligence, supply of weapons, and operations” (Alexander, 1992, 8). The division in levels makes it possible to differentiate between evidentiary connections and intangible connections. The categories in this case study overlap somewhat with the above mentioned levels.

Lastly one can say that the academic debate is very alike the contemporary debate on the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism. First, one is too shocked and surprised to analyze or comprehend the events within the context necessary for analyzing terrorist violence (Robison *et al*, 1995). This phase is followed by one in which the violence is analyzed by taking into account the context, yet still with various political tendencies, which are thus still likely to affect these analyses. The final stage of academic analysis is the most objective, critical and thorough, although it unfortunately seems to coincide with – or, as some would vehemently argue, only exclusively exists in regard to – the period when most of the threat has already subsided.

⁸ See for instance the counter-terrorism policies of the Netherlands *vis-à-vis* Germany during the 1970s and thereafter.

2.2 The context of Euroterrorism

This section contains the analysis of the historical background that influenced Euroterrorism as contextual element. Within this historical background some common denominators, like the material and financial support of the Soviet Union (KGB and its predecessor) and the support of Libya's Colonel Muammar Kaddafi, have been addressed as these denominators are difficult to ignore in the Euroterrorism network.

Historical Background

'Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist experts believe an Irish Republican Army cell operating out of Western Europe is responsible for the Christmas letter-bomb blitz aimed at prominent Britons. [...] British authorities have known of the IRA's links in Europe since soon after sectarian fighting erupted in Northern Ireland in August 1969. British intelligence helped intercept a two-ton shipment of Czech arms en route to Ireland at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport in 1971. The guerrillas are believed to have contact with European terrorist groups such as Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades and Spain's Basque ETA movement' (AP, December 23, 1979).

Countless examples of such reports can be found in European newspapers from the 1970s and 1980s. During these decades Europe was confronted with bombing campaigns, kidnappings, attacks, and assassinations by a variety of terrorist groups. During that time, the Cold War was the biggest political catalyst both in the field of international relations, and in domestic politics. During that time public air travel became increasingly accessible and commonly used. Technological improvements like these benefited the making of transnational connections between terrorist groups. In addition, air planes deemed also very useful as a target or means to execute terrorist attacks, and as a way for terrorists to escape to safe havens more remote than ever before.

It should be noted however, that the main connections between terrorists of that time were executed mainly by live meetings, postal letters and telephone conversations. It is important to bear this in mind, as these contacts thus had to have an invariable location point through which they managed to communicate.

Nowadays the internet provides the means to communicate quicker, more anonymously and from many differing locations all over the world.

In the course of time, terrorists came to understand the media very well. They adapted their methods and tactics of terror to attract media attention. Among these adaptations are the degree of violence applied, the use of symbolism, and the performance of very spectacular or special deeds (see TTSRL, work package 4, deliverable 6 for more information on terrorism and media). 'These techniques have created environments wherein the media have been eager to receive the terrorists' message' (Martin, 2003: 291).

State sponsorship as a part of transnational terrorism

The growth of transnational terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as a result of the clandestine state-sponsorship from Kaddafi's Libya and the Soviet Union, 'which found the underwriting of terrorist organizations an attractive tool for accomplishing clandestine goals while avoiding potential retaliation for the terrorist attacks' (Cronin, 2002: 37). The Soviet Union had consistently denied involvement in transnational terrorism. However, after its dissolution, when the archives were opened and some witnesses started talking, the secret ties were revealed. These ties consisted of relationships by intermediaries, among other groups or individuals, under supervision of the KGB, with Carlos Marighella, RAF, BR, and ETA (Laqueur, 1999: 160).

In contrast to the Soviet Union, Libya seemed less hesitant of provoking other nations by openly supporting terrorist attacks and providing refuge for terrorists⁹, which becomes apparent considering the many publications on Kaddafi's support. He was able to finance terrorist activities out of the national oil profits. By the mid 1980s his 'prestige was high among the terrorists, even though they were aware that the Libyan dictator tended to promise more than he delivered' (Laqueur, 1999: 170).

Carlos Marighella

An important person on the European terrorist market is Carlos Marighella, who developed a network of cooperating groups, sometimes called the *Terrorist International*, ranging from Europe to Asia, including Germans from the RAF,

⁹ An article in *the Washington Post* in 1980 listed about 40 countries - ranging from countries in the Far East to Latin American nation states - in which Libyan support of terrorism or subversion was known. *Die Welt* reported in 1977 that Libya was spending \$73 million a year in support of terrorism (Francis, 1985).

Palestinian and Japanese terrorists. The *Terrorist International* and its associates have been responsible for several attacks, among which the kidnapping of the OPEC ministers during their meeting in Vienna on 21 December 1975.¹⁰ The *Terrorist International* is also deemed to have had a hand in the coordinated terrorist attack on Hanns-Martin Schleyer, chairman of the West German Employer's Union, conducted by the RAF in September 1977 to demand the release of eleven imprisoned RAF members (Francis, 1985).

Carlos Marighella became famous as writer of the mini-manual of the urban terrorist, in which he describes ways to enact terrorist attacks, gain financial means, and promote urban terrorism. Chapter 3.2 further elaborates on the manual and its content.

¹⁰ 'Qadhafi has (...) had close ties with "Carlos" (Ilich Ramirez Sanchez), a KGB-trained terrorist who took sanctuary in Algeria with H. J. Klein, Gabrielle Kroeher-Tiedemann, and Wilfred Bose after they and Palestinian terrorists kidnapped the ministers of OPEC in Vienna in December 1975. Libya is reported to have provided the arms for the OPEC attack through its diplomats in Austria, and Egyptian sources reported that Klein, Bose, and Carlos received over \$2 million for their operation from Qadhafi. Carlos himself provided the Czechoslovak arms for the JRA team that murdered twenty-six persons and wounded seventy-six on behalf of the PFLP at Lod Airport on May 31, 1972' (Francis, 1985).

3. EUROTERRORISM AUTOPSY

3.1 Root and Trigger Causes

The causes for transnational terrorism can be differentiated into root causes and trigger causes. The contextual TTSRL-paper Root and Trigger causes uses Crenshaw's definition of these terms (see TTSRL, work package 3, deliverable 4: 6). Root causes are preconditions, factors that set the basis for terrorism on the long term. Trigger causes are precipitants, which are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). This definition makes it possible to discuss the reasons that lead to transnational terrorism and the triggering causes for the two strands in particular.

Root causes for transnational terrorism

Root causes can further be divided into two sorts (Crenshaw, 1981: 381):

- 1) Root causes that are enabling factors, providing opportunities for terrorism or terrorists. Two of these enabling root causes are relevant for Euroterrorism:
 - a. The lack of democracy (Soviet Union and Libya) and capacity to control the territory resulted in possibilities for Euroterrorists to seek refuge in safe havens and receive training facilities (along with other aid) from outside their own country (see Root and Trigger causes, Work Package 3, deliverable 4: 16-17). Members of terrorist groups are able to network and establish alliances or obtain resources in order to be more effective and to gain extra media attention for their cause. The sponsorship of terrorism by Kaddafi started in 1969, the year of his coup. Massive oil transports between 1985 and 1995 enabled Kaddafi to buy his way into terrorism with large sums of money¹¹. In the 1980s selected Palestinian groups (among them the PFLP) and the famous terrorist Carlos Marighella received an annual subsidy of \$100 million. But he certainly seemed more willing to accept the risks of provoking major powers than any other country. The more extreme the group, the more likely it was to find help and, if need be, a refuge in Tripoli'

¹¹ See footnote 7 on p. 13, Section 2.3.1

(Laqueur, 1999: 169-170). By the 1990s Qaddafi had lost much of his status as a regional leader and from then on is even ignored by (the majority of) fellow Arabs. The openly exposed (large) support of Kaddafi for the terrorist is – according to Laqueur – one of the reasons for Kaddafi's downfall (1999: 171-172).

The KGB's (and that of the KGB's predecessors) involvement in terrorism extends over a longer period of time (before 1920, when the KGB was still called the Cheka and from the 1960s to the 1990s) and was kept secret (as most actions of the KGB were it being a secret service). During the 1960s the KGB denied any involvement in terrorism. The sponsorship did not only focus on the Marxist-Leninist ideological based terrorist groups. The KGB occasionally sponsored right wing terrorism in order to embarrass and provoke Western countries.

'To certain separatist terrorism groups, such as the IRA and the Basque ETA, the Soviet Union did extend help in various ways, directly or through its allies. Since many of the separatists had at that time a protective Marxist-Leninist, anti-imperialist colouring, such assistance could always be justified in ideological terms. These were, in Soviet eyes, progressive forces, and extending help to them was a duty quite apart from the political benefits accruing to the Soviet bloc from the terrorist activities' (Laqueur, 1999: 160).

From the literature study it can be concluded that this sponsorship was an important enabling root cause for transnational connections as it was this form of state sponsorship that allowed terrorists to exist without ever being financially impeded.

- b. A general enabling root cause for Euroterrorism is stated by Cronin. The rise of the transnational aspect of terrorism has two factors, namely technological advances and the increasing influence of the international media on domestic societies, emphasizing or sometimes even creating transnational links as the centre of attention. 'Individual, scattered national causes began to develop into international

organizations with links and activities increasingly across borders and among differing causes' (Cronin, 2002: 37).

2) Furthermore there are situations that are direct transnational motivators for terrorism and make up the second sort of root cause. For Euroterrorism three situational motivated root causes are considered to be relevant.

- a. The socialization of people in a cultural system that has been damaged by revolutions, wars, dictatorship and political violence make people accept martyrdom, hatred and revenge. This increases the possibility that they will support violent forms to reach their goals (Root and Trigger causes, work package 3, deliverable 4: 17). All of the terrorist organizations of the two strands of the Euroterrorism-network have been part of a society that was involved in or suffered the consequences of one or more damaging situations (repression by dictators, the aftermath of the Second World War, and the Cold War).
- b. The feelings of social injustice can also be seen as a root cause for both strands within Euroterrorism (Root and Trigger causes, work package 3, deliverable 4: 17). Martin states that

'[a]t some level, all terrorists seek to change an existing order, even if it is simply a short-term objective to disrupt the normal routines of society by inflicting maximum casualties. (...) Ethno-nationalist terrorists seek to win recognition of their human rights or to a degree of national autonomy, from the present order' (Martin, 2003: 246).

Martin also states that '[n]ihilists wish to destroy systems and institutions without regard for what will replace the existing order' (Martin, 2003: 246). This is to some degree also a root cause for terrorist organizations like the RAF, BR the CCC and AD. Although they do, in contradiction to the nihilist view, have a detailed idea of what is to replace the existing order. Because all of the groups within the two strands fight for this cause, besides being a root cause, this cause is also seen as a *soft* link as the groups seem to have respect for each others ideology.

- c. The overwhelming power of mainly great international institutions or authorities is the last root cause for the RAF and BR (and also AD and CCC). They openly declared to strive against what they perceived as being an asymmetrical society (Root and Trigger causes, work package 3, deliverable 4: 17-18).

Trigger causes

Regarding the issue of trigger causes, one can distil many different triggers even while looking within the same alliance. For example, the RAF and AD alliance is triggered by several issues. Mainly, the almost simultaneous portraying of AD and RAF against NATO after the Stammheim suicides¹² in 1977 triggers the groups to form a politico-military front (Wright, 1991:168). A communiqué on RAF and AD alliance is made in 1985 triggered by the need to compensate the capture of 18 AD members and the mutual lack of popular support for the groups. The international links are established with the reason to stabilize operations in a time of globalization (Dartnell, 1995: 87).

One of the trigger causes for the connection between IRA and ETA is the lack of weapons and of knowledge. Both IRA and ETA are triggered by the fact that the expertise and the weapons are available between the organizations. If the opportunity occurs, the means are exchanged between the two and from 1972 the two groups even form a (semi-official) companionship (Sterling, 1981: 160).

The following example is an illustration of a trigger cause out of which the connections between terrorist organizations can arise. For instance a root cause for IRA is diminishing financial support from Irish American citizens/sympathizers. Due to this decline IRA starts to focus upon other terrorist organizations (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 37). The diminishing financial support from Irish American citizens or other IRA sympathizers forced the IRA to look for alternatives. As they started looking for other terrorist organizations, the lack of

¹² 'The Stammheim suicides' is the name of the suicides of the prominent RAF members Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe. These suicides took place in the Stammheim prison in West Germany. The RAF members hoped that the kidnapping of Union leader Schleyer and the hostage taking in Mogadishu would ensure their release. When this did not happen the prisoners committed suicide. All West European left-wing radicals were convinced the deaths were not caused by suicide but by murder because of the poor conditions in which the RAF members were imprisoned (Dobson and Payne, 1981: 137). For more information on the conditions in prison for these RAF members see for example Demaris (1977).

financial support became trigger causes in themselves for the continuation of terrorism.

The transnational connections within Euroterrorism can have external and internal root causes. An external root cause is for example the support of the Soviet Union and Kaddafi. Internal root causes come from within terrorist organizations, like the *soft* link of ideology. Trigger causes are mostly described as those causes that immediately precede a terrorist incident. In light of this case study trigger causes can have three dimensions:

1. Causes that immediately precede the founding of a terrorist organization;
2. Causes that immediately precede a terrorist incident;
3. Causes that immediately precede the establishment of a transnational connection.

For the purpose of this case study it solely focuses on the later sort of trigger causes. Considering these trigger causes, it can be concluded that these are totally depending on the alliance studied, as well as the exact time and place. It is noted that even within the same alliance many different triggers give rise to many different forms of cooperation, and sometimes can even lead to a decision to withdraw from cooperating in any case. However, one conclusion that can be drawn, based on this total combination and evaluation of root and trigger causes for transnational terrorist cooperation, is that these terrorist groups would not be able to accomplish as much as they did if state sponsorship and transnational connections were not available to them.

3.2 Categories of soft and hard links

3.2.1 *Soft links*

The *soft* links distilled from the literature study are divided into the following categories; solidarity, ideological resemblance, strategy, and media strategy. The following section discusses the indicators for the soft links and these categories found in the literature.

Before giving examples of the links there are three remarks to be made. Firstly, the *soft* links often precede *hard* links in the way the links are arranged,

but there are situations in which *hard* links can precede *soft* links. An example of a hard link preceding a soft link would be a personal meeting between certain terrorists, who had no previous acquaintance, and only met at the instigation of a third party. Secondly, it is noted that given the limited open-source information available regarding these sorts of hard links, it has not been within the scope of this research to verify or claim to have verified all these links, and therefore, nothing can be said about their frequency. Thirdly, it should be noted that the literature mainly addresses the way transnational connections are arranged, with a serious lack of focus on the financial aspects of transnational terrorism, possibly due to the same lack of concrete, open-source information regarding this area of investigation. Based on the literature we put forward the suggestion that financial support is mainly given by other actors than terrorist organizations themselves as these could obviously use the money themselves (the Soviet Union, Kaddafi and others). However, it needs to be mentioned that the possibility that the literature used may not be all-inclusive and/or that financing between terrorist organizations might not be known by outsiders.

Solidarity

The expressions of solidarity often go together with *hard* links or other *soft* links. In 1972 there is a meeting between members of different terrorist groups (which in itself is a *hard*, tangible link). This "Baddawi"-meeting (Lebanon, 1972) is one of the events often described in the literature. Other meetings have been reported to be arranged in Japan, Ireland, and Algeria.

'The meeting in Lebanon was hosted by representatives of the PFLP and Black September and attended by members of the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Japanese Red Army, the Turkish People Liberation Army, the Iranian Liberation Front, the IRA and the Tupamaros. All these groups agreed to supply each other with arms and information and to carry out operations on behalf of and in the name of a brother movement, thus making it more difficult for security forces to identify the culprits. This tactic was for example employed after the May 1972 meeting in Dublin where the IRA exploded a bomb at the West-German embassy in Dublin' (Wilkinson, 1986: 38).

Afterwards the RAF claimed responsibility for this attack in Dublin (Wilkinson, 1986: 38). So the *soft* link solidarity can be found in the agreement to show solidarity to each other. Solidarity was also visible when the assassination of an important businessman took place. It was conducted by the RAF's Mara Cagol Commando. The driving force behind this new cooperation was, according to the BR, the idea to destroy the NATO and to undermine the US (Meade, 1190: 238). The *soft* links of solidarity in this example are shown in the common cause to destroy the NATO and the usage of the name Mara Cagol for the RAF commando. Mara Cagol was one of the founders of BR. The use of this name can be seen as a tribute from RAF to BR.

Ideological resemblance

Soft links based on ideology exist among both strands. The RAF, BR, AD and CCC are linked on an *ideological* basis. One of the basic ideas is to try to overthrow the capitalist society, which their parents created or like a RAF member said, a society consisting 'of tired and corrupt old men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima' (Washington Post, 28 August 1988). Furthermore, the Vietnam War (1957-1975) and the perceived oppression and exploitation of the Third World by Western nations, stimulated the young in the West to contest the values of the existing system in which they lived.

The IRA and ETA have a fundamental (swift) connection in the perspective that they are both *nationalist-separatist* movements. The pair is in search of damaging the regime which they feel is oppressing themselves and their population, respectively the governments of the UK and Spain. As discussed in section 3.1.1 the root cause to establish the transnational links can also be viewed as an ideological *soft* link. The fight against social injustice is among the academics not only seen as the root cause but also as an ideological *soft* link.

Strategy

The similarity in strategy of the groups in Euroterrorism is a soft link as there is no tangible evidence to support strategy being a hard link. However, the similarities in strategy cannot be ignored. There are several sorts of strategies, differing from financial strategies, methodological and tactical strategies to attack strategies. These sorts of strategies are not to be confused with the hard links that also cover these issues (finance, methods and tactics, weapons etc.). The former strategies are not tangible and therefore *soft* links. In this section

some of the most interesting strategy resemblances that show a soft link are described.

With regard to the Euroterrorism groups, other parallels with regard to strategy can be drawn in the way these groups take care of their (own) financing. These parallels can be qualified as soft links between the different terrorist groups. The IRA, ETA, and the BR levied "revolutionary taxes" by threatening with kidnapping. They did not hesitate to perform actual kidnappings and demand extreme amounts of ransom.

A more clear parallel in strategy is fostered by Carlos Marighella¹³ who published his book *For the Liberation of Brazil* in 1992. The chapter *Handbook of Urban Guerrilla warfare* soon became the standard for terrorists operating in Europe, Japan and the Middle East. Marighella provided terrorists with information about strategies on how to disrupt and overthrow state authority in order to create a revolution. Consequently, Dobson and Payne (1982: 148) mention the following activities that were employed by most European terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s.

- 'murder by gunning down people in the streets;
- assassination of political leaders and other well-known people;
- bombing of public places or the homes of private individuals;
- kidnapping of prominent people for ransom or the release of prisoners;
- hijacking aircraft and using the safety of the crew and passengers as a bargaining counter to secure the same aims;
- armed bank robbery and raids to get money, weapons, documents, etc.'

In all of the groups belonging to the two strands of Euroterrorism one or more of these strategies were used, some more successful than others. In some of the groups this was directly inspired by Marighella's mini-manual. The RAF, for example, financed its activities by stealing money, identification cards, passports, and conducting robberies. Some of the RAF members however, like Meinhof, use their own money or funds from their parents.

Marighella's tips and tricks are not the only link on the strategy level between the different groups. The ETA also copied some of the IRA tactics, like its main military activity, the liquidation of members of the Guardia Civil and the

Policia Nacional. However, they do not share the IRA's tactic of bombings (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 191).

Media strategy

Sporadically there are links between the two strands in the use of media strategies. The broad propaganda themes directed by the IRA are quite comparable to those used by the RAF. Both groups use allegations of mistreatment and improper conditions with respect to imprisoned members, and the demand to be treated as political offenders in their propaganda. They ensured, for instance, that courts granted the prisoners a special status as the result of a hunger strike (Wright, 1991: 134-135).¹⁴

3.2.2 Hard links

Alliance

The fact that IRA members train *Ettarras*¹⁵ and a formal pact of mutual assistance is sealed between them, can explain the remarkable technical resemblance (of the construction of the explosives) between the assassination of Admiral Luis Carrera Blanco, Franco's Prime Minister and aimed successor, in December 1973, and the attack on Christopher Ewart-Biggs, the British Ambassador in Dublin, in July 1976. The elimination of Carrera Blanco¹⁶ was a highly sophisticated and technically demanding assassination. Dobson and Payne state that ETA is believed to have received assistance from the IRA, or even KGB, in the assassination on Blanco although the ETA denies this (Dobson and Payne, 1979: 191, Alexander and O'day, 1984: 8).

With regard to the dynamite's provenance, a hard link is proven by explosives experts. Alexander and O'day state about the attacks that 'the resemblance in the technical field, between the assassination of Blanco and the

¹³ Marighella was a member of the Communist Party in Brazil, but left the party because 'it was too tame for his taste'. His mini-manual is probably more known in Europe than in his native country (Laqueur, 1999:26).

¹⁴ At times the entire RAF and PIRA campaigns were focused on prisoners. The RAF used the propaganda for external and internal purpose, like the 1985 hunger strike in prison, it was modeled after the PIRA hunger strike in 1981 (Wright, 1991: 151).

¹⁵ *Ettarras* is Spanish for ETA members.

¹⁶ December 1973, the Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco is assassinated. Carrero is killed by a car bomb, sitting in his car he was blown high into the sky. ETA claims responsibility for the attack and justifies the act by declaring it was in revenge for the killing of nine Basque militants by the Spanish government (Dobson and Payne, 1981:215 and Dobson and Payne, 1982:6, 211).

ambassador in Dublin Biggs, three years later gave further credence to the claim of the Spanish police of the existence of a secret pact between the two' (Alexander and O'day, 1984: 8).

In the early 1970s, Maria McGuire, a former IRA member, recalls two secret visits to Dublin of Jose Echebarrieta, one of ETA's most influential members, in order to seek contact with the IRA. According to her, the Basque leaders met the IRA Chief of Staff, Sean MacStiofain in 1971.

'There was an occasion when a friend of mine was at a private house helping to interpret for MacStiofain while he conversed with two groups, one French and one Spanish, from the Basque resistance movement ETA. They had come to offer us revolvers in return for training in the use of explosives, and my friend was struggling with words like "gelignite" and "detonator"' (McGuire, 1973: 71).

The partnership became more concrete when ETA, IRA and FLB signed a joined communiqué in May 1972 (Clark, 1984: 69).

Another example of a *hard* link between the RAF and AD is the communiqué (Pour l'unité des révolutionnaires en Europe de l'ouest, Für die Einheit der revolutionäre in Westeuropa, January 1985) they published about their intention to cooperate. It states that terrorism is entering a new phase in which AD and the RAF are taking a qualitative leap towards achieving their goal(s).

Organizational assistance/training

The organization of transnational terrorism also includes providing safe havens for other terrorist groups. At a police search, AD was allegedly in the possession of the address of a safe haven of the CCC in Sint-Joost-ten-Node, Belgium. Moreover, the BR also sought refuge in CCC houses, as well as in safe havens of the RAF and AD. It is argued that this co-operation is based upon both the mutual willingness of parties to cooperate, and the necessity for them to do so (Van der Velpen, 1987: 31).

This *hard* link between the RAF and BR dates back to 1972 when identification cards were discovered. These cards were stolen by the BR, but found on the body of a dead RAF member and on another RAF member who was arrested in the same occasion. Later that year BR broke with RAF, because they concluded that the RAF was too much engaged in international issues, instead of

focusing on the problems of the domestic working class (part of their shared ideology). However, the contacts were re-initiated six years later. BR member Laura Braghetti opened a post office box in Rome to be used for the contacts with the RAF (Meade, 1190: 238).

Weapons/Joint attacks

The following example is one of the most important *hard* links between the leftist groups (RAF, AD and CCC). In June 1984, seven hundred kilos of explosives were stolen in Belgium. The stolen explosives were used for attacks by three different terrorist groups, namely the RAF, AD and CCC. The first two groups claimed joint responsibility for the assassination of the French General Audran in January 1985 and for a car bomb in the parking lot at the US Air Force's Rhein-Main Air Base near Frankfurt, killing two and injuring more than 20 people (Visser, 1986: 51). With the identification, proof was supplied about the connections between RAF, AD and CCC.

3.2.3 Concluding remarks

Many examples show the *hard* and *soft* links between terrorist organizations on methods and tactic sharing. Sometimes they even conduct terrorist acts together. Additionally, it can be concluded that these links (and the copying for instance) are inevitable for them. The goals of the separate terrorist organizations could probably not be met, if it was not for the sharing of methods and tactics. The terrorist organizations simply lacked knowledge and means to conduct the acts in total isolation. The rise of the transnational connections on this particular point thus was a condition for them to succeed. These conclusions arguably are still valid for today's terrorist activities.

3.3 Dynamics of Euroterrorism Development

Over the years the connections between the terrorist groups professionalized. The development of the connections, its changeable nature, and the influence of the social-political environment make it difficult to give one description of the dynamics of the connections. The technological developments, media influence and lack of information further complicate the description of the dynamics of the connections. Laqueur for instance states that an operation 'would be planned in West Germany by Palestine Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in

Japan with weapons acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, supplied by an Algerian diplomat, and financed with Libyan money' making transnational terrorism professional and enlarging its destructive consequences. The accessibility of modern technology also contributes to the power of the terrorist organizations, enabling them to establish and maintain contacts easier than before (Laqueur, 1984: 323 - 324).

It is important to note before the actual discussion that each connection had its own development and thus its own dynamic regarding successes and failures over time. Because of the diversity and plenitude of the different connections it is not possible to describe the development of all the connections. Therefore a description of several of the most interesting dynamics is given.

In general, the "successful" development of transnational terrorism can be seen as the dynamics of these transnational connections to become more and more resembled as multinational corporations. In order to show the dynamics and changing nature of transnational Euroterrorism, the case of the BR is most illustrative, especially in their relationship with the RAF. In the early years the relationship between them was substantial and on the side of the BR maintained by the top leaders, like Reggiano and Laura Azzolini, investing in contact with the RAF through interpreter Ingeborg Kitzler. For political reasons (in the opinion of BR, the RAF focused too little on their own working class and too much on international goals) BR reduced this form of contact over time. The contact between BR and ETA and IRA also decreased because of the difference in ideology, as was publicly stated as such by BR member Partizio Peci (Meade, 1990: 219). After 1972, BR finds that the attitude of the 2nd of June movement is more compatible with their own than the attitudes of RAF. BR is then more willing to invest in the contacts with 2nd of June movement (Meade, 1990: 220). In the 1980s the contacts with RAF were re-established and in the late 1980s RAF and BR together are involved in a failed assassination attempt in Germany (Meade, 1990: 238). The reason for re-establishing the contacts remains unclear, but it does support our theory that these terrorist groups profited from transnational connections.

Even before this sort of professionalization, terrorist organizations transformed themselves according to the strategy of Marighella. In his *Mini-manual for Urban Guerrillas*, he built his strategy around the transformation from a political structured terrorist organization to a military structured one. Around 1970 the IRA chose to implement this strategy. Apart from the need for *reach*,

reciprocity and *resources*, another factor was vital to ensure IRA's existence, namely organizational change. The organizational structure of IRA, a classic army structure, had the advantage of good, clear and efficient way of communication and facilitated cohesion with the local communities. One of the disadvantages with growing importance however, was the relatively easy way in which intelligence services were able to gather information by infiltrating an organization with that structure. Another growing concern was that new recruits had fairly easy and quick access to detailed knowledge of the identities of individuals already involved in actions and within the higher legions of the command structure in general. Wright discusses a document found in the flat of Chief-of-Staff Seamus Twoney explaining that 'an efficient infrastructure of commands, brigades, battalions and companies [is] contributing to our defeat'. With these considerations in mind, the IRA adapted the same sort of cellular structure many terrorist groups were using, abandoning their old form of organization (Wright, 1991: 153).

In sum, terrorist organizations are very flexible in their relationships, in some cases because they want to be, in others, most likely the majority, because they need to be. Flexibility enables them to be and stay professional. It can be stated that terrorist organizations and also the transnational connections between them have become highly professional. The professionalization is possible through technical progress, Laqueur states in 1984 (Laqueur, 1984: 324). Therefore the conclusion is that transnational terrorism nowadays has the potential to be even more professional due to the further development of modern technology (internet, email etcetera).

3.4 Responses to Euroterrorism

As discussed before, the terrorist groups in the Euroterrorism network could not have reached their goals without the transnational connections (because of the lack of the three R's). However, the actual responses to the attacks carried out by the terrorist groups in the Euroterrorism network were mostly conducted nationally. There has not been an effective transnational response to the transnational phenomenon. This chapter discusses the responses to Euroterrorism by the different countries including their way of organizing counterterrorism and their efforts to organize a transnational response (without great success).

The different countries that had to cope with Euroterrorism favored a unilateral national approach above a transnational approach. This own approach is developed out of the historical, jurisdictional and societal experience in the country.¹⁷

The response of Germany is often described as being a strong one. Terrorism had no roots in Germany before the RAF emerged and the authorities took extremely severe and rigid actions against it. One of them is the so called 'Vorfeldkriminalisierung' which makes it possible to punish the expressions of sympathy towards the RAF and the spreading of its ideology with jail sentences (Duyvesteyn and De Graaf, 2007: 110). The political preoccupation with urban guerrilla terrorist actions has been said to be smaller than the preoccupation that journalists, psychologists, lawyers, judges and law enforcement officers have with the impact of terrorism (Laqueur, 1984: 323). This is for example shown by the way the RAF gets (international) attention and even sympathy from different psychologists, judges, lawyers, and the media (Pekelder, 2007: 27). An illustrative example of the strong German government response to the actions of the RAF is the following. In September 1977 RAF abducted Schleyer (as mentioned in section 2.2.3). In return for his release the RAF demanded the release of eleven imprisoned RAF members (among them Andreas Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe and Gudrun Ensslin); all the imprisoned RAF members are to be given 100 000 DM and a flight to a country of their choice. The government set its goals at making sure Schleyer stayed alive, catching the terrorists and putting them on trial, preventing the decline of the (inter)national trust in the negotiation skills of the government, and not releasing the prisoners as demanded by the RAF. These goals are not met by the German government and Schleyer is found with three deadly head wounds in a car. Schmidt, chancellor at that time, states almost 30 years later (on 30 August 2007) that in a way he feels guilty for the death of Schleyer. He explains that he had always been aware of the fact that not negotiating could result in the death of Schleyer. And he knows that while Schleyer was murdered by the RAF, the government was partly responsible (NRC Handelsblad, 2007).

In Italy the *Legge Reale*¹⁸ is introduced (in 1976) giving a "carte blanche" to the security agencies in their battle against terrorism. This leads to an unclear

¹⁷ When it concerns security measures, countries are *usually / openly / understandably* extremely reluctant to cooperate.

¹⁸ *Legge Reale* is a jurisdictional measure named after the minister of Justice Oronzo Realle.

line between repression and terrorism. At one point judges are no longer able to judge correctly as demonstrators and police officers get involved in armed fights where many of the activists are killed. Political scientist Donatella della Porta describes this interaction as a vicious circle of 'violenza-repressione-violenza-repressione' (Duyvesteyn and De Graaf, 2007: 11).

The literature contains a marginal description of transnational responses to Euroterrorism. Dobson and Payne (1981) explain that the anti-terrorist brigades started working closer together in the 1970s. In July 1978 the Republic of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, Canada and Japan attended a conference in Bonn, in which they unanimously decided to take drastic measures against countries refusing to extradite terrorists. These measures included the postponing of air traffic from the countries refusing to extradite terrorists to the countries attending the meeting (Dobson and Payne, 1981: 148). This measure is an example of a short-term repressive response that did not contribute to a general transnational approach to counter the phenomenon. The success of a transnational approach could only have been achieved if the governments had taken the whole phenomenon as a point of departure. Instead, they focused on parts of the transnationality of terrorism as the example described by Dobson and Payne shows.

The consequence of this scattered approach and of the unsuccessful effort to respond in a transnational way are still visible today. The different countries and the EU have made a lot of efforts to transnationalize counterterrorism since the Euroterrorism phenomenon. The individual response to Euroterrorism has not contributed to the development of a transnational approach, but instead delayed it or even set it back. The countries focused on their own approach and therewith set a standard that has proven not to be easy to turn.

3.5 Factors of Decline

The decline of Euroterrorism and the connections between the groups in the two strands can be explained in two ways. Firstly, the defeat of the individual groups by, for instance repressive measures, has resulted in the decline of the Euroterrorism connections or Euroterrorism as such. However, although the Euroterrorism network lost terrorist groups through this decline, there is no evidence that transnational connections in general also declined. Secondly, the support given by the Soviet Union and Kaddafi declined over the years.

This section furthers elaborates on these two factors of decline. It must be noted that the existence of the ETA and IRA is the exceptional case in discussing the decline of Euroterrorism. Even though the ETA and IRA still exist as terrorist organizations and both of them still have transnational connections (even with each other), the Euroterrorism network as such no longer exists. The transnational connections (even between the IRA and ETA) nowadays should be placed in a different context and are part of another scale of transnational terrorism. It is noted, however, that the factors causing the decline of other terrorist organizations must have affected IRA and ETA, for example in the numbers of connections with the defeated terrorist organizations losing valuable assistance and information.

With regard to the first factor of decline, Rapoport states that in the 1980s the third wave of terrorism, 'the New Left' begins to decline as revolutionary terrorist groups are defeated one by one. (Rapoport, 2003: 37). As soon as the counterterrorism activities became more effective, the transnational contacts decreased. Scholars like Cronin have suggested elements that can cause the defeat of individual groups (2006: 19):

- The capture or killing of a leader;
- An unsuccessful generational transition;
- Achieving the cause;
- A transition to legitimate political processes;
- The loss of popular support;
- Repression;
- The transit out of terrorism (crime of insurgency).

It is important to stress that these seven factors are not mutually exclusive, but should be taken together and coupled to the intrinsic characteristics of the terrorist organizations themselves. Furthermore it is obvious that some of these results can be viewed as the outcome of governmental counter-terrorism measures.

In the case of a disappearance of a group all the above mentioned elements may have caused the decline. Specifically looking at the decline of the connections between the rest of the groups discussed in this study, only a few elements are of relevance to the decrease in cooperation. In the case of the RAF

(and to some extent the BR) repression can be seen as a factor contributing to the decline.

For the RAF the process accelerated after the capturing and the death of its leaders. The capture first set in an increase in support from sympathizers, but on the long term generated a decline in sympathy. For the RAF the arrests of the leaders Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Jan Carl Raspe in June 1972 led the leaders to decide to transfer 'initiative-taking and decision-making to the "commando"-level' (Horchem, 1991: 66), which included other groups or persons within the RAF. This led to a loss of support within the group. Simultaneously, the CCC turned its back to terrorism because of the capture of its leader. As soon as the leader of the CCC was captured, the organization stopped inciting. The connections between these groups and the rest of the network then came to an end as well.

The second factor behind the decline involves the decrease of support from the Soviet Union and Kaddafi. These were major factors that brought terrorist organizations in contact with each other on different levels. Therefore, terrorist organizations were strongly affected when the support decreased. The end of the Cold War (in 1989/1991) and the demise of the Soviet Union and Communist regimes in Europe are (other) factors of the decline of connections between the RAF, AD, CCC and BR. A decrease of state sponsorship of terrorism in this part of Europe sets in, as there was no longer a need for destabilizing Western Europe (Wilkinson, 1992). This made the terrorists lack resources. Around the same time a collective initiative of the EU was made to unite in a front against terrorism. Enders and Sandler state that '[t]hese events coming around the end of 1991 have been shown to decrease the amount of transnational terrorism' (Enders and Sandler 1999, 2000).

4. CONCLUSION

In this study an overview has been given of the transnational connections between Euroterrorism groups. The connections, which exist on a variety of categories (see Annex II), are very complex but provide a basis for answering the leading questions of this case study.

The first question (why do these transnational connections within Euroterrorism exist?) can be answered by stating that transnational connections for the Euroterrorism network provided more opportunities than groups might have had acting alone. It is easily imaginable that Euroterrorism groups could have diminished sooner without these *soft* and *hard* links. The copying of other terrorist groups and establishing connections with different groups enabled them to reach their goals. The rise of the transnational connections was a necessity to succeed. The lack of reach, reciprocity, and resources contributes to a cooperation between the groups within the Euroterrorism network.

With regard to the second question (what are the benefits of the specific connections?), the study shows that transnational terrorism contributes to greater consequences of possible terrorist attacks. Without transnational contacts between the terrorist groups, the terrorists would not be able to cause the greater effects that contribute to a greater form of impact. The fact that transnational terrorism is occurring on such a large and much diversified scale indicates that there are several benefits for the terrorist groups. Professionalizing the transnational connections make the networks and the different terrorist groups even more successful.

The third question (how do these connections arise and evolve?) can be answered on different levels. The rise of the Euroterrorism connections in the 1970s and 1980s is established mainly through direct contacts and connections by telephone and letters. Most of the Euroterrorism organizations have disappeared because of various reasons. ETA and IRA are the exceptions, as they still exist.

Terrorist groups have been very flexible in their relationships and connections in order to achieve the best results. Factors that enabled terrorist groups to evolve can be found in enabling factors. The main enabling factors were the technological advances and the development around sharing information. Technological advances as aviation created a new way to connect to each other quickly and relatively easily.

Nowadays connections are even more easily made through technological advances, internet being the most effective way to establish and maintain connections. The decline of the connections between Euroterrorism organizations can be categorized in the decline of support and the rise of repressive measures. Even though this rise exists, effective responses were mainly taken on a national level. There were great differences in the response of the different governments involved.

Although the connections between different groups within the Euroterrorism network have declined, mutated or shrunk there is no evidence that the phenomenon of transnational terrorism has declined. On the contrary, transnational terrorism nowadays seems to be even more abundant.

Nowadays the responses to transnational terrorism can still mainly be found on a national level, despite through the differences in opinions on how to respond. However, it must be stated that – at least at a European level – more and more initiatives are being taken. The effect thereof is hard to measure.

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ANNEX I Overview of terrorist organizations

In this section the different terrorist organizations are described in short. The information for this description can be found in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.

Action Directe (AD): Leftist. Base of operation: France.

First appeared in 1979 when it claimed responsibility for an attack on a French business organization. It is a Marxist-Leninist organization which focuses on the French state, consistent with its goal of a revolutionary communist movement in France. After the election of a socialist prime minister in 1980 their ideology changed with a focus on anti-Americanism. Current goal: pressuring the French government to improve living conditions of Action Directe prisoners, the group is effectively decimated.

Related groups:

- Affiche Rouge • Faction
- Committee for Liquidation of Computers (CLODO) • Splinter Group (Suspected)
- Communist Combatant Cells • Rival and Ally
- Group Bakunin Gdansk Paris Guatemala Salvador • Suspected Alias/Ally
- Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction • Ally
- Red Army Faction • Ally
- Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action • Splinter Group (Suspected)
- Revolutionary Solidarity • Ally (Suspected)

Black September Organization (BSO): Nationalist/Separatist. Base of operation: Jordan; Lebanon; West Bank/Gaza.

The *Black September Organization* (BSO) was formed in 1971 as a clandestine wing of al-Fatah. Their objective was to avenge the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan in September 1970 ("Black September"). BSO had direct linkages with al-Fatah who actually formed BSO in order to circumvent an al-Fatah declaration that they would not interfere in the domestic policies of Arab nations. However, some al-Fatah members planned to

assassinate King Hussein. Hence, Black September was partially formed in order to pursue this specific objective. Black September expanded its list of targets from the Jordanian government to Israeli and "Western" targets. BSO is infamous for its attack against Israeli athletes and coaches at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Following the Israeli response (with the purpose to eliminate the organization), al-Fatah dissolved Black September in December 1974. As a result many of the BSO members joined the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other active terrorist organizations. Attacks in the name of Black September continued long after the official dissolution.

Related groups:

- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) • Shared Members
- al-Fatah • Founding Group

Brigate Rosse (BR): Leftist. Base of operation: Italy.

The *Brigate Rosse* (BR) was founded on rigidly Marxist-Leninist principles, advocating violence in the pursuit of class warfare. Concentrated in Italy, the Brigate Rosse targeted businessmen and politicians and were a notable terrorist threat during the 1970s and early 1980s. In the end, the Red Brigades' increasingly brutal attacks eroded the support of those sympathetic with the group's Communist ideals. In April 1984, four of the Red Brigades' key leaders wrote a communiqué from their jail cells, ending the resistance of the Brigate Rosse. Following the release of this letter, two splinter groups broke off from the Red Brigades: the New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC) and the Red Brigades/Union of Combatant Communists (BR/UCC). The BR/PCC specifically has chosen to continue in the ideological and violent path of the Red Brigades.

Related groups:

- Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction • Ally
- Metropolitan Political Collective • Founding Group
- New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party • Splinter Group
- Popular Forces of April 25 • Ally (Suspected)
- Red Brigades-Union of Combatant Communists (BR-UCC) • Splinter Group

Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC): Leftist. Base of operation: Belgium.

The group was active for less than two years in the mid-1980s, primarily engaged in bombings within Belgium's borders, although their goals and targets were predominately international. CCC attacked perceived enemies of communism, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. and international business firms, and the Belgian Employers Association. In December 1985, police arrested CCC founder and leader Pierre Carette. His conviction for murder on January 14, 1986 essentially eliminated the Communist Combatant Cells who had not been active since 1985.

Related groups:

- Action Directe • Rival and Ally
- Red Army Faction • Rival and Ally
- Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action • Ally (Suspected)

Communistes Organisés pour la Libération du Prolétariat (COLP): Leftist/anarchist. Base of operation: France.

Related groups:

- Action Directe.

El Fatah: Nationalist/Separatist. Base of operation: Israel, West bank/Gaza.

Fatah was founded in the late 1950s by five Palestinian activists operating out of Kuwait, Yasser Arafat among them. They rejected the legitimacy of Israel and espoused violence as a means to drive Israel out of greater Palestine. Fatah stressed Palestinian self-sufficiency as the key to defeating Israel and creating an independent Palestinian state. They emerged from the underground in the mid-1960s, and, in the power vacuum that followed the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; Fatah aligned itself with the PLO, establishing itself as the dominant faction within the PLO. By 1969, Arafat was serving as the PLO's Chairman. They operated out of Jordan, but were expelled violently during 1970-71 (Black September).

As part of the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, all PLO factions, including Fatah, recognized the state of Israel and renounced terrorism and acts of violence. Since 1993, the PLO has transformed itself into a quasi-government, the Palestinian Authority (PA) with Arafat and Fatah still playing the dominant roles. While Fatah and Arafat have formally committed themselves to working with Israel towards peace, the reality has been much more complicated as many Fatah members are still actively engaged in legitimate Palestinian Authority governmental activities. This jeopardizes the relationship between Fatah and Israel. Fatah therefore appears split between its role as the leader of the Palestinian Authority and its traditional role as the leader of the Palestinian resistance. In January 2006, Fatah suffered a shocking defeat to Hamas in Palestinian parliamentary elections. Fatah's loss of power has profoundly changed the Palestinian political landscape, and factional clashes between Fatah and Hamas have consumed the Gaza Strip, leading to deaths on both sides.

Related groups:

- Abu al-Rish Brigades • Splinter Group
- Asbat al-Ansar • Enemy
- Black Panthers (West Bank/Gaza) • Splinter Group
- Black September • Splinter Group
- Force 17 • Faction
- Hamas • Rival and Ally
- Jund al-Sham • Enemy
- Knights of the Tempest • Splinter Group
- Mujahadi Bayt al-Maqdis Brigades • Shared Members
- Omar bin al-Khattab Brigades • Faction
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) • Rival and Ally
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) • Rival
- Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PSF) • Rival and Ally
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) • Rival and Ally
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command (PFLP-GC) • Rival
- Popular Resistance Committees • Shared Members
- Sami al-Ghul Brigades • Armed Wing
- Tanzim • Splinter Group

- al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades • Splinter Group

Ejército de Resistencia Patriótica/Patriotic Resistance Army (ERP):

Nationalist/separatist. Base of operation: Honduras.

Little is known about the Patriotic Resistance Army. The group claimed responsibility for a small bombing at a shopping centre on March 15th, 1990. ERP did not publicly articulate its goals, nor did it claim credit for any other attacks. It is not known what political affiliations they held. Opposing the Contras (Supported by the US and fighting the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime in a vicious civil war) was the most common motivation for this type of violence in Honduras during that era.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA): Nationalist/Separatist. Base of operation: Spain, Basque country.

Its goal is a separate nation-state for the Basque people who live in northern Spain and the south-west of Europe. The ETA was founded in 1958 from the remnants of EKIN, just like ETA discontent with the moderate nationalism of the main Basque party. With the return of democracy (1979), after the Franco regime, the Basque provinces were granted more autonomy, even acquiring their own parliament. March 2006 ETA declared a cease-fire and expressed a willingness to join the political process. In June 2007 this cease-fire was null-and-void.

Related groups:

- EKIN • Founding Group
- Gazteriak • Ally
- Herri Batasuna • Political Wing
- International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI) • Ally (Suspected)
- Irish Republican Army (IRA) • Ally (Suspected)
- Red Flag (Venezuela) • Ally

Front de Liberation Breton (FLB): Nationalist/separatist. Base of operation: France.

FLB has been established in 1963 to try and achieve the liberation of Brittany from France. The Armee Revolutionaire Bretonne (ABR) was created in 1971 as the armed wing of FLB. The pro-independence, anti-capitalist group Emgann ("Combat"), created in 1982, is considered the official front for the ABR.

The group's strategy seems to have changed in the late 1990s, when it developed links with the Basque separatist movement ETA. The ABR said it would no longer limit itself to just symbolic actions, that [the government in] Paris never budged unless it believed it was under attack, and that the group would therefore pursue that goal. In 1999 this was confirmed in a Basque newspaper wanting to obtain autonomy.

Related groups:

- Breton Liberation Front • Founding Group
- Emgann • Political Wing
- Gora Euskadi Askatuta • Ally

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): Leftist/anarchist. Base of operation: Ireland, Northern Ireland and United Kingdom.

The INLA is a republican paramilitary organization operating in Northern Ireland. Founded by Seamus Costello in 1974, the INLA is the armed wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) and a splinter group of the Official Irish Republican Army (Official IRA). The INLA broke away in 1974, desiring to continue the armed struggle after the Official IRA declared a ceasefire and decided to join the political process. As a paramilitary organization in Northern Ireland, the INLA espouses a unique ideology of militant republicanism coupled with a Marxist-Leninist political and social approach. Shortly after its formation, the INLA was engaged in a bitter feud with its founding group, the Official IRA, which sought to destroy the faction. In 1998 the INLA declared a ceasefire. The INLA continues to pose a threat to Northern Ireland and members remain active through the use of cover names such as the Catholic Reaction Force (CRF) and People's Republican Army.

Related groups:

- Official IRA • Founding Group
- Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) • Ally (Suspected)
- Irish Republican Socialist Party • Political Wing

Irish Republican Army (IRA): Nationalist/separatist. Base of Operation: Northern Ireland.

Founded over 80 years ago, the IRA is arguably the longest operating terrorist organization in Western Europe. An Ireland fully independent of Great Britain was their founding goal.

After the Irish separatists and the United Kingdom had signed the Anglo-Irish treaty (six countries of Ireland remained part of the UK, known as Northern Ireland) in 1921 the anti-treaty faction founded the IRA in 1922. In 1969, the IRA split into two rival factions, the Official and Provisional IRA. After 1972 the Official IRA declared ceasefire and the Provisional IRA became the de facto IRA, desiring the removal of British troops and the unification of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. After several instances of damaging police informant infiltrations, the IRA reorganized itself into small cells, called Active Service Units, under the leadership of the Army Council, to maintain operational security. However, while the IRA had theoretically agreed that a peaceful solution was the only option (1998); their actions demonstrated that violence was still a viable option. Members continue to engage in criminal activities such as smuggling and robbery.

Related groups:

- Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) • Ally (Suspected)
- Catholic Reaction Force (CRF) • Suspected Alias/Ally
- Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) • Splinter Group
- Official IRA • Splinter Group
- Popular Forces of April 25 • Ally (Suspected)
- Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) • Splinter Group
- Sinn Fein ("Ourselves Alone") • Political Wing
- Irish Northern Aid Organization (NORAID) • Financial Associate

Japanese Red Army (JRA): Communist. Base of operation: Japan, Lebanon.

The JRA was formed after breaking away from the Red Army Faction, a military arm of the Japanese communist League. The JRA and its predecessor sprang from the vigorous student protest movements of the 1960s. They sought to overthrow the Japanese monarchy and bring about an international communist revolution. They formed close ties with Palestinian revolutionary movements through the efforts of the JRA's leader, Fusako Shigenobu. In 1983, Shigenobu told the Japanese press that the group had "left the way of absolute terror." Attacks continued despite this statement, although they were on a much smaller scale than the group's previous activities. In 1987, the Japanese government began a successful campaign to locate and arrest the JRA's leadership. In 2001, the JRA was removed from the list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Related groups:

- Anti-Imperialist International Brigade • Suspected Alias/Ally
- Japanese Communist League - Red Army Faction • Founding Group
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) • Ally

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): Nationalist/Separatist, Communist. Base of operation: Israel; West Bank/Gaza.

The PFLP is a Marxist-Leninist, Palestinian secular nationalist movement. The PFLP was founded in 1967 by George Habash after the crushing defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Inspired by revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology, Habash and the PFLP saw the Palestinian nationalist movement as part of a broader movement to transform the Arab world along Marxist-Leninist lines. The PFLP joined the PLO in 1968 and quickly became the organization's second-largest faction (behind Arafat's Fatah faction). Though the PFLP is committed to destroying Israel, it also opposes conservative Arab regimes. In 1970 King Hussein expelled all Palestinian organizations from Jordan, which is referred to as "Black September", after a series of high-profile terrorist attacks around the world conducted by the PFLP. Faced with decreasing support from the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the PFLP became an increasingly marginalized player in the Palestinian nationalist movement.

The PFLP believes that Fatah, the PLO, and the Palestinian Authority effectively sold out the Palestinian people by agreeing to negotiate with Israel

and they continue to espouse the use of violence against Israeli targets. In 1999, the PFLP leadership reconciled with Arafat and his Fatah faction in an effort to increase the group's role and visibility in the Palestinian cause. In 2002, in an effort to crack down on militants, the Palestinian Authority arrested the PFLP's Secretary General, further straining the relationship between Arafat/Fatah and the PFLP. Because of their actions the PFLP continue to loos ground to both Islamist (Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and secular (Fatah) rivals.

Related groups:

- Anti-Imperialist International Brigade • Ally
- Baader-Meinhof Group • Ally
- Black September • Shared Members
- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) • Splinter Group
- Hamas • Ally
- Islamic Movement for Change • Other Affiliation
- Japanese Red Army (JRA) • Ally
- Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades • Armed Wing
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) • Rival and Ally
- Palestinian Authority • Rival and Ally
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) • Rival and Ally
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) • Splinter Group
- Popular Resistance Committees • Shared Members
- al-Fatah • Rival and Ally

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): Nationalist/Separatist. Base of Operation: West Bank/Gaza.

The PLO was formed by the Arab league in 1964. Consequently from 1964 to 1967, the PLO was largely under the control of the founding Arab states. Following the six-day war in 1967, the Arab states controlling the PLO lost much of their legitimacy. Yasser Arafat, of the terrorist organization al-Fatah, took advantage of the resulting power vacuum and was elected chairman of the PLO in 1969. The group's original goal was to destroy the Israeli state but later became dedicated to the goal of creating an independent Palestinian nation-state. Currently, the PLO feels that Israel has the right to exist if an independent

Palestinian state is established on part of the "historic lands of Palestine." The PLO is an umbrella organization including many of the key Palestinian political groups and terrorist organizations but does not necessarily support the goals of all its consistent members. In 1993, Arafat publicly denounced terrorism and oversaw the official annulment of several sections of the PLO charter which had called for the destruction of Israel. But still, the PLO umbrella contains both political and guerrilla consistencies, some of which are actively engaged in terrorism.

Related groups:

- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) • Faction
- Hezbollah • Ally
- Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP) • Faction
- Lebanese National Resistance Front • Other Affiliation
- Palestine Liberation Front • Faction
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) • Rival
- Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PSF) • Faction
- Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command • Faction
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) • Faction
- al-Fatah • Faction
- al-Saiqa • Faction

Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)/Baader-Meinhof Group: Leftist. Base of operation: West Germany.

Founded in the late 1960s, the Baader-Meinhof Group was a violent leftist organization responsible for several decades of urban terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. Members embraced a blend of several Marxist beliefs, protesting the Vietnam War and the occupation of Palestine and supporting other prominent leftist causes at the time. Baader (the founder), Ensslin (his girlfriend), Meinhof (helped Baader escape from prison) and others trained in terrorist camps in Jordan operated by the PFLP. The trio was captured in 1972, leading to the ascension of the RAF's "second generation", zealots dedicated mainly to securing the release of the group's former figureheads. Baader and Ensslin were found dead in their prison cell after the failed hijack of a Lufthansa plane by the second generation (1977, Meinhof hung herself in her prison cell

one year earlier). In 1998 the group disbanded after five years of virtual inactivity.

Related groups:

- 2nd of June Movement • Rival and Ally
- Popular Forces of April 25 • Ally (Suspected)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) • Ally

Revolutionary cells (RZ): Leftist. Base of operation: Germany.

An important German domestic group is the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Together with an affiliated feminist group called Rote Zora. RZ staged a series of terrorist attacks during 1987, most of which were low-grade bombing and arson attacks against official and nonofficial targets.

2nd of June movement (Bewegung 2 Juni): Leftist. Base of operation: Federal Republic of Germany; Germany.

The 2nd of June Movement was a left-wing German terrorist group that operated in the mid 1970s. They favoured an anarchist path, compared to the Marxist nature of Baader-Meinhof/RAF. The Movement's name was a reference to June 2nd, 1967, the date on which German police killed pacifist protestor Benno Ohnessorg. The group was formed from an earlier German terrorist group, the West Berlin Tupamaros, whose members came from a German socialist commune called "Kommune I". Currently the group is inactive.

Related groups:

- Baader-Meinhof Group • Rival and Ally
- West Berlin Tupamaros • Founding Group

ANNEX II Diagram of transnational connections in the Euroterrorism network

Based on a literature study and the MIPT database it has been possible to draw a diagram of these soft and hard link categories between the two ideological strands of RAF, BR, AD and CCC, and IRA and ETA. This diagram shows the transnational links between terrorist organizations on different categories. It gives a first superficial view of the phenomenon Euroterrorism and the complexity of the connections between the organizations. The diagram and its categories are the starting point of this case study. This study primarily searches for the connections of one or more of the organizations of the two strands of Euroterrorism. Other non-European groups entered the figures because of their connections with the Euroterrorism groups. The linkages between the non-European groups are also touched upon.

With regard to this diagram it should be noted that the diagram is spread out on three pages. The complexity of the linkages makes it difficult to put all the information in one diagram. Therefore, it may seem like the diagram is repetitive. The opposite is true. The diagrams should be read in conjunction with each other.

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| <i>Italic</i> | - Suspected connections |
| Bold | - In these connections both parties are receiving and giving |
| Grey Areas | - Connections marked grey are connections between organizations from the same countries. As the purpose of this study is to analyze transnational connections, these national connections have not been researched in the main body of this case study |

ANNEX II – part 1 of 3

Receiving groups

	RAF	2JM	RZ	BR	CCC	AD	Red Youth/ Red Help/ RRF		Angry Brigade	JRA	ETA	FLB	IRA	INLA	PLO / FATAH / Black Septem-ber	PFLP	FARL	FP-25
RAF				Alliance Strategy Joint attack Ideology Org.ass. Media strat. Methods Protection Weapons AOBO	Alliance Strategy Joint attack Weapons Ideology Methods	Alliance Strategy Joint attack Org.ass. Media strat. Weapons Ideology Methods	Ideology	Strategy		Joint attack	Solidarity		Solidarity Org.ass. Methods	Solidarity	Solidarity Joint attack Org.ass.	Joint attack AOBO Solidarity	Solidarity Org.ass.	Strategy
2JM				Org.ass.			Solidarity		Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity		
RZ					Methods Ideology									Org.ass. Protection Weapons	Solidarity Joint attack Org.ass.	Alliance Joint attack Org.ass.	Solidarity	
BR	Alliance Strategy Joint attack Ideology Org.ass. Media strat. Methods Protection Weapons	Org.ass.			Strategy	Strategy Ideology Methods	Ideology	Strategy			Weapons Solidarity		Solidarity AOBO Org.ass. Weapons	Solidarity	Alliance Org.ass.	Solidarity	Joint Attack Solidarity Org.ass.	Strategy
CCC	Alliance Strategy Joint attack Weapons Org.ass. Protection			Strategy Protection		Alliance Strategy Joint attack Weapons Org.ass. Media strat.		Strategy		Solidarity			Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity Org.ass.	Strategy
AD	Alliance Strategy Joint attack Org.ass. Media strat. Weapons			Strategy Protection Training	Alliance Strategy Joint attack Weapons Ideology			Strategy						Weapons	Solidarity	Solidarity	Alliance Joint attack Org.ass.	Strategy

ANNEX II – part 2 of 3

Receiving groups

	RAF	2JM	RZ	BR	CCC	AD	Red Youth/ Red Help/ RRF	GRAPO	Angry Brigade	JRA	ETA	FLB	IRA	INLA	PLO / FATAH / Black Septem-ber	PFLP	FARL	FP-25
Red Youth/ Red Help/ RRF	Solidarity Org.ass.			Solidarity Org.ass.							Protection		Org.ass.					
GRAPO	Strategy Solidarity			Stragety	Strategy Ideology	Stragety			Ideology					Og.ass.				Strategy
Angry Brigade	Solidarity			Solidarity				Solidarity			Solidarity		Solidarity	Solidarity				
JRA	Joint attack														Solidarity	Alliance Joint attack AOBO	Solidarity	
ETA				Weapons Training								Alliance Weapons	Alliance Methods Weapons		Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	
FLB											Alliance Weapons Org.ass.		Alliance Weapons Org.ass.					
IRA	Solidarity AOBO			Solidarity	Solidarity Org.ass. Methods Training Weapons						Alliance Methods Weapons Training	Alliance Weapons Protection Training			Joint attack Solidarity	Solidarity	Solidarity	

ANNEX II – part 3 of 3

Receiving groups

	RAF	2JM	RZ	BR	CCC	AD	Red Youth/ Red Help/ RRF	GRAPO	Angry Brigade	JRA	ETA	FLB	IRA	INLA	PLO / FATAH / Black Sept.	PFLP	FARL	FP-25
INLA	Solidarity			Solidarity														
PLO / FATAH / Black September	Solidarity Joint attack Org.ass. AOBO Weapons Finance Protection Training	Training	Solidarity Joint attack	Alliance Protection Training Weapons			Training			Joint attack Training	Training Weapons		Joint attack Finance Training Weapons	Training Weapons				
PFLP	Joint attack AOBO Training Protection	Joint attack AOBO Training Protection	Alliance Joint attack Finance Protection Training Weapons				Training			Alliance Joint attack Org.ass. Finance Training Weapons	Training		Finance Training					
FARL			Solidarity	Joint attack Methods														
FP-25	Strategy			Strategy	Strategy	Strategy		Strategy										

ANNEX III Transnational connections per organization



Figure 1: RAF connections within Euroterrorism network




Figure 2: BR connections within Euroterrorism network



Figure 3: AD connections within Euroterrorism network




Figure 4: IRA connections within Euroterrorism network

