



Theoretical Treatise on Counter-Terrorism Approaches

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	INTRODUCTION	3
2.	METHODOLOGY	4
3.	INVENTORY OF COUNTERTERRORISM THEORIES	5
3.1	Policy Perspective	6
3.2	International Relations Perspective.....	9
3.3	Hard Power v.s. Soft Power	13
3.4	Communications Perspective	16
3.5	Economic Perspective	20
4.	GENERALLY ACCEPTED ASSUMPTIONS	23
4.1	Assess the relevant theories.....	23
4.2	Initiate and promote ideological responses	24
4.3	Develop a coherent counter-narrative and communication strategy	24
4.4	Reflect on foreign policy approaches.....	25
4.5	Ensure efficient coordination of counterterrorism efforts	25
4.6	Recognize 'root causes'	25
4.7	Adopt a common definition	26
4.8	Be cautious with violent approaches	26
4.9	Avoid focusing solely on religious-inspired terrorism	27
5.	DISCUSSION ON THEORY AND EVALUATION MECHANISMS.....	27
5.1	Measuring Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies	28
6.	REVIEWING POLICY OF THE EU.....	29
6.1	EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy Measures.....	30
6.2	Theory and Action.....	32
7.	CONCLUSION	33
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	34

1. INTRODUCTION

Countering terrorism has been a top priority for most European countries, following the catastrophic events of 9/11, and especially after the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings. Striking a delicate balance between ensuring the right to security of citizens and respect for human rights has been of utmost importance for the EU in its efforts to combat terrorism. As terrorism poses a serious threat not only to national security, but also to the fundamental democratic values of society, the European Union has adopted a number of important legislative measures and policies to protect its citizens, including an EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (European Union, 2005) and Action Plan (European Council, 2007) with initiatives to enhance police and judicial cooperation, among others. The Strategy introduces four pillars that constitute a framework for the comprehensive and proportionate response to international terrorist threat and include: *prevent* (individuals from turning to terrorism), *protect* (citizens and infrastructure by reducing vulnerability to attack), *pursue* (investigate terrorists and disrupt support networks) and *respond* (manage and minimise the consequences of an attack). With an emphasis on reducing the threat from terrorism and vulnerability to attack, the Strategy requires work at the national, European and international levels. However, while the adopted measures have been a step forward, difficulties in countering terrorism remain due in part to the lack of a clearly defined policy area.

In order to be able to review the EU's strategic efforts to combat terrorism, this report aims to present a study of the theoretical dimension of counterterrorism by focusing on the extended scope of the concept. Thus far there has been no common consensus on a single counterterrorism theory. As such, the literature reviewed in this report takes elements from a number of academic fields in an effort to present a broad view of theories and notions that have continuously contributed to counterterrorism research. Taking stock of previously conducted research from a broad range of disciplines including, international relations, sociology, psychology, communications, conflict studies, economics, and public policy, this report aims to distil a theory-based framework for developing effective counterterrorism strategies. Focusing on those disciplines that contribute to a theoretical notion of the issue, we review the prevailing

literature, categorising the articles and studies into five perspectives. Following an inventory of the literature, generally agreed upon assumptions are highlighted to provide a launch pad for assessing them within the framework of EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Action Plan. Particular attention is paid to the pressing need for development of mechanisms for effectively assessing strategies that are already in place. Building on the knowledge derived from academic literature, the report draws comparisons between the suggestions made by scholars and practitioners and several policy measures outlined in the EU Action Plan.

2. METHODOLOGY

Tasked with researching the theoretical dimension of counterterrorism and providing an in-depth overview of the prevailing scholarly literature on counterterrorism policies, we sought to first and foremost identify studies that have significant relevance to the issue at hand. Given the plethora of research focused on counterterrorism yet providing no single agreed-upon theory, we selected those studies and articles that best addressed specific theoretical aspects of the phenomena. Bearing in mind the scope of this report, we aimed to derive a widespread perspective of a theoretical framework as presented in the literature by focusing on a range of academic fields, including, public policy, international relations, sociology, psychology, communication studies, conflict studies and economics. Furthermore, we sought to identify authors and publications that offered noteworthy contributions to the existing body of knowledge and presented coherent arguments for building a theoretical framework. Striving to find a balance between contextual information and the influential factors of the articles and authors, we referenced a wide range of academic journals and consulted the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) to estimate the impact of the authors and publications.

The methodology certainly bears considerable drawbacks, not least of which is the fact that the SSCI assesses only English language literature and does not contain every important author and article. As such, the selection of relevant literature relied on the combination of factors including a general inventory of the literature, citation indices and bibliographical references.

To further understand the rationale behind literature selection, we take a brief moment to delineate the notion of 'theory' and 'theoretical dimension'. We understand theory to be a multifaceted and systematic relationship between a number of factors contributing to an understanding of an issue. It is more than causal elements in that it denotes comprehensive thinking beyond the obvious, leading to the questioning of what is normally thought to be common sense. Therefore, the theoretical dimension we sought to identify in the literature on counterterrorism should illustrate such thinking. With this in mind, the range of literature included in the report demonstrates the breadth of counterterrorism research and is representative of what we considered as noteworthy insofar as it contributed to our overall understanding of the theoretical dimensions of counterterrorism, offering the necessary suggestions to derive a set of generally accepted assumptions. Ultimately, the research revealed an absence of a concrete single agreed-upon theory, with the literature offering a number of instrumental suggestions for distilling recommendations.

3. INVENTORY OF COUNTERTERRORISM THEORIES

Given the lack of an internationally accepted definition and relative absence of concrete, agreed-upon theories of terrorism as a phenomenon, it is perhaps not surprising that there is a similar shortage of theories on how to combat it. Furthermore, due to the increased complexity and wider threat of the terrorist phenomenon vis-à-vis the influx of actors, range of motivations, strategies and tactics, assessing the available means on how to counter such threats is essential in guiding counterterrorism policy-making. Taking an inventory of the prevailing literature, we highlight studies, reports and book chapters that contribute to an existing body of knowledge, provide suggestions for further conduct and assess the current state of affairs. Drawing on research from a broad range of fields and disciplines that integrate various approaches, we seek to present an extended view of research and suggestions that contribute to the theoretical notions on counterterrorism.

Categorising the literature into five previously mentioned perspectives we introduce overviews of significant works by academics and practitioners as they relate to each field of study.

3.1 Public Policy Perspective

Looking at counterterrorism through a policy lens allows us to examine the relationship between different forms of terrorism and the general policy principles necessary for countering it.

Since counterterrorism efforts constitute actions taken by governments to hinder attacks or curtail the consequences of terrorism, the formulation of counterterrorism policies should reflect its underpinning goals and mission. Distinguishing the types of counterterrorism practices available to governments is one way of structuring theoretically based suggestions for future measures. Pointing out the difference between proactive and defensive measures, for example, Todd Sandler attempts to draw conclusions on the implications each has for coordinated multilateral counterterrorism actions (2005: 75). Sandler's understanding of proactive measures is the targeting of terrorists and their supporters with the aim of weakening the ability of the enemy to operate and subsequently reducing the occurrence of attacks (2005: 75). Defensive measures, on the other hand aim to protect potential targets and seek to decrease the amount of damage caused by an attack (2005: 78).

Further outlining the goals governments may have in countering terrorist threats, Boaz Ganor distinguishes three aims of counterterrorism policies: 1) eliminating terrorism, 2) minimizing damage caused by terrorism and 3) preventing escalation of terrorism (2005:25-6). The goal of eliminating terrorism is grounded in the desire to eradicate the adversary by removing the incentive to commit terrorist acts and use violence (Ganor, 2005: 26). In other words, the destruction of a terrorist organization is the ultimate goal, albeit perhaps one of limited probability. Minimizing damage caused by terrorism may include efforts to reduce the number of future attacks or prevention of certain types of attacks such as suicide bombings or mass killings. A decrease in the amount of damage done to property and infrastructure may also be of relevance. Preventing the escalation of terrorism, according to Boaz, is based on ensuring that the conflict does not spread as well as making certain that the scope of attacks does not escalate further (2005: 26). As such, governments will seek to preclude an

organization from gaining certain political achievements, including receiving support from foreign countries.

Clearly demarcated goals allow policymakers to formulate counterterrorism policies that are based on an analysis of successful tactics that have been used in the past. Additionally, policies should be “within the bounds of some basic assumptions about the sorts of actions acceptable to a democratic society and capable of absorbing change as a result of research and new data” (Wardlaw, 1982: 66). The lack of a theoretical framework, however, calls for governments to ensure that policies are developed in a way that allows for flexibility in action and decision-making (Ganor, 2005: 45).

In her contribution to MIPT’s report, “The Organization of Terrorism”, Martha Crenshaw encourages governments to “think beyond conventional measures” when considering counterterrorism policies (Crenshaw, 2007: 25). As there is no single and consistent model of terrorism, with terrorist organizations capable of adapting and continuously developing, different structures of terrorism require different policies (Crenshaw, 2007: 27). Advocating cooperation between local police and intelligence agencies, Crenshaw maintains that among the most essential measures democratic governments can take in countering terrorism is understanding the motivations and processes of radicalization (Crenshaw, 2007: 25). Furthermore, according to Crenshaw, acknowledging that the threat cannot be eliminated entirely is an important element to bear in mind in developing strategies. She argues that despite the voluminous information and intelligence, gaps in knowledge will persist providing an incomplete picture for disrupting terrorist activities entirely. As such, flexibility in strategies ensures that assumptions can be constantly tested against reality (Crenshaw, 2007: 26).

Further illustrating how the threat of terrorism is perceived by various governments, David Omand – UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator and Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005 – provides an overview of the state of affairs in the EU. In his article “Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy” (2005), Omand argues that collective efforts of combating the developing threat of terrorism are weakened due, in part, to the absence of an internationally recognized and agreed upon long-term and comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. As such, the lack of a theoretically based framework continues to hinder the common international understanding at

the European level of “what we are really fighting and what strategy we are following” (2005: 115).

Highlighting the notion that terrorists’ most effective weapon is their use of ideology driven by the underlying strategic thinking of their leaders, Omand contends that it is not enough to simply eradicate the source (i.e. terrorist cells or leaders of terrorist organizations), but that a fundamental change in ideology is essential (Omand, 2005: 109). In order to address ideology, the author recommends taking stock of the impact of Western economic, foreign and development policies, as well as taking account of legitimate concerns with regard to all parts of the community that could potentially feed a cycle of radical consciousness (2005: 114).

A similar ideological response is advocated by Rohan Gunaratna in his article “Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward”, in which he maintains that bridges must be built between the government(s) and the Muslim communities (Gunaratna in Ellis, 2007: 64). One of the ways for countering terrorism, Gunaratna maintains, is engaging the community and building platforms in which moderate clerics can preach tolerance. Fostering an environment where interfaith initiatives can be nurtured would alleviate deep misunderstanding and suspicion between the different communities (2007: 63). One example of such societal bridges can be the creation of Muslim Contact Units within police departments that would help empower moderate Muslims to counter radicalization by establishing norms and ethics against extremism and terrorism within the Muslim communities (2007: 64).

As different governments perceive the threat of terrorism in different ways, the subsequent legislative, policing and intelligence measures undertaken by them also vary, producing often uncoordinated initiatives. With the adoption of the 2002 Framework Decision as well as the introduction of the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the European Union has undoubtedly taken steps in the right direction, however as Omand points out “without a greater degree of convergence of understanding ... it is hard to see how the world-wide threat can be contained and eventually eliminated” (2005: 108). While the author does not make an explicit distinction of where the diverging nature within the EU policy is currently found, one can suppose that the difference in implementation of measures by the member states is but one of the precluding factors.

3.2 International Relations Perspective

An international relations perspective offers insights into how states can tackle global issues of terrorism within the international system. Specifically, the role of EU member states is evaluated in their efforts to combat terrorism at the EU level.

In his article "Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework" (2007), Jeremy Pressman presents a number of challenges for governments to consider in developing counterterrorism strategies. Historically, Europe witnessed a surge in national terrorism with groups such as the IRA in Ireland and ETA in Spain that were driven mostly by national territorial objectives tied to a single state. Throughout the years the situation has changed with the emergence of transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda whose aspirations are not territorially bound. This distinction plays an important role in understanding how to effectively combat terrorist threats. For example, many policies that might be successful against national terrorist organizations may not be as useful in the transnational context (Pressman, 2007: 64).

The fundamental difference between national and transnational terrorist organizations lies in the geographic scope, with national groups utilizing the world stage to achieve certain national objectives. In contrast, transnational organizations operate in many different countries with the aim of achieving a more regional if not global impact (Pressman, 2007: 64). Furthermore, while transnational means such as the World Wide Web are certainly available to and employed by national terrorist groups, such networks are less likely to seek mass casualty attacks than their transnational counterparts. As nationalist and separatist terrorist groups fight for the interests of people living in a particular region, they often depend on those same people for support and are hesitant of causing mass destruction. Moreover, as mass-casualty terrorism inevitably affects not only the enemies but also to a certain degree some of 'their own people', the role and self-perception of the terrorists as freedom fighters is limited (Pressman, 2007: 66).

Distinguishing between national and transnational terrorism, Pressman maintains that standard tools for countering terrorism, including sanctions, negotiations and deterrence, decrease in value when the terrorist group's target

is not limited to a single state (2007: 67). Furthermore, as ideologically motivated transnational terrorism is difficult to root out, rather than focusing on an outright victory, countries should aim to keep the terrorists off-balance and in constant need of repair, replenishment and rebuilding (2007: 71). Consequently, a broad counterterrorism coalition, rich in cultural and international diversity, is needed to effectively combat transnational terrorist networks.

Pressman further cautions against relying on policies that are not specifically suited for countering transnational threats. Such policies according to the author are not only ineffective, they may also be counterproductive. According to Pressman's recommendations, an effective counterterrorism strategy should highlight the importance of allies, rejecting the temptation for unilateralist policies that can alienate potential allies and undermine ties to others whose cooperation is essential for countering the threat (2007: 72).

In his work "The EU and Counter Terrorism" (2005), Daniel Keohane – senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, provides a number of meaningful insights of counterterrorism measures of the EU. Short of providing a theoretical framework, Keohane nonetheless discusses the efforts of the EU and comprising member states to develop effective counterterrorism strategies from a practitioners' point of view.

Keohane argues that the European Union could and should do more to assist member states' governments in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. However, he admits that the EU's ability to tackle terrorism is limited due, first and foremost, to the fact that it is not a national government. Additionally, as counterterrorism spans across a number of policy areas, coordination between member states has been difficult to achieve. While EU governments agree that long-term political approaches are essential in trying to overcome terrorism (Keohane, 2005: 8), the legal process of dealing with terrorists, for example prosecution, varies between member states. Similarly, although many agree that the "EU is the only organisation where European governments can collectively 'join up' the counterterrorism parts of their law enforcement, foreign and defence policies" (2005: 15), Keohane points out that "the EU has been slow to build an effective institutional infrastructure for counterterrorism, while EU governments have been sluggish in implementing parts of the counterterrorism action plan" (2005: 23).

According to Keohane, a mix of political, judicial, police, diplomatic and possibly military means can provide a long-term, multifaceted approach to countering terrorism (2005: 25). Furthermore, the author proposes a strategy built around three tactical elements: integration, investigation and insulation. Each of the elements contributes to the overall aim of isolating potential terrorists from their supporters, supplies and targets (2005: 25). The suggested three-pronged approach echoes the EU's commitment to combat terrorism while respecting human rights, based on the four pillars outlined in its Counter-Terrorism Strategy – prevent, protect, pursue and respond.

Working through the analysis, Keohane stresses the importance of coordination and information sharing (investigation), rapid and efficient response to emergencies in an effort to protect citizens and critical infrastructure (insulation), as well as making counterterrorism a foreign policy priority (integration). Moreover, an argument is put forth for the creation of a cross-institutional body - a European Security Committee (ESC) - to overcome institutional obstacles and advise European heads of government on security matters (Keohane, 2005: 20). Keohane envisions the ESC as a body able to identify and quantify threats of terrorism and offer suggestions for effective responses. However, as official EU policy continues to place the responsibility of implementing counterterrorism measures with national governments, the process of sharing powers such as investigation and prosecution as well as resources, poses difficulties for effective cooperation at the EU level.

While acknowledging that the EU has made progress in its efforts to encourage governments to improve law enforcement and judicial cooperation, Keohane nevertheless offers several indispensable recommendations to further advance counterterrorism strategies at the EU level. For example, intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation with key third countries, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia should be deepened through training missions of police and security forces. However, the author acknowledges that the practical costs associated with such endeavours may inhibit its implementation in practice. Moreover, Keohane recommends a reconsideration of the EU's long-term policies towards the greater Middle East, putting more effort into encouraging democratic reform throughout the region. Lastly, counterterrorism should be placed at the core of EU external relations, ensuring that all committees and action plan measures are geared toward

achieving the same basic aim (Keohane, 2005: 38). As advocated by Omand, a truly international understanding and implementation of a 'counter-narrative' is vital for Europe to make progress and maintain the critical foundation they have already established in combating terrorism.

Beyond rhetoric, putting in place the acceptable and justifiable means of coordinated efforts in pursuing terrorist networks is of utmost importance (Omand, 2005: 110). Reflecting the EU's strategic commitment to counter terrorism, Omand maintains that "[s]ecurity cannot be achieved within a single country. Intelligence, police and military efforts need to be coordinated and information exchanged in a secure and timely way" (2005: 110). Furthermore, controlling and protecting borders, as well as ensuring the security of international transport are important considerations in counterterrorism strategies.

Recognizing that there is not a single correct organisational model that will fit all nations given their different traditions and legal systems, the author nonetheless insists that intelligence structures, processes and coordination mechanisms that have worked for nations in the past should be re-evaluated against the development of new threats (Omand, 2005: 114). While Omand does not present any concrete suggestions on which coordination mechanisms have been successful, he does emphasize that "underpinning each of these campaigns must be good intelligence" (2005: 114). For example, good public information which includes "honest and direct communication of the steps ... with proper justification that they are legitimate and proportionate for public protection" is important for securing public support (Omand, 2005: 115). Additionally, clear agreement on the long-term threat can be helpful in what the author terms effective international liaison. Specific EU-wide contributions like common arrest warrants and proposals for retention of communication data are also important for the pursuit of terrorist networks and bringing terrorists to justice (Omand, 2005: 115).

It may be argued that the policy recommendations provided by Omand do not fall into the category of direct scientific theories on counterterrorism. However, the author's perspective does contribute to the broader understanding of what the EU can do as well as the steps it has already taken in dealing with the threat of terrorism.

3.3 Hard Power v.s. Soft Power

The following section aims to provide an overview of military (hard power) and conciliatory/diplomatic (soft power) measures for managing conflicts and countering terrorism. The utilization of air strikes as a counterterrorism strategy will be used as an example of hard power, while conciliation will be discussed in terms of soft power options.

Former terrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of Defense, Michele L. Malvesti, presents in her study "Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy" (2002) a strategic evaluation of the United States' previous use of military air-strikes as a counterterrorism strategy. Analysing the circumstances leading up to and following three case studies, Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993 and Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, the author concludes that experience reveals "this option is a blunt, ineffective instrument that creates a cycle of vengeance" (Malvesti, 2002: 17). Stopping short of adopting a comprehensive theoretical framework, as previous authors have, Malvesti nevertheless contributes meaningful insights for evaluation of U.S. counterterrorism policy, focusing on two concise objectives: 1) countering and deterring current threats (prevention), and 2) holding terrorists accountable for their actions (accountability) (2002: 18).

Focusing on the three failed attempts to achieve U.S. counterterrorism policy objectives of *prevention* and *accountability*, Malvesti points out that none of the air strikes prevented further acts of terrorism (2002: 20). In fact, rather than thwarting the ability or intent of the perpetrators, in two of the three cases the U.S. raid seemed to perpetuate the hostilities. Perhaps the gravest example of the ineffectiveness of past U.S. counterterrorism air strikes is the unwavering determination of Bin Laden and his organization Al-Qaeda, to continue launching terrorist attacks (2002: 22).

With this in mind, the author considers overt military action as one of the most aggressive counterterrorism instruments available and regards them as a "tool of hostility and punitive action rather than one of justice" (Malvesti, 2002: 23) - a policy option that is often opted for when emotions are raw.

Conciliation has been another strategic approach used by governments in countering terrorism. In his 1995 article "Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy", Peter Sederberg presents his arguments for considering conciliation – a means often considered to be a sign of weakness in the current discourse (for an in-depth discussion see "Decline in Terrorism" chapter in TTSRL Workpackage 3). Basing his argument on the notion that if terrorism is just one of the tactics available to a challenger group engaged in a political struggle, then negotiation and possibility of conciliation should be regarded as an option within a wider political context of countering terrorism (1995: 295). Furthermore, Sederberg considers how the two major models presented as a theoretical notion of terrorism – the war model and rational actor model – incorporate conciliatory strategies. Outlining a number of strategic and tactical considerations in determining the appropriateness of a conciliation strategy, Sederberg argues that governments have historically engaged in various forms of conciliation with groups that have used terrorism to attain certain goals. "Regime concessions have ranged from ransom payments for the release of hostages to formal political accommodations with their antagonists to bring about a cessation of hostilities" (Sederberg, 1995: 295-6). As such, Sederberg identifies factors that affect the success of a conciliation strategy including the imperativeness of clarifying the context for discussion, shifting rhetoric to account for differentiating the act of terrorism from the actor and delineating terrorist tactics from other forms of violence used in political struggle. Additionally, credence ought to be paid to widening the range of response, where "negotiation, compromise, and conciliation rest at the heart of democratic political processes, but commentators usually dismiss them as irrelevant or even dangerously ineffective" (Sederberg, 1995: 298).

Echoing Malvesti's arguments regarding the adverse affects of military action, Sederberg cautions against judging conciliation and negotiation in terms of an idealized strategy; rather, he advises that both measures should be considered in alignment of what occurs in the real world (Sederberg, 1995: 299). Lastly, the author highlights the notion of time as another important factor to bear in mind when considering conciliation as part of a comprehensive strategy. "What works over the short run, may not work over the longer term, and vice versa," warns Sederberg (1995: 299).

Given the evidence of success for ending or curtailing terrorist incidents with short-term concessions, Sederberg posits that "long-term concessions may contribute to either the transformation or the disintegration of the challenger" (1995: 305). Such an approach however, is largely shaped by the ideological character of the terrorist (or challenger group). While Sederberg acknowledges that concessions "may also encourage passive supporters to defect from the challenger movement" (1995: 307), he points out that the differences in ideology, i.e. secular versus religious based, should not be overlooked as the success of conciliatory tactics will vary. Furthermore, the challenger's ideology has a bearing on the choice of conciliatory strategy as transformation or disintegration of the challenger movement (Sederberg, 1995: 308). Quoting Bruce Hoffman, Sederberg highlights that "religiously motivated challengers are more likely to view their struggle in totalistic terms ... resist[ing] utilitarian calculations in their political decision-making," whereas secular motivation for increased autonomy within a political community "offers greater promise for a conciliatory strategy of transformation" (1995: 308). This argument is revealed in the ideological position of the challenger group, which Sederberg argues can be held neither consistently nor sincerely. As such, the author considers that a "lack of sincerity opens possibilities for political transformation" and a "lack of consistency creates openings to promote disintegration through defections"(Sederberg, 1995: 308).

In an effort to illustrate conciliation as a counterterrorism strategy, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita introduces a complex formal model of interactions between governments and terrorist organizations. The model is based on the hypothesis that terrorist organizations become more militant following government concessions (de Mesquita, 2005: 146). According to de Mesquita, the increase in militancy occurs because it is the moderate terrorist factions that most often accept government concessions, leaving room for extremist factions to take control (2005: 146). Consider for example the termination in peace talks between the Spanish government and ETA after the unexpected and devastating bombing of Madrid airport in late December 2006. Having deceived even its political wing, the terrorist group carried out the attacks without the usual warning of a breach in cease-fire, leaving the Spanish government and law enforcement and security authorities in a peculiar situation of not knowing ETA's future motives or strategies.

Interestingly, the author also argues that the moderate leaders are particularly interested in striking a deal with the government when their control over their organization is beginning to decline (de Mesquita, 2005: 163). This is ultimately due to the fact that if moderates permit extremists to take control, the potential government deal will not be as favorable (2005: 164). As such, “moderates want to appear to have control over the extremists before an agreement but ... after concessions ... might be reluctant to crack down too strongly for fear of undermining their bargaining leverage” (de Mesquita, 2005: 171). Furthermore, the model illustrates that when concessions are offered, the level of violence may increase so long as the loss of resources is not too large.

With this in mind, considering conciliation as a counterterrorism strategy is important in that it offers a broader range of responses. However, the employment of such an approach largely depends on a government’s view of terrorism. Those that consider terrorism as a form of warfare (for example the United States) often engage in repressive responses. In contrast, those who view terrorism as a crime (European Union) may support more legal solutions like conciliation. An often-cited example is the situation in Northern Ireland.

3.4 *Communications Perspective*

The broad field of communication studies offers a unique perspective for developing effective counterterrorism strategies based on practices found within the larger framework of communications.

In “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter-Narrative Strategy’” (2005), William Casebeer and James Russell provide an explanation of counterterrorism strategy using communication theory. They argue that a “grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit from a comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell; understanding the genesis, growth, maturation and transformation of terrorist organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for undermining the efficacy of those narratives so as to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups” (2005: 3). The authors build on story-telling theories developed by Gustav Freytag and Patrick Hogan, known as the Gustav Freytag Triangle. Freytag believed that narratives follow a general pattern of a beginning, presentation of the problem, and an ending. Hogan amplifies this by stating that most plots involve an agent (a hero

or protagonist) striving to achieve a goal and a series of events driven by their attempt to achieve some objective (Casebeer et al, 2005: 4).

According to Casebeer and Russell, storytelling is fundamental in structuring human thought. Stories are "rich in metaphors and analogies" and "affect our most basic attitudes toward the world" (2005: 5). Furthermore, they reason that much of the root causes of terrorism – such as social deprivation and alienation from society – pertain to human psychology. Pointing to one of the best known "stories" associated with terrorism and often employed by Islamist terrorists groups – Benjamin Barber's "Jihad versus McWorld" (1992) – the authors argue that creation of myths is essential in perpetuating narratives conducive to terrorist activities. Stories have influential properties in that they affect the ability to recall events, motivate people to act, modulate emotional reactions to events, cue certain biases and ultimately even constitute identity (Casebeer et al, 2005: 5).

For terrorist groups, the creation of myths through weaving together of narrative elements provides a basis for developing an emotionally compelling ideology that manipulates and influences the susceptibility of a population (Casebeer et al, 2005: 8). One of Al Qaeda's foundational myths for example, involves the antagonistic narrative that "The West" is its first and most formidable enemy. Disrupting such a myth, thus involves development of a counter-narrative that both undermines the original story and offers an alternative – a "better story"– than that presented by the terrorist organization. With this in mind, the authors posit that "an effective counter-narrative strategy will require understanding of the components and content of the story being told" by a terrorist group (Casebeer et al, 2005: 11).

According to Casebeer and Russell, terrorism research to this point has failed to "come to grips with the narrative dimensions of the war on terrorism", and that is a "weakness already exploited by groups such as Al Qaeda" (Casebeer et al, 2005: 3). It is important to note the "multiple critical roles" narratives play throughout the life cycle – genesis, growth, maturation, and transformation - of terrorist groups. During the genesis of the organization, narratives provide incentives for recruitment help justify the needs for organizations, reinforce and create identities and solidify leadership roles. Throughout the growth period, they reinforce specific obligations of the terrorist group and its foundational myths. And finally, during maturity, narratives serve

as insulation against environmental change, continue to motivate members and channel organizational thought. Narratives are also used to prolong the group's survival, by allowing the organization to adapt, change goals, or modify its structure. Therefore, during transformation, narratives can smooth the transition to new organizational forms and provide the foundation for revived identities (Casebeer et al, 2005: 7).

The authors argue that counterterrorism specialists should effectively use narratives in combating terrorism by telling a better story or creating alternative exemplars that do not advocate violence. One of the reasons individuals become "at risk" within certain populations is the failure of those individuals to identify with a member of a non-violent, non-state actor or member of the government or occupying power (Casebeer et al, 2005: 9). As illustrated by the report on Decline of Terrorism in Workpackage 3, providing non-violent means and creating alternative exemplars provides a way out for those individuals dubbed "at risk". Furthermore, given the power of metaphor to shape human thoughts, shifting metaphors used to frame worldviews could change their reasoning about the situation. Any action that diminishes the ability of a terrorist group to sell a mythical interpretation of the struggle is therefore an effective use of story telling (Casebeer et al, 2005: 10). Alternatively, a few critical slips by key public representatives may entrench an antagonistic narrative (Casebeer et al, 2005: 12).

The value of Casebeer and Russell's research for an EU counterterrorism strategy lies in its understanding of how a failure to tell good stories can lead to an increased terrorist threat and risk of attacks. The impact of language rhetoric should not be underestimated by public representatives, for it influences human thought and has a profound affect on how an audience perceives the world at large. In combating terrorism, this means that one of the counterterrorism measures implemented by EU member states should be to present a unified narrative front to their audience. This audience includes not only domestic populations, but also terrorist groups worldwide and – most importantly - those residing in Europe who are vulnerable to radicalization and susceptible to violent ideologies.

A vital instrument for such an initiative is the use of mass media. An in-depth analysis of the complex and symbiotic relationship between terrorism and media coverage will be discussed in Workpackage 4, aimed at describing how the

media influence the perception of a terrorist threat. For purposes of this report however, the mass media will be considered as a tool for countering terrorism.

As mass media shapes public opinion and is often used by terrorist organisations to promote and advocate their cause, so too should it be used as a vehicle for countering the narratives of such organisations. With a proven track record of raising awareness and helping fight poverty, disease and illiteracy, mass media should be utilised in conveying counterterrorist messages. One of the seven strategic strands in Rohan Gunaratna's counterterrorism recommendations, development of a media strategy and communications plan should be an integral part of any counterterrorism policy.

"As the terrorists seek to exploit the media to reach out to their existing and potential supporters and sympathizers, it is imperative for governments and the wider counterterrorism community not to neglect the mass media" (Gunaratna in Ellis, 2007: 68). Furthermore, governments can utilize the media to educate the masses on fundamental concepts and important terminology. For example, setting the record straight on the difference between Islamism versus Islamist, as it applies to terrorism, is an important element in the overall education and fostering of understanding for the religion of Islam. Gunaratna points out that contrary to public perception, Islamism is a political rather than a religious ideology. Thus, when the terms Islamism or Islamist are used, they imply the political interpretation of Islam (2007: 68). Clearing up such misunderstandings and misinterpretations via mass media communication signals a governments' commitment to countering terrorism, without isolating and potentially further alienating members of the Muslim communities. While the role of the media can and by normative accounts should contribute to counterterrorism policy, its role is frequently seen as an obstacle to such efforts. For a more detailed analysis please see objective 1 of Workpackage 4.

In their study "Belgium and Counterterrorism Policy in the Jihadi Era (1986-2007)", Rik Coolsaet and Tanguy Struye de Swielande offer an overview and assessment of the country's specific efforts to combat Jihadi terrorism. One example of the governments' efforts is the great care given to using non-stigmatizing language and increasing awareness of the fact that the Belgian government does not cultivate anti-Muslim or anti-Arab bias (Coolsaet et al, 2007:18). The authors maintain that the Belgian police and intelligence officers recognized early on that religion was not of the essence, as Jihadi terrorism is

often linked to bitterness, frustration and humiliation (2007:19). As such, “the Belgian authorities have gone to great lengths to make clear that not Islam is being targeted, but instead extremist and terrorist acts of whatever origin or justification” (Coolsaet et al, 2007: 19).

3.5 Economic Perspective

With the aim of providing a comprehensive account of the theoretical literature, an economic perspective was chosen to illustrate how an untraditional analysis can be relevant in guiding counterterrorism policymaking. For a more detailed evaluation of the European economic vulnerabilities to terrorism, assessing the efficient and appropriate response options, see Workpackage 5.

In their study “An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism” (2004), Todd Sandler and Walter Enders¹, indicate how economic analysis can be applied for enlightened policymaking with respect to transnational terrorism. Using modern economic game theory, an economic perspective is applied to a political problem, producing several recommendations based on economic methods. According to the authors, while an encompassing theoretical framework is absent, economic methods can provide important policy insights through strategic interaction (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 1).

Game theoretic studies of counterterrorism consider whether a stated policy by a government will have the intended consequence by weighing costs and benefits. The authors perceive terrorists as rational actors who strive to maximize expected utility (or net payoffs) from the consumption of basic commodities created from their terrorist and non-terrorist activities (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 18). The “price” terrorists have to pay in order to employ their tactics is anticipated to differ based on security measures taken by the government. Therefore, according to the authors, policy makers should take substitution effects in account (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 19). For example, the relative success of metal detectors in terms of a reduced number in hijackings may lead to an increase in other kinds of terrorist attacks. As such, government policies aimed at a single type of terrorist event adversely shift its relative price,

¹ Todd Sandler is a Professor of International Relations and Economics at University of Southern California. Walter Enders is a Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of Alabama.

resulting in a substitution for less expensive modes of attack (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 19). Testing for such factors included vector autoregression analysis (VAR), allowing for potential interactions among various terrorist time series in response to government policies (2004: 20). From their analysis, Sandler and Enders derive at the following conclusions.

To address possible substitutions and complementarities, the authors propose a three-prong strategy: 1) governments should make the terrorists substitute into less harmful events, 2) governments must go after the terrorists' resource endowments including the group's finances, leadership and members, and 3) the government must simultaneously target a wide range of terrorist attack modes, so that the overall rise in the prices of terrorist attacks becomes analogous to a decrease in resources (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 20). In other words, raising the price for all modes of terrorist attacks would influence terrorists to shift into non-violent actions to air their grievances. Such recommendations however are vulnerable to the extent that the authors acknowledge that there are fundamental difficulties in assessing counterterrorism strategies using game theory.

In their expanded 2004 study entitled "Transnational Terrorism: An Economic Analysis", Sandler and Enders maintain that every policy to thwart terrorism based on an economic analysis would require its own stream of costs and benefits calculations (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 25). While it is fairly simple to calculate costs, benefits calculations are less transparent. Moreover, the true benefits from a decrease in future terrorist attacks in terms of lives and property saved are even more difficult to compute as counterfactual information is required (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 25).

Another economic perspective contributing to the analysis of policies aimed at countering global terrorism can be found in Sandler's "Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism" (2005). Through game theory analysis the study examines efforts of coordinated action by a number of nations in response to a common threat of transnational terrorism. Exploring the collective action dilemmas or asymmetries that confront nations as they address a global terrorist threat, the author distinguishes between proactive and defensive conducts on which policy makers generally build their antiterrorism strategy. Confirming the findings of other works including prior research of his own, Sandler points out that some proactive measures have a potential downside in that they tend to

provoke a terrorist backlash (2005: 78). For example, "making one type of attack harder without affecting the costliness of other types of attacks, then such partial measures can merely induce terrorists to substitute one mode of attack for another relatively cheaper one ..." (Sandler, 2005: 78).

Sandler uses economic game theory to examine efforts to pre-empt a terrorist group – for instance by attacking the terrorists' bases and training camps. He continues comparing the outcomes with a generic defensive policy – for instance protection against terrorist attacks by fortifying vulnerable targets. He concludes "if countries realize that defensive measures may merely divert attacks abroad where their people and property are still targeted, then there will be a smaller tendency to overspend on defensive measures" (Sandler, 2005: 90). Moreover, since many counterterrorism actions – such as freezing terrorists' assets and no-negotiation policies - require sufficient transnational coordination, the possibility exists of non-participating countries severely undermining the efforts of the co-operators. As a result, if the number of participants required for cooperative gains to be realised increases, the associated assurance probabilities also increase (Sandler, 2005: 90).

An alternative dilemma that characterizes the relationship between targeted nations and their terrorist adversaries is the fact that while terrorists can identify and attack virtually every target, nations must guard everywhere. Therefore, beyond some point, government size can limit its effectiveness in waging an antiterrorist campaign, due to the number of targets that must be protected (Sandler, 2005: 79). Another asymmetry essential to countering terrorism is the false sense of security national strength provides. Moreover, "the high value that governments place on their autonomy over security matters also inhibits their addressing collective action issues successfully" (Sandler, 2005: 80). Finally, the association between democracy and transnational terrorism presents a public choice dilemma, while recent terrorism literature has shown that there appears to be a positive association between terrorism and democracy (Sandler, 2005: 89). Sandler argues that several factors in a liberal democracy, such as freedom of press and extensive media coverage of terrorist attacks, can provide a favorable environment for cultivating even more transnational terrorist activities (2005: 89). For example, terrorists can take advantage of the media to publicize their cause through news coverage of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the media often plays a paradoxical role in that reports of

terrorist attacks often serve to further create an atmosphere of fear solidifying the events in the public consciousness. Sandler goes on to highlight that freedom of association – another basic right of a democratic society – is also conducive to terrorism (2005: 89). A detailed explanation of association as a precursor to radicalization and recruitment can be found in Workpackage 4, objective 5.

4. GENERALLY ACCEPTED ASSUMPTIONS

Having reviewed prevailing studies and reports in an effort to isolate a theoretical framework for counterterrorism, it is apparent that an accepted overarching theory is still lacking. As such, this section aims to highlight nine commonly accepted notions distilled from the literature review. Comprised of suggestions from the authors highlighted in previous sections, the commonly held beliefs are presented in the form of recommended considerations and are intended to serve as a basis for guiding future counterterrorism policymaking. Rather than separating the featured approaches into corresponding perspectives, they are presented in random order as follows: 1) assess relevant theories, 2) initiate and promote ideological responses, 3) develop a coherent counter-narrative and communication strategy, 4) reflect on foreign policy approaches, 5) ensure efficient integration of counterterrorism efforts, 6) recognize 'root causes', 7) adopt a common definition, 8) be cautious with violent approaches, and 9) avoid focusing solely on religious-inspired terrorism.

4.1 *Assess the relevant theories*

Working in concord with scholars and practitioners who examine and assess theoretical notions contributing to counterterrorism, isolating generally agreed upon assumptions can be a step forward in contributing to the development of policies aimed at combating terrorism. A multi-dimensional approach that considers the contextual complexity of terrorism and counterterrorism is useful in developing strategies and shaping policy. As there are numerous scattered theories on counterterrorism, focusing on delineating or emphasizing social theories, for example group dynamics, can bear fruitful results and shed additional light on formulating counterterrorism measures. Furthermore, as will

be discussed in the following sub-sections, measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies is essential in distinguishing not only whether measures are effective, but also whether they may produce harmful or counter-productive results (Lum et al, 2006).

4.2 *Initiate and promote ideological responses*

Community engagement is an essential element of an ideological response to terrorism. Engagement in and promotion of inter-cultural dialogues and interfaith initiatives can help alleviate deep-rooted misunderstandings. When considering religious-inspired terrorism, lending support for the preaching of moderate clerics can help raise awareness and tolerance of different views without resorting to extremism (Gunaratna, 2007). Recognising that terrorism thrives on bitterness, frustration and humiliation, avoiding the use of politically charged rhetoric can reduce the likelihood of alienating vulnerable groups from society. Drawing on prior experience of member states, citizens of Arab descent and/or Islamic background should be made aware that at the EU level “not Islam is being targeted, but instead extremist and terrorist acts of whatever origin or justification” (Coolsaet et al, 2007). Lastly, encouragement of engagement and cooperation within the political context is one way to build cultural and societal bridges between government and certain Muslim communities.

4.3 *Develop a coherent counter-narrative and communication strategy*

Analyzing counterterrorism within a communication framework illustrates the imperativeness of considering a coherent counter-narrative as part of a larger communication strategy. As Casebeer and Russell’s research denotes, the impact of language rhetoric is significant and has a profound affect on how audiences perceive the world at large. Developing a coherent communication strategy is essential in presenting a unified narrative domestically and abroad, where audiences are vulnerable to radicalization and susceptible to violent ideologies. Echoing the findings of many other scholars, Marc Sageman contends that “[w]inning the media war to label terrorists as criminals rather than brave mujahedin is especially important to eliminate the appeal of self-sacrifice for a cause and discourage potential terrorists from engaging in such behaviors” (2004:

176). Moreover, the media should be engaged in further educating the public, serving as a counterterrorism measure in itself given the fact that “terrorists seek to exploit the media to reach out to their existing and potential supporters and sympathizers” (Gunaratna, 2007).

4.4 Reflect on foreign policy approaches

As counterterrorism spans a number of policy areas, it should be taken into account that declining support of European member states’ foreign policies in Muslim regions may have a negative impact on the views and opinions of Muslims living inside the EU’s borders. Although the EU member states have engaged in development programs abroad – with initiatives that include promoting inter-cultural dialogue and supporting improvement of law enforcement – additional attention should focus on “ensuring that all committees and action plan measures are geared toward achieving the same basic aim” (Keohane, 2005). Difficulties in implementing such an approach at the EU level however, arise due to a lack of common agreement on foreign policy initiatives among the governments which comprise the EU.

4.5 Ensure efficient integration of counterterrorism efforts

Discrepancies between counterterrorism policies at the EU level and national law enforcement of member states should be limited in scope. Additionally, while the primary responsibility of combating terrorism lies with the national governments, timely implementation of EU measures must be ensured. Since national police and intelligence services carry out the majority of counterterrorism work collaborating only marginally with their peers in other countries, “national governments tend to see EU agreements ... as useful rather than crucial in their fight against terrorism” (Keohane, 2005). With this in mind, the EU should use its leadership role in guiding national governments by encouraging the sharing of experiences and cross-border cooperation between member states.

4.6 Recognize the ‘root causes’

Despite a sizeable volume of research aimed at understanding the causes of terrorism, no significant progress has been made in isolating specific factors

since the pioneering research of Martha Crenshaw in 1981. Distinguishing between preconditions (root causes) and precipitants (trigger causes), Crenshaw sought to isolate factors that set the stage for terrorism. Over the years Crenshaw has been instrumental and influential in furthering terrorism and counterterrorism research. In one of her more recent works, she points out that “government security services must also recognize that they cannot eliminate the threat [of terrorism] entirely” (2007). As such, assumptions should be continuously tested against reality. Given the increasing fear of radicalization among parts of Europe’s Muslim immigrant communities and the imminent threat of so-called “home grown terrorists”, making a serious effort to recognise the motivations of persons and groups to radicalise is one of the keys to understanding terrorism and subsequently developing successful counterterrorism strategies.

4.7 *Adopt a common definition*

One of the most generally accepted assumptions in terrorism research is the paramount importance of espousing a universally accepted definition of the phenomenon. There is still widespread difference in perception of what exactly constitutes terrorism. Although the EU has adopted a definition of terrorism through its 2002 Framework Decision, which serves as the foundation on which the Union’s counterterrorism policies are based, an encompassing internationally accepted definition is still lacking (for a complete discussion on definitions please see “Defining terrorism within the EU” in Workpackage 3). As the EU continues to press the member states of the United Nations to adopt a common definition, our research has found that its absence is among the essential elements precluding the formulation of an internationally accepted counterterrorism strategy (Keohane, 2005). The widespread agreement among scholars and practitioners alike, however, is that despite the difficulty in generating a coherent definition of terrorism, great steps have been taken towards coping with the threat of terrorist violence.

4.8 *Be cautious with violent approaches*

Scholars from various disciplines stress that military intervention as a counterterrorism measure should be employed only as a last resort. Given the potential backlash challenges posed by policies based on proactive strategies (Sandler, 2005), the biggest challenge is developing a counterterrorism strategy that causes as little harm as possible. While military action may serve as an effective measure to impair the capabilities of terrorist organisations leading to a reduction in some forms of terrorist threat, such actions may also lead to an increase of the support and number of recruits for the terrorist organization. In effect, any strategy that is legally questionable in terms of violation of international law, human rights norms or has the potential to challenge democratic values should be seriously reconsidered (Lum et al, 2006).

4.9 Avoid focusing solely on religious-inspired terrorism

Although counterterrorism research in recent years has concentrated mainly on various forms of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on this type of terrorism. While the terrorist threat posed by radical Jihadi Muslims is currently a top priority for EU governments, Islamist-inspired terrorism is not the only form of terrorist violence Europe has experienced. As such, various academic and professional publications state that it is essential to bear in mind that terrorism can take a variety of forms and appearances, posing a threat to communities of all nationalities, religions, political or ideological backgrounds.

5. DISCUSSION ON THEORY AND EVALUATION MECHANISMS

The preceding sections provide an inventory of prevailing literature from a broad range of disciplines in an effort to distill a theory-based framework for counterterrorism. Reviewing counterterrorism measures and approaches found in fields of political science, communications and economics among others, we have highlighted conclusions drawn by scholars and practitioners with the aim of extracting generally accepted notions to guide future counterterrorism policymaking. Acknowledging that literature focusing solely on a theoretical dimension is scarce, with an agreed-upon encompassing theory yet to be introduced, the report nonetheless concludes that the reviewed articles, book

chapters and studies continue to generate thought-provoking research for scholars and policymakers alike.

5.1 Measuring Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies

Research has shown that a theoretical framework is undoubtedly needed to formulate coherent counterterrorism strategies, however there is also a pressing need to develop evaluation mechanisms. Measurement of the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies remains largely unexplored, with only a handful of empirically tested studies conducted. With the aim of assessing the strength and scope of evaluation of counterterrorism programs, Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy and Alison J. Sherley conducted a comprehensive analysis of scientifically-based evaluations, publishing their findings in a study entitled "The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies: A Campbell Systematic Review" (2006). Focusing on research that directly addressed the issue of strategy evaluation, the authors developed strict criteria of selection and included works using rigorous scientific methodology to assess a program or policy designed to detect, prevent, respond to or manage terrorism (Lum et al, 2006: 14).

Beginning with a broad search for empirically-based evaluation studies, the authors came up with a list of 20,000 general reports that had the potential to shed light on the problem, of which only 1.5% even "remotely discussed the idea that an evaluation had been conducted of counter-terrorism strategies" (Lum et al, 2006: 13). Further narrowing down the search through literature reviews, the authors identified 21 studies that satisfied their minimum criteria of counterterrorism evaluations. Focusing next on the strength of the methodology employed in the studies, Lum et al derived at a total of seven reports that satisfied their rigorous criteria (2006: 18)².

With a final list of seven pertinent reports, Lum et al analyzed the research findings of overall effects of counterterrorism strategies. Finding that "across all interventions studied, there does not seem to be a consistent indication of positive effects of counter-terrorism policy" (Lum et al, 2006: 22), the authors explored a set of six specific categories of intervention: 1) increased security screening and installation of metal detectors at airports; 2) increased protection

² The final seven reports that satisfied the criteria for further analysis include: Landes (1978); Cauley and IM (1988); Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990); Enders and Sandler (1993); Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994); Enders and Sandler (2000); Barros (2003)

of diplomats or fortified embassies; 3) increased severity of punishment for apprehended or convicted terrorists; 4) use of UN Resolutions against terrorism; 5) use of military and/or retaliation attacks; and 6) changes in political governance. A thorough statistical analysis of each category revealed that the most commonly used interventions often do not produce the results expected from the theoretically based assumptions of non-evaluation related literature (Lum et al, 2006: 32). In other words, the counterterrorism strategies employed in the study at best fail the litmus test of successful evaluation, and at worst lead to an increase in terrorist activities.

While the authors acknowledge that an increase may be short term, the evidence nonetheless illustrates the need for additional and concrete evaluation of employed counterterrorism measures. Of all the recommendations for policy and further research initiatives offered, perhaps the most compelling is the need for researchers to “explore ways in which terrorism strategies can be analyzed ” (Lum et al, 2006: 36), as well as different methodologies that can be utilized to bring about additional understanding of the processes and its consequences.

6. REVIEWING POLICY OF THE EU

The role of the EU has been strengthened through a number of initiatives taken by EU member states to protect its citizens against terrorism (de Vries, 2005: 3). The formulation of a common definition through the adoption of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (Council of European Union, 2002), and drafting of The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of European Union, 2005) significant progress has been made in the EU’s strategic commitment to combat the global threat. However, given that the EU is not a national government, it cannot go it alone in the fight against terrorism.

Spanning a number of policy areas, the concept of counterterrorism is not clearly delineated in the EU’s strategies, requires action from various government departments across member states (Keohane, 2005: 3). In other words, in order to successfully combat the threat, national governments must coordinate all the ministries and agencies involved in the process, not just those dealing with law enforcement or border control. To complicate matters further, collective efforts must also be coordinated across all governments in order to achieve a truly unified effort at the EU level. With this in mind, it is perhaps not too difficult to

recognize the paradox of the EU's role in counterterrorism. National governments agree that cooperation at the EU level is important, but they are slow to grant the Union enough powers and resources to effectively tackle the problem (Keohane, 2005: 3). Assessing whether the tactical measures taken by the EU are in line with the theoretical assumptions of counterterrorism strategies found in prevailing academic literature is thus an important step in furthering the understanding of what is required both at the EU and member states' level.

6.1 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy Measures

Focusing on the tactical recommendations made by the authors in the abovementioned literature review, we extracted those suggestions that were relevant at the tactical or strategic level and could be categorized into the four pillars of the EU strategy. Furthermore, the aim of this list was not to assess all the measures in the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy, but rather to illustrate how the generally accepted notions derived from literature could be evaluated against the measures already in place.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on four strands: prevention, protection, pursuit and response. With each strand aimed at combating global terrorism - while respecting human rights and allowing EU citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice - the strategy outlines the objectives of each strand as follows (Council of European Union, 2005).

- **Prevent:** The first objective is to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalization and recruitment in Europe and internationally.
- **Protect:** The second objective is to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce vulnerability to attacks. This includes improved security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure.
- **Pursue:** The third objective is to pursue and investigate terrorists across borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt supportive networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and to bring terrorists to justice.
- **Respond:** The fourth objective is to prepare the EU member states, in the spirit of solidarity; to manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attacks, by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath; the coordination of the responses; and respond to the needs of victims.

	Literature-based Recommendations	Policy Strand*	EU Policy Measures**	Status
1.	Reflect on foreign policy approaches	Prevent, Respond	- International dimension: assistance to priority third countries and strengthening of international cooperation.	Ongoing
2.	Develop a coherent counter-narrative and communication strategy	Prevent; Respond	- Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism: develop non-emotive lexicon for discussing radicalization; discuss role of media.	Ongoing
3.	Initiate and promote ideological responses	Prevent; Respond	- Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism: empower moderate Muslim voices.	Ongoing
4.	Ensure efficient integration of counterterrorism efforts	Prevent; Protect; Pursue; Respond	- Assessment and analysis: enhance cooperation and conduct more detailed (academic) studies. - Information gathering, analysis and exchange: emphasize responsibility of member states. - Judicial cooperation: enhance capacity of EU institutions such as Eurojust.	Annual/ Ongoing
5.	Recognize and tackle 'root causes'	Prevent; Pursue	- Disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism: prevent radicalization and recruitment. - Promote security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all: target inequalities and discrimination. - Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism: empower moderate Muslim voices	Ongoing
6.	Adopt common definition	Prevent; Protect; Pursue; Respond	<i>Steps have been taken as a result of the 2002 Framework Decision to develop an EU definition, but a universally accepted definition is still missing.</i>	Ongoing
7.	Be cautious with violent approaches	Prevent; Pursue; Respond	- Military rapid response capability to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist attack.	Ongoing

8.	Avoid focusing solely on religious-inspired terrorism	Prevent; Pursue	<i>Although the 2007 Action Plan does not include policy measures focusing on this recommendation; the measures contained within the Plan place significant concentration on Islamist-inspired terrorism.</i>	TBD
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* Prevent, protect, pursue and/or respond

** Based on EU Terrorism Action Plan 2007

The above table depicts some of the relevant elements of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy as they relate to the literature-based recommendations. While the measures within the EU documents are generally broad, we can nonetheless draw a few interesting conclusions. First, the table illustrates that most of the EU measure are ongoing and are in the process of being integrated by the member states. The key issues and recommendations derived from the literature seem to parallel the views of the EU. For example, from the literature it is evident that an ideological response in the form of lending support for the preaching of moderate clerics can help raise awareness and tolerance of different views. Correspondingly, the EU Action Plan mirrors these sentiments by encouraging and empowering the prevalence of moderate Muslim voices. Similarly, the EU acknowledges the need for effective information gathering, analysis and exchange, emphasizing the responsibility of member states in integrating this approach. The following section provides additional information and insights and serves as a basis for an evaluation of theory and action.

6.2 Theory and Action

In an effort to understand how the EU's strategic efforts fare against the theoretically based recommendations, we distinguished a set of recommendations from the literature that may lay the groundwork for future measures insofar as it provides counterterrorism with a basis in scientific research. Comparing some of the suggestions derived from the literature to the measures formulated in the Action Plan as outlined in the EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy, a number of overlaps can be observed.

For example, the Action Plan outlines efforts to develop non-emotive lexicon for discussing issues concerning the terrorist threats, as well as widening the inter-cultural dialogue within and outside the Union. These measures are in line with the recommendations derived from our literature in that Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande maintain the importance of using non-stigmatizing language and making citizens of Arab descent aware that the government(s) nourishes no anti-Muslim or anti-Arab bias.

Similarly, as suggested by the literature, coordinated inter-governmental actions representing a unified narrative front to the target audience is essential for breaking down the ideological appeal of Islamist terrorism. As such, the Action Plan has made efforts to improve coordination with international organizations on managing the response to terrorist attacks and other crisis. Finally, recommendations for encouraging member states to learn from each other's experiences are reflected in measures aimed at making the best use of EU and Community level research activities.

While not all literature-based recommendations were compared and contrasted, the table illustrates that the practical measures at the EU-level are often in-line with the theoretical assumptions from the literature. However, there are still a number of gaps that remain within our matrix that may be filled by actions taken by national governments. As the ultimate responsibility for countering terrorism lies with the national governments, it is important to understand that "the role of the EU in fighting terrorism ... is to assist member states, not to supplant them" (de Vries, 2005: 8). With this in mind, emphasis needs to be placed on the need for improved collaboration and cooperation efforts, as well as implementation of EU directives across member states; a necessity if true cohesion in countering terrorism is to be attained at the EU level.

7. CONCLUSION

In this report, an overview of the prevailing literature from a broad range of disciplines has been provided in an effort to distil a theory-based framework for developing effective counterterrorism strategies. Based on the inventory, this report illustrated that while there is an abundance of discourse on counterterrorism theories, a universally accepted theoretically based strategy is yet to be formulated. Suggestions drawn from the literature, such as the pressing need to develop a mechanism for evaluating counterterrorism strategies or enhancement of multicultural programs can add constructive knowledge to the practical side of policy making. However, despite the fact that practical measures and theoretical assumptions do often overlap – as depicted by the table above – it is perhaps premature to conclude that the field of counterterrorism studies is ready to serve as a firm basis for counterterrorism policymaking.

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