



Measures of Counterterrorism and their Effect on Civil Peace

24 November 2008
Deliverable 8, Workpackage 4

'Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society'

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A project financed by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme



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1. Introduction

An important feature of the struggle against terrorism is the question to what extent counterterrorism measures affect society, and more specifically what effect these measures have on civil peace and processes of radicalization. This paper analyses how measures of counterterrorism have affected civil peace including processes of radicalization. The paper examines these trends on the basis of interviews with researchers, official sources, NGOs, and documentary evidence including secondary literature.

Section 2 assesses the potential negative effects of counterterrorism measures analysing their implications in terms of radicalization and conflict. Section 3 of the paper examines whether governments have introduced measures to mitigate the possible negative impact of counterterrorism measures.

The concept of civil peace is used to indicate a condition apposite to civil war (Rupesinghe and Anderlini, 1998). However, civil peace is more than the absence of war. For the purpose of this deliverable civil peace is defined as a condition of enduring social, economic, and political stability, such that the thought of taking up arms against one's government (or against an enemy defined in some way or another) becomes inconceivable (Centre for the Study of Civil War, 2008).

While civil peace relates to trends and change at the national and macro-political level, radicalisation relates to changes in perceptions and behaviour of individuals and groups. Radicalisation is defined as a process of adopting an extremist belief system and the willingness to use, support, or facilitates violence and fear, as a method of effecting changes in society. Radicalisation can take place within any extremist group (from left/right wing groups to environmentalist, separatist and terrorist groups). It is important to note that radicalisation, as such, does not necessarily have to result in terrorism and the use of violence (Precht, 2007: 45).

An important feature when analysing processes of radicalisation is that the impact on radicalisation can be both direct and indirect: direct when policy change or other social phenomena are directly leading willingness and commitments to extremist action, indirect when policy change or other phenomena lead to changes in the breeding ground of extremist environments.

The paper is mainly based on interviews conducted in five countries identified in the previous research on civil peace (TTSRL, 2008). The countries are Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. They have been identified

comparing 10 indicators of civil peace.¹ In these countries qualitative interviews have been undertaken with research specialists working in the field of countering terrorism, with civil servants being responsible for monitoring processes of radicalization or collecting information on it, and with NGO representatives monitoring the human rights and the rule of law situation in the country.

The paper addresses two overriding issues:

- To what extent have counterterrorism measures negatively impacted on civil peace and radicalization? Is it possible to identify the consequences of these measures and what did they bring about in terms of tensions and social unrest, trust, and human rights deterioration (section 2)
- What measures by states – if any – have been undertaken to counter the negative effects of counterterrorism as identified in section 2 (section 3).

2. Assessment of the Negative Effects of Counterterrorism Measures on Civil Peace

In this section it will first be examined whether counterterrorism measures have had a negative impact on civil peace or led to radicalization in five European states (section 2.1). Secondly, based on these country studies some general findings and conclusions on the relationship between counterterrorism measures and civil peace and radicalization will be discussed (section 2.2).

¹ See TTSRL 2008: *Indicators of Civil Peace and Conflict in Europe. The Character of Social Unrest*. 10 April.

2.1. Counterterrorism, Civil Peace and Radicalization. The Interpretation from Case Countries

Denmark

While the Danish Intelligence Service (PET) emphasizes that the number of radicalized persons willing to engage in terrorist activities is small, PET states that the number of individuals prone to terrorist activities (e.g. extreme political participation) is increasing.

"It is the assessment of PET that in terms of rhetoric as well as behaviour, there are indications of a development in a more radical and militant direction, and that there is a willingness of some circles to employ more serious methods" (Report from the Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration 2008: 15 [translated from Danish]).

According to official sources, radicalisation frequently occurs in leftwing as well as in rightwing groups (ibid). The latter has used the situation of the cartoon crisis to create polarised situations between Danish citizens and some Muslim groups, while the leftwing groups have come together in connection with demonstrations in Copenhagen concerning the decision of authorities to close a youth house. However, what is also implied in the official discourse is that threats of terrorism derive primarily from extremist Islamic groups (PET, CTA, retrieved 2008).

The cited official sources are keen to stress that softer measures of equal treatment, diversity strategies, dialogues, and combating racist or discriminatory practices are vital efforts in the process of containing radicalization. Nevertheless, the same sources do not make the inference that counter-terrorist strategies are important reasons why young people (principally men between 15 and 24) become radicalized. The effort to employ softer measures is not seen primarily as a means to curb possible negative effects of counterterrorism measures, but is rather justified by the belief that such measures in combination with harder measures are effective tools in preventing radicals to turn into terrorists.

According to the researchers interviewed, there is no clear direct causation between the enhanced counterterrorism measures after 2005 in Denmark and

growing threats of terrorism.² Perceived measures of discrimination, and notably, the recent (2008) decision to expel terrorist suspects who are not Danish citizens administratively without a court ruling are estimated by the researchers to have negative implications – e.g. in the form of distrust in public authorities and a feeling of being subjected to special procedures short of normal rule of law standards – in the environments where there are reasons to suspect that potential terrorists may operate.

During 2007 and 2008 the stop and search zones were introduced to apprehend youngsters wearing knives to contribute to perceived discrimination as the zones are narrowly linked to the suburban areas where the minorities stay. Also, external events or political manifestations, like e.g. the continued detention of prisoners at Guantanamo at variance with e.g. fair trial requirements, are used by recruiters operating in these environments.

One NGO representative with knowledge from the mosques and the sub-urban areas where young Muslims reside stressed that the increased surveillance of the police and the security services in these areas did not bring increased tensions and conflict of more serious nature, but contributed to the fact that young Muslims became more reluctant in practicing their religion, at least in public places. Indirectly, the intensified surveillance of counterterrorism has therefore implications for freedom of religion, see section 67 of the Danish Constitutional Law and article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The interviews also confirmed that the recent demonstrations and protest fires in suburbs in and around Copenhagen could not be linked in any direct way to counterterrorism measures, but rather to confrontations between police forces and young marginalized groups who entered into confrontations for various reasons that had relation to terrorism.

In summary, counterterrorism measures are not estimated to have a direct bearing on radicalisation and social unrest in Denmark. As mentioned recent social unrest has been triggered by other factors. However, counterterrorism measures and

² Interviews with Lars Erslev, research specialist on terrorism, Danish Institute of International Studies, with Tina Maggaard, University of Århus, research specialist on terrorism and religious ideology, and with a member of Retssikkerhedsfonden [Rule of Law Security Fund] respectively 22 April, 21 May and 26 May, 2008.

the sense of discrimination may enter into the structural breeding ground of radicalization together with other factors.

With regard to human rights deterioration and terrorism, the scholars and NGOs interviewed acknowledge that a sense of discrimination prevails among those minority groups who are also subject of surveillance. This has also been acknowledged by the authorities who are embarking on various measures to diminish such tensions. The decision by the government during the beginning of 2008 to expel administratively terrorist suspects may however further contribute to the tension, as stressed by researchers and NGOs. Indirectly, it was emphasized, enhanced surveillance may also infringe upon freedom of religion.

France

Like many of its European counterparts, France has a lively migration tradition with many immigrants from former French colonies having migrated to France. In the 1960s France attracted many labor-immigrants from Southern Europe and the Maghreb countries in order to sustain the economic growth the country was experiencing after the Second World War. Integrating in the French society proved to be a difficult task for these newly arrived groups, as exemplified by the high level of ethnic segregation that was and still is prevalent and can be seen in the ghettos which surround big French cities. The French immigration debate has been stirred up by right-wing politicians such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and his party *Front National* as early as the 1970s. Le Pen argued for a severe restriction of immigration and he has been regularly accused of xenophobia. Interestingly, contemporary French migration has been characterized by a high level of discrimination and racism towards immigrants.

This view is supported by many human rights reports. The official US State Department Report on Country Human Rights Practices, which monitors the human rights situation globally, stated in 2001 that "*anti-immigrant sentiments led to some incidents of violence and discrimination, including occasional attacks on members of the large Arab/Muslim and black African communities*" (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2001: 6). France's National Consultative Commission of Human Rights (NCCHR) reported an increase in the number of racial threats and incidents in 2001 and 2002. During the latter year Le Pen qualified for the second round of the French

presidential election. In 2003 the number of racist attacks decreased to 232, but in 2004 an increase occurred with 600 racist acts committed (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2005). The incidents of violence directed against the Muslim community have thus become quite frequent during the most recent years. Attacks on mosques occurred. Islamophobic websites preaching violence and even racist murders also appeared.

A widely discussed issue was the government proposal to introduce legislation that prohibits the wearing of religious symbols in public schools and government workplaces. However, the debate was mainly directed at Muslim girls and the wearing of veils. The French republic has been known for its principle of *laïcité* which can be regarded as the concept of a secular state. In December 2003 this principle was reinstated when President Chirac said that "secularism is not negotiable" (U.S. Country Report, 2003: 6). In March 2004 the Parliament passed the law that banned the wearing of "conspicuous religious symbols" in public schools. In the public discourse this issue has been discussed at length and increased societal tensions.

Discrimination and racism towards minorities mainly occur with regard to employment, housing and leisure activities (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2006). In 2003 the NGO SOS-racism alleged that "racist hiring practices prevented minorities from Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia from equal access to the workplace". The NGO investigated whether employees were discriminated on the basis of race and sued a company which did not hire people with a "Maghrebin-sounding" first name (U.S Country Report on Human Rights, 2003: 11). Over time the police services were also charged with racism on several occasions. The U.S. report on 2003 mentions that the "*police brutalized and insulted suspects with racial comments*".

The problems French society faces, with reference to the historical relationship between autochthones and immigrants, became visible during the urban riots in 2005 and 2007. In October 2005 two boys were electrocuted when they hid in a power substation because they believed the police were following them. The incident "triggered three weeks of social unrest that began in the suburbs of Paris where there are large concentrations of immigrant and minority populations, plagued by poor housing conditions and high unemployment" (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2005: 13-14). The rioting soon spread to nearly 300 communities throughout the

country. In 2007 riots erupted after two teenagers died when their motorcycle collided with a police vehicle.

As can be seen there are numerous examples of societal tensions in France within recent years. But what role if any play counterterrorism measures in furthering the described societal tensions or in disturbing civil peace and creating a more radicalized society? The two research specialists interviewed acknowledged that some counterterrorism measures have been perceived as discriminatory. However, it must be noted that most of these measures were not regarded as counterterrorism measures, but as general security measures. Because of the long-standing problems in the *banlieus* (suburban areas), security measures such as stop and search undertakings and passport controls have been used for a long time. Although a lot of problems exist with regard to the police and ethnic minorities, these are not due to counterterrorism measures, but reflect the wider societal problems concerning immigration and integration.

According to Christophe Bertossi, fellow researcher at the *Institut Français des Relations Internationales*, the French state added security into the integration agenda, but did not connect this with terrorism. He doubts whether counterterrorism measures have engendered radicalization, but thinks that it can possibly lead to further societal alienation of ethnic minorities.³ However, this has already been a long standing problem in France with regards to "normal" security measures and discrimination of minorities. This view is supported by Michel Wieviorka, director of the *Centre d'Analyses et d'Interventions Sociologique*, who claims that terrorism and radicalization are not heavily debated issues in France, whereas migration and integration policies are. Examples of security measures being perceived as discriminatory are security checks at airports, passport controls, body searches and stop and search undertakings. According to both interviewees there are no specific examples of counterterrorism measures engendering radicalization.

According to Michel Wieviorka radical Islam was not at stake during the riots taking place during 2007; the riots were caused by broader social problems such as discrimination and social exclusion. Wieviorka thinks that these problems are exacerbated because France is a Republic and the French state has promised a lot to

³ Christophe Bertossi, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (13 June, 2008)

its immigrants, but has not been able to fulfill its republican promises summarized in the motto "*liberté, égalité, fraternité*", since inequality still persists.⁴

To summarize, there have been considerable ethnic tensions and incidents in France since 2001. However, these tensions reflect the long standing problems French society faces with integrating immigrants. There is absolutely no evidence that counterterrorism measures lie at the heart of these problems. Even though some security measures are being perceived as discriminatory, they are not regarded as counterterrorism measures and have not led to further radicalization. If anything, in France the public discourse mainly deals with topics such as immigration and integration, and not with terrorism and radicalization as such.

The Netherlands

Even though the social and societal context of the Netherlands has already been described in other parts of TTSRL⁵ a brief overview of the most well known cases of social unrest will be presented here. Apart from written documentation, the US State Department Reports on the Netherlands and the official NCTb report⁶ are used. The information retrieved from interviews with experts will be employed in order to see if the incidents of social unrest can be attributed to counterterrorism measures. The interviewees were divided into several groups. The groups consisted of governmental officials engaged in counterterrorism, terrorism and radicalization scholars from two different Dutch universities, a terrorism researcher working at a human rights organization and a Dutch politician.

Just weeks before the attacks on US soil of 9/11, a Dutch columnist and university lecturer, Pim Fortuyn, announced his renewed political ambitions. Mr. Fortuyn was a well-known commentator on Dutch politics and focused increasingly on the social tensions he perceived between the native Dutch population and Muslim immigrants. The majority of these immigrants had come from Morocco and Turkey during the 1960s and 70s when the demand for labour force had increased sharply

⁴Michel Wieviorka, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (29 April, 2008)

⁵ See also deliverable 2, WP2, www.transnationalterrorism.eu

⁶ The National Coordinator For Counterterrorism (NCTb), Justitie and Ministerie von Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, retrieved July 2007. *Radicalization in Broader Perspective*. Den Hague

and could not be met by the Dutch population alone. Some of the comments voiced by Fortuyn were not new as they had already been expressed by right wing politicians, such as Hans Janmaat, leader of the Centrum Democrats, in the 1990s. In the case of Fortuyn however, the 9/11 attacks proved an accelerating factor in spreading the message and gaining acceptance for it. As such, the U.S. Report on 2002 mentions that “[i]n late 2001, there was a sharp increase in anti-Muslim incidents, including vandalism, arson, the defacing of mosques or Islamic institutions, harassment, and verbal abuse in public places, directed particularly at women wearing headscarves” (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2002: 3). This is corroborated by the statistics made available via the Fifth Monitor on Racism and Extremism⁷ which shows that 60% of the incidents took place after 9/11, even though the overall number of incidents was still lower than in 2000. This decline in incidents compared to the year 2000 persisted even in the face of the murder of Dutch columnist van Gogh in November 2004. Similar to the development after 9/11, there was a sharp increase in the number and intensity of incidents, but no statistics are available for the overall number, so no deductions can be made. Corresponding to the rise in incidents in 2005 (296) compared to 2003 (260), the U.S. Country Report on 2005 mentions that it found “societal discrimination and violence against some religious and ethnic minorities” (U.S. Country Report, 2005: 1) a growing human rights concern. This negative development was also mentioned in the reports on 2006 and 2007, even though the Dutch government “pursued a comprehensive outreach campaign to counter anti-Muslim sentiments, stressing that the majority of Muslims fit comfortably into Dutch society” (U.S. Country Report, 2006: 4). Overall, the U.S. reports attribute reasons for these societal abuses and rising tensions to a number of outspoken politicians, such as Geert Wilders (U.S. Country Report, 2007: 3), who seemingly fill the void left by the deaths of Fortuyn and van Gogh as critical commentators.

Based on the interviews with the aforementioned group of terrorism experts, this section will describe if any, and if so, which, counterterrorism measures have also played a role in furthering societal tensions or radicalization under the Muslim

⁷ This Monitor is the only national means of retrieving numerical data on racist or right wing incidents. The fifth issue of the Monitor was retrieved via <http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?PID=44&LID=1> on 23rd of June 2008

population.⁸ All interviewees acknowledged that certain counterterrorism measures, for instance screening at airports, passport controls, other security check regulated measures, could trigger feelings of discrimination. These feelings however, can only originate after feelings of irritation have been coupled by the perception that these measures are only aimed at a specific group of people. Jean Tillie, a radicalization scholar at the University of Amsterdam, argues that some counterterrorism measures may have increased the chances of radicalization, but have never served as a primary cause. In his research on radicalized Islamic youth in Amsterdam, Tillie found that the radicalization process was accompanied by strong feelings of discrimination. In turn, Tillie and Slootman state that "discrimination can lead an individual to turn away from society and orient themselves on their own group, which provides the safety of a common identity. This is often coupled with a greater emphasis on religion" (Slootman and Tillie, 2006: 48). Therefore, feelings of discrimination can reinforce the radicalization process. This view is supported by a research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice regarding radicalization processes in Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The report states that "no single factor can be considered 'causal' in the radicalization process" (Precht, 2007: 32). Nevertheless, the report mentions that experiences of discrimination and injustices are important background factors for radicalization processes.

Two very concrete measures mentioned by some interviewees were regarded as engendering radicalization: measures regarding the freezing of assets and something known in Dutch as *persoonsgericht verstoren* (a measure to intentionally disturb a person in his private life). Both governmental officials as well as independent researchers mentioned that both these measures were so specifically geared towards one individual, with very visible and direct effects, that it might radicalize the individual even further. Beatrice de Graaf, assistant professor at the university of Utrecht, refers to an incident in which a radicalized female Muslim was subjected to individual disruption. Before the tactic was applied her parents cooperated with the police out of concern for their daughter's well-being. However, they refrained from doing so after a period in which their daughter was being followed. According to De Graaf in this particular case individual disruption led to the exclusion of the suspect's

⁸ One should bear in mind however that the Netherlands only adopted counterterrorism measures in the Dutch Penal Code in 2004, taking effect in 2005, so that the majority of the years and developments within those, cannot even be considered.

Umwelt, her parents. De Graaf deems it important to involve the *Umwelt* whilst dealing with radicalized Islamic youth, a position also stressed by Tillie.⁹ Another example of police interference leading to further radicalization can be found in Tillie's research. During one of the interviews held with radicalized youth an interviewee claims that because his brother was detained by the police in 2004, he started to radicalize himself.¹⁰

Even though the freezing of assets and individual disruption can engender radicalization, all experts agreed that this process would by then already be under way and would be intensified or accelerated by the adopted measure. Regarding the general disruption of society and the concept of civil peace however, none of the respondents could point to any of the counterterrorism measures as being disruptive of that.

Finally the NCTb report comments on the risk of terrorist attacks in 2007: "*All in all there is a clear threat of jihadist terrorist violence in the Netherlands. Estimating the level of this threat has now become a process structured to the minutest detail, implemented with great care. Aspects of concretisation and imaginability are included in the process in a balanced manner. Whereas for a considerable time the threat was substantial, at present (July 2007) it can be described as limited*" (NCTb 2007, 30).

By and large, it is disconcerting to see the rise of social tensions, especially between different religious and ethnic groups, and associated incidents over the past few years. It is quite fortunate however, that no evidence can be found that counterterrorism measures lie at the heart of this negative development. Even though at times they might have had an effect on certain, targeted, individuals, they do not seem to have any perceivable effect on the behaviour of society at large. Moreover, official sources report a decreased threat during the most recent period.

United Kingdom

⁹ Beatrice de Graaf, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (May 13, 2008) & Jean Tillie, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, Amsterdam, (May 26, 2008)

¹⁰ Jean Tillie, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, Amsterdam, (May 26, 2008) & Sloopman & Tillie (2006) 'Processes of radicalization. Why some Amsterdam Muslims become radicals.', pp. 93

Below an assessment is undertaken of the effects of counterterrorism measures on the civil peace in the United Kingdom. Firstly, an overview of the most well known incidents of social unrest will be presented. The information is based on written documentation from 2001 onwards. The information retrieved through interviews with experts will be used to establish whether incidents of social unrest can be attributed to counterterrorism measures. The interviews were conducted with three terrorism and radicalization scholars, two parliamentarians, and a government official. In addition to this, information from human rights organizations as well as official government reports was used.

The United Kingdom (UK) has a lively migration history, with many immigrants from the Commonwealth having migrated to the UK. From the 1950s until the 1970s a lot of immigrants from the Caribbean and South-Asia (e.g. Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) came to the UK to fulfil the labour shortage that existed after the Second World War. It is interesting to note that these newly arrived ethnic groups found it difficult to integrate in the British society, as exemplified by the high level of ethnic segregation that was prevalent. In addition to this, a February 2000 report commissioned by the Home Office stated that some religious groups, among them Muslims from Southern-Asian descent, reported being discriminated against on the basis of their religious beliefs (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2001: 7). From April until July 2001 these findings became painfully visible when tensions erupted during several violent riots between whites and people from Southern-Asian descent in Northern England. During these riots hundreds were injured and severe property damage was reported (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2001:8).

According to the report commissioned by the Home Office the riots erupted due to ethnic segregation and severe polarisation between different ethnic communities. The report, therefore, urged to increase community cohesion (Cantle, 2001). This view is partly supported by Jeffrey Murer, research fellow to the Centre for the Study on Terrorism and Political Violence at Saint Andrews, who states that the 2001 riots were expressions of frustration to long-standing social problems such as race-relations and discrimination.¹¹ The US Report on 2001 mentions that "isolated attacks against Muslims occurred throughout the country after the September 11 attacks in the United

¹¹ Jeffrey Murer, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (26 June, 2008)

States" (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2001: 7). Several NGOs stated that after the attacks of 9/11 an increase in negative attitudes towards Islam occurred. This view is supported by the U.S. Report on 2003 and 2004; reports on both years mention that attacks against Muslims, including verbal and physical abuse, occurred. From 2004 onwards the ethnic tensions grew worse. A 2004 investigation into racism in the police service pointed to discrimination within the service as well as to the fact that some officers were making racist statements (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2004: 2). The Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) reported that "approximately 85 incidences of Islamophobia occurred between January and November" (U.S. Country Report on Human Rights, 2004: 4). This statement was supported by the Muslim Council of Britain who claimed that Islamophobia-related incidents had increased and the Muslim community was facing an increasing bias from the police. Towards the end of 2004 the police arrested the leader of the far-right British National Party on suspicion of incitement to racial hatred. Prior to his arrest, several other member of the Party were arrested because of their involvement in racially motivated hate crimes (U.S. Country Reports, 2004: 4).

After the London bombings in July 2005 the number of hate crimes increased considerably. Within three days after 7/7 about 180 race-related incidents were reported in which one man of Pakistani descent died (U.S. Country Reports, 2005: 3). This number is supported by the European Monitor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia which reports a "sharp increase in faith related hate crimes".¹² Furthermore, a large number of acts of vandalism and arson took place. The number of race-related incidents remained quite high throughout 2005 until 2007. The U.S. report states that Victim Support, a charity assisting persons affected by crime, received "29,995 referrals for assistance with racially motivated incidents between April 2005 and March 2007, a 42 percent increase from 2004-05" (U.S. Country Reports, 2007: 7).

Based on the interviews held with the abovementioned group of terrorism experts, this section will describe if any, and if so, which, counterterrorism measures have played a role in furthering societal tensions or radicalization under the Muslim population. The assessment is undertaken against a background where the Home

¹² European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 'The impact of 7 July 2005 London bomb attacks on Muslim communities in the EU' See online at: <http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/London/London-Bomb-attacks-EN.pdf>

Office currently (September 2008) is estimating the situation as regards a terrorist threat as "severe", i.e. – "an attack is highly likely".¹³

All interviewees acknowledged that some counterterrorism measures have been perceived as discriminatory. This has mainly been the case with the police undertaking "stop & search" methods and detaining alleged suspects without formal charge. These measures have been extensively debated in Parliament and criticized by human rights organizations and Muslim groups, such as the Muslim Council of Britain, alike. The U.S. reports of several years mention the fact that the Muslim community as well as independent researchers found that minorities were more likely to be stopped and searched. In addition to people from Muslim descent, the Caribbean community also suffered discrimination in this respect. More broadly directed security measures, such as passport controls, body searches and screening at airports, were also mentioned by the interviewees. Despite the fact that some measures have been perceived as being discriminatory, none of the interviewees thinks that they served as a primary cause for radicalization.

Bill Durodie, a Senior Lecturer in Risk and Corporate Security at Cranfield University, argues that the causes for radicalisation can be found within the British society which fails to provide a meaning to the lives of ambitious Islamic youth.¹⁴ According to several interviewees, feelings of discrimination can reinforce the radicalization process because this might distance them further from society.

One very concrete measure mentioned by most interviewees was regarded as possibly engendering radicalization: detention without official charge. In December 2007 the Home Secretary announced a proposal to extend the pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects from 28 to 42 days. On 11 June 2008 the proposals narrowly passed the House of Commons. According to Tom Brake and Alan Beith, both members of the Liberal Democrats in the British House of Commons, this measure is sensitive for discrimination. They also worry about the state a person might be in after being detained for such a long period of time. Mr. Brake thinks that a detainee's opinion regarding the British justice system might deteriorate considerably. This in turn, might lead to further societal alienation as well as intensify the radicalization

¹³ <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/current-threat-level/>.

¹⁴ Bill Durodié, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (13 May, 2008)

process.¹⁵ According to Mr. Murer radicalization processes often occur in prisons and this measure might therefore be counterproductive. He also states that the detainee's *Umwelt* might be more susceptible to radicalization as well.¹⁶

To summarize, there have been considerable tensions and incidents between different ethnic and religious groups in the UK since 2001 and the current threat level is estimated by the Home Office to be severe. However, no evidence indicates that counterterrorism measures created these disturbances of civil peace. Although some measures might have had an effect on certain individuals, they do not seem to affect society at large.

Spain

The situation in Spain is different from the rest of the countries examined as the threat of terrorism has been strong in the country during the last decades due to attacks of ETA, the Basque separatist movement.

On March 11, 2004, a coordinated series of 10 explosions occurred during rush hour aboard 4 commuter trains in Madrid. The attacks by the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group killed 191 persons and injured more than 1,800. On April 2, Islamic extremists attempted to bomb the high speed AVE train south of Madrid. On April 3, six of the suspected leaders of the Madrid attacks killed a policeman and then committed suicide during a police raid of an apartment in Leganes.

ETA, whose declared goal is to establish an independent Basque state, continued its terrorist campaign of bombings during 2004. ETA publicly claimed responsibility for its attacks. The Government continued to pursue legal actions against ETA members. By year's end, police had arrested 74 ETA members and collaborators and had dismantled 3 ETA operational cells. Authorities in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands have arrested, and in some cases extradited to Spain, ETA members. In

¹⁵ Alan Beith, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (14 May, 2008)

Tom Brake, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (8 May, 2008)

¹⁶ Jeffrey Murer, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (26 June, 2008)

October, French police, working with Spanish investigators, arrested ETA leaders Mikel Albizu and Soledad Iparraguirre¹⁷

During 2005, ETA bombings and attempted bombings caused numerous injuries and property damage. In May a car bomb in Madrid injured more than 50 persons. On June 25, a car bomb exploded in a Madrid stadium. In addition throughout August there were another 12 terrorist attacks in places such as Santiago de Compostela, Guernika, Boroa, Zaragoza, Guipuzcoa, Madrid, Alicante, and Vizcaya. During the year there were 41 ETA bombings causing 96 injuries. However, none of the injuries were serious.

In February 2004, the U.N. Special Reporter on Torture, Theo van Boven, issued a report on his visit to Spain in October 2003.¹⁸ The purpose of the visit was to study the various safeguards for the protection of detainees in the context of anti-terrorism measures. The UN representative noted that "the degree of silence that surrounds the subject and the denial by the authorities without investigating the allegations of torture has made it particularly difficult to provide the necessary monitoring of protection and guarantees". He concluded that, "in the light of the internal consistency of the information received and the precision of factual details these allegations of torture cannot be considered to be fabrications". Although not a regular practice, "their occurrence is more than sporadic and incidental".

Many citizens have blamed recent Moroccan immigrants for increased crime rates in the country, which sometimes resulted in anti Muslim sentiment. It is however not possible to affirm that xenophobic or anti-immigrant sentiment is related to an antiterrorist one.

Moroccan community is the largest Islamic community in Spain (almost 55% of the Muslim community in this country). It is important to differentiate between anti-Muslim perception by the general population and the perception of anti-Muslim attitudes by the Muslim community itself. According to a recent report, 64% of this Islamic population do not feel any anti-Muslim attitude in Spain.¹⁹ Moreover, they feel

¹⁷ Unites States of America, Department of State, Patterns on Global Terrorism 2004, April 2005, p. 53.

¹⁸ U.N. Special Reporter on Torture, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven, Addendum, Visit to Spain, E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.2, 6 February 2004.

¹⁹ Spanish Ministry of Interior, Muslim migrant community in Spain, December 2007.

that the Spanish situation in this regard is better than the situation in other European countries.²⁰

A documented increase in violence towards Muslims following the March 11 train bombings in Madrid can not be affirmed. However, Muslim leaders were concerned that media reports would be linking the practice of Islamic religion to terrorist attacks. Even the Euro-Islam organization recognizes: "Although there were reports of anti-Muslim violence after September 11th, it does not appear that it was very widespread. After the bombings in Madrid in 2004, there were also isolated reports, but the scale of the problems was fortunately less than many had expected."²¹

On the issue of employment discrimination Spain obtained the second highest score of the 28 countries considered on labour market integration policies.²²

Some residents in the medieval quarter of Barcelona protested against the Pakistani community efforts to build a prayer center (US State Department Report 2004).

The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (COE/CHR) explained in his report on the country released in November 2005²³ that "it is common knowledge that systematic allegations of torture--regardless of whether there are any facts or evidence to corroborate them--are an obligation on any ETA activist from the very moment that the arrest takes place, as demonstrated by the documents found in flats occupied by activists of this terrorist organization and used in judicial proceedings."

The COE/CHR reported that "the NGOs I spoke to all agreed that torture and ill-treatment were not systematically practiced in Spain, although they expressed concern that complaints were not always systematically and effectively investigated." He further noted that "in spite of the persistent and violent terrorist attacks Spain has suffered since its transition to democracy 30 years ago... there has been no corresponding toughening of the legislation to curtail, restrict, or limit the rights of people detained for terrorist activities."

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Available at: http://www.euro-islam.info/spip/article.php3?id_article=295

²² Migration Integration Policy Index, British Council, 2007.

²³ Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to Spain, 10 – 19 March 2005, available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=927685&Site=CommDH&BackColorInternet=FEC65B&BackColorIntranet=FEC65B&BackColorLogged=FFC679>

In April SOS Racismo²⁴, a local human rights group, claimed that race-based attacks increased because some politicians linked Muslim immigration with crime. SOS Racismo said that the March 2004 terrorist attacks did not create a new xenophobia, rather that the attacks roused the existing societal suspicions toward the Muslim population.²⁵

In 2006, Jewish community leaders reported that while violence against persons in the 30,000 to 40,000 member Jewish community was rare, they were concerned about anti-Semitism expressed as vandalism against Jewish institutions. On July 25, the building housing the Jewish Information Center in Toledo was defaced with 12 swastikas. Synagogues in Barcelona were vandalized at various times during the year, especially during the July/August conflict involving Israel and the terrorist organization Hizbollah in Lebanon. Also, in March 2005 Jewish synagogues in Barcelona were defaced with anti-Semitic graffiti. No suspects were arrested.

Jacobo Israel Garzon, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Spain, stated in a November 5 article in the International Herald Tribune that, despite increased interest in the country's Jewish heritage, "a new anti-Semitism is developing in Spain. It uses the Israeli Palestinian conflict as its source, but it passes very quickly from anti-Israelism to anti-Semitism."²⁶

While analyzing the effects of counterterrorism measures on civil peace in Spain, two sources were interviewed, namely the Director of the National Centre for Anti-Terrorist Coordination (Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista - CNCA), and the Director of Amnesty International in Spain.

According to the Director of the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Centre, Eugenio Pereiro, there were no new counterterrorism measures as a result of the attack in March 2004 where Islamic radical groups were involved. As the government had already been fighting terrorism for years, there seemed to be no need of new measures. Thus, according to official sources, counterterrorism measures can hardly explain radicalization in Spain.

According to the Director of Amnesty International in Spain, David Beltrán, the connection between radicalization and threats of terrorist attacks was hardly the

²⁴ <http://www.sosracismomadrid.es/>

²⁵ United States of America, Department of State, Patterns on Global Terrorism 2005, April 2006.

²⁶ United States of America, Department of State, Patterns on Global Terrorism 2006, May 2007,

counter-terrorist policies, but rather external events or policies like the Guantanamo, secret flights and extraordinary renditions of terror suspects, reports on torture in prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan by coalition forces. An important part of external influences becoming internalized stems to a certain extent from the loss of moral authority by US and UK government.

In Spain, according to the director, Counterterrorism measures have not directly resulted in increased radicalization. According to Rogelio Alonso²⁷, terrorists were mainly radicalized by group and familiar close interaction based on propaganda and jihadist discourses.

In summary, increased tension and unrest occurred in Spain especially during 2004 and 2005. Muslim minorities suffered attacks in some urban centers, but anti-Semitic aggressions also took place. During these years, allegations of torture, confirmed reports of torture incidents created a loss of moral authority for official government action and this appeared to have stimulating effects on extreme and radical sentiments among certain parts of the Muslim community. It should be noted, however, that no indications exist confirming that counterterrorist measures directly engendered radicalization or triggered terrorist attacks in Spain.

2.2. General findings

None of the representatives interviewed made a direct link between counterterrorism efforts and civil peace and radicalization processes and none of the written interpretations establish such a direct link.²⁸

²⁷ Alonso, Rogelio, Radicalization Process of Jihadist terrorists in Spain, Real Instituto Elcano, No. 31, 2007.

²⁸ Tomas Precht, December 2007. *Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe. From Conversion to Terrorism*. Research Report Funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice.- Center for Terroranalyse, PET (Police Intelligence Service, Denmark), Retrieved July 2008. *Radikalisering og Terror*. [Radicalization and Terror]. - Center for Terroranalyse, PET (Police Intelligence Service, Denmark), Retrieved July 2008. *Jihad-bregrebet og terror*. [The Concept of Jihad and Terror].- Ministeriet for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration [Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, Denmark], June 2008. *En fælles og tryk fremtid – forslag til handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikalisering blandt unge*. [A Common and Secure Future – Proposals for Action Plan concerning Prevention of Extremist Attitudes and Radicalization among Young People. København.- The National Coordinator For Counterterrorism (NCTb), Justitie and Ministerie von Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, retrieved July 2007. *Radicalization in Broader Perspective*. Den Hague. – Home Office, United Kingdom, 2005. *Preventing Extremism Together. Working Groups August-*

Extremism and radicalization have different pathways, and it is also emphasized that the actors of radicalized behaviour derive from diverse extremist backgrounds such as right- and left- wing extremism, separatist and nationalist movements, and religiously founded movements.

As regards, the causal pathways of Islamic inspired terrorism, it is stressed in the studies that “*There is no single cause or catalyst for radicalization. Radicalization is a multi-dimensional process influenced by a complex array of factors*” (Precht, 2007: 11).

The model used in official Dutch as well as official Danish studies for explaining radicalization and – ultimately - involvement in terrorist activities of primarily young men is one where *supply* factors of ideology (Jihadism or other ideological propositions) meet with *demand* factors, e.g. the search for identity and roles in society to create a framework of propensity or risks of becoming involved in terrorist activities. Trigger mechanisms for the latter may be personal experiences, political events whether at home or abroad, or influences from other personalities or charismatic figures. The risk that propensity to act negatively becomes real practice is enhanced by *structural breeding ground factors*, e.g. discriminatory practices, lack of democratic knowledge, social injustices, and by *resilience* to become involved in violence of persons in the risk group. Forthcoming, in this model four factors can be identified that enter into the equation of radicalization leading up to terrorist involvement: the demand for identity and integration in social networks, the supply of ideologies, the structural factors, i.e., the breeding grounds of social discrimination, conflicts, policies of exclusion, and social injustice, and the resilience to violence imbedded human persons generally and in individual personalities.²⁹

As concluded above from the general documentation and from the case studies counterterrorism measures are not estimated to have an impact on civil peace.

October 2005. See also TTSRL, July 2008. *Radicalization, Recruitment and the EU Counter-Radicalization Strategy*. 15 July TTSRL, Workpackage 4, Deliverable 7.

²⁹ See The National Coordinator For Counterterrorism (NCTb), Justitie and Ministerie von Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, retrieved July 2007. *Radicalization in Broader Perspective*. Den Hague. - Ministeriet for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration [Ministry of Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, Denmark], June 2008. *En fælles og tryk fremtid – forslag til handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og radikaliserung blandt unge*. [A Common and Secure Future – Proposals for Action Plan concerning Prevention of Extremist Attitudes and Radicalization among Young People. København.

However, it is established in the country studies that various counterterrorism measures are perceived as discriminatory by some Muslim groups and the sense of discrimination may enter into the structural breeding ground of radicalization together with other factors. Thus, it can be concluded that some counterterrorism measures may have an indirect impact on radicalization processes.

In section 3 below it will be examined whether states have taken any initiatives to counter this identified negative impact of counterterrorism measures.

3. Measures to Mitigate the Negative Effects of Counterterrorism

This section (objective 9) will first describe what measures – if any – five European states have taken to counter the negative effects of counterterrorism measures, i.e. the indirect impact on radicalization processes. Secondly, the various measures will be compared and analyzed.

3.1 Overview of counter-radicalization measures

The study of the five European states reveals that none of the five countries has taken any measures with a specific purpose to counter possible negative effects of counterterrorism policies.

As concluded in section 2 some Muslim groups perceive counterterrorism measures as discriminatory against non-citizens and in particular against Muslim groups and in this way counterterrorism measures may contribute to a more radicalised society.

Most states have taken general measures to counter radicalization but these measures are of a general nature and not directly linked to mitigate the negative effects counterterrorism measures may have on radicalization.

However, it must be expected that these general counter radicalization measures also will have an impact on – and reduce – radicalization caused by counterterrorism measures and consequently the most pertinent of these general counter radicalization measures will be described below.

United Kingdom

There has traditionally not been a strong focus to counter radicalization or mitigate possible negative effects of counterterrorism measures in the UK. However, after the London bombings on the 7th and 21st of July 2005 a number of initiatives has been undertaken to counter radicalization and extremism.

The UK Government appointed a diverse range of people with different skills and knowledge in mid August 2005 to join seven Working Groups that was set up with a view to discuss and analyze the two events and come up with recommendations in order to prevent extremism and radicalization.³⁰

The Working Groups were united in the view that whilst the remit for various working groups was to tackle extremism and radicalisation, the solutions lie in the “medium to longer term issues of tackling inequality, discrimination, deprivation and inconsistent Government policy, and in particular foreign policy.”

In relation to counterterrorism policies it was recommended by the Working Groups that the Government must encourage and empower greater Muslim participation in the various reviews of anti-terrorism provisions and implement the recommendations of these reviews in a more transparent manner. It was further recommended that the Government must consult widely, and particularly the Muslim community, on any further anti-terrorism provisions. The UK must lead on and not unilaterally derogate from international principles and standards of human rights.

In addition to the deliberations and recommendations of the Working Groups the UK Government communicates with representatives of the Muslim community on a regular basis. These initiatives have, however, been criticised.³¹ It has been claimed that the representative organizations lack actual representativeness. Islamic youth, and in particular those who hold radical views, are usually not represented by the (older) representatives. This can be explained by the fact that most persons in these organizations are appointed instead of democratically chosen by their communities.

³⁰ *Working Together to Prevent Extremism*, see: <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164.pdf> (Last visited August 2008).

³¹ Bill Durodié, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (13 May, 2008) and Jeffrey Murer, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (26 June, 2008).

Furthermore, a Muslim contact unit has been established in London consisting of officers with language skills (in order to form partnerships with local mosque managers that are under threat of extremism) and six regional Muslim forums against extremism (consist of police, public service and local Muslim community representatives) have been established.

After investigations pointed out that racism existed within the police forces, several initiatives have been taken to tackle this issue, among others broadening the ethnic diversity within the service. The police services are also focusing on communicating with citizens and try to explain certain counterterrorism policies such as stop and search undertakings.

In addition the UK prison service has started a national training event for Imams and a mentoring programme for prisoners potentially susceptible to radicalisation (also support upon their release into local community), (Hannah, Clutterbuck and Rubin (2008).

As can be seen a number of initiatives has been taken in the UK after the London bombings in July 2005 with a view to counter radicalization. However, none of these initiatives have specifically targeted possible radicalisation caused by counterterrorism measures.

France

Although the public discourse in France does not focus on radicalization, the government initiated several measures to prevent radicalization. These measures mainly deal with tackling discrimination and racism issues.

Discrimination can be an important cause for radicalization. The French government strongly condemns acts of racism. Government programs attempt to combat racism and anti-Semitism by promoting public awareness and bringing together local officials, police, and citizen groups (U.S. country report, 2001: 6).

The government also tried to tackle the issue by providing antiracist educational programs in some public school systems and launching an anti-racism campaign together with NGOs in which the free hot-line to report discrimination was publicized (U.S. Country Reports, 2002). Over time the hot-line has been extensively used; in

the first two years the line has received over 85.000 calls (U.S. Country Reports, 2002).

In 2002 the government toughened penalties "for crimes of a "racist, anti-Semitic, or xenophobic" nature". Furthermore, it communicates with representatives from the Muslim community.

In 2002 the Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, created the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) which can be translated as the French Council of the Muslim Faith. The organization is used as a representative organization in which the government consults with leaders of the Muslim community on various topics, but mainly integration-related ones. The organization has been criticized for representing certain Muslim groups more than others. The Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF), an organization which is also represented in the CFCM, has been criticized for its involvement in the 2005 riots by issuing a fatwa condemning the civil unrest. According to Michel Wieviorka the CFCM has not been regarded successful thus far, nor has it been reviewed.³²

In 2005 the government created a junior ministerial position for the promotion of equal opportunity. Its main priorities are providing minority groups with better access to education and jobs.

In June 2005 the government created the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discrimination et pour l'Égalité (HALD) to which citizens can report cases of discrimination. The organization is independent and "can demand inquiries on the practices of a particular agency and bring court cases on behalf of citizens against companies found to be exercising discriminatory practices". (U.S. Country Reports, 2005: 14).

Despite the fact that the French government has tried to tackle the structural racism problems, it is argued by Mr. Wieviorka and Mr. Bertossi that a lot more needs to be done in order to find a solution to the structural racism problems the country has, i.e. Government institutions and companies should excess racism and create more ethnic diversity.³³

³² Michel Wieviorka, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (29 April, 2008).

³³ Mr. Wieviorka, *Ibid.*, and Christophe Bertossi, in an interview conducted within the TTSRL framework, The Hague, (13 June, 2008).

Netherlands

In order to prevent radicalization, the Dutch government has adopted several measures. The creation of the ministry of Housing, Communities and Integration in 2007 is one example. Hereby the government invests in sensitive areas and tries to stimulate integration (Ongering 2007).

The continuing communication with representatives from the Muslim community is another example. It should be noted that most initiatives to mitigate radicalization take place on a local level. Amsterdam, for example, has adopted a broad strategy and tries to tackle the causes of radicalization by communicating with mosques, schools and parents and simultaneously pursue anti-discrimination measures (Ongering 2007).

Furthermore, in order to detect radicalization the city-council created an organization which deals with the gathering of information with regards to radicalization by enhanced cooperation between the police and intermediate organizations such as mosques and schools (Ongering 2007).

Denmark

In Denmark a number of dialogue meetings with muslim groups and representatives have been carried out. The Prime minister and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with Muslim representatives in 2006. Furthermore, the Danish intelligence service (PET) regularly has dialogue meetings with Muslim representatives.

There has also been focus on police and community "early warning" initiatives trying to observe if e.g. youngsters are becoming radicalised e.g. through a change in dress code, growing a longer beard, religious habits, etc. There is cooperation between schools, local police, and social workers (SSP), and they are focussing on observing if certain groups and persons are being radicalised.

A new unit on countering radicalisation has been established in the Ministry of Integration that will provide information and training. Furthermore an action plan on

countering radicalisation among young persons identifying and proposing a number of concrete initiatives is being elaborated.³⁴

Furthermore, there has been more focus on strengthening better integration of foreigners, e.g. in primary schools, women from ethnic communities, etc.

Also, initiatives have been taken to counter discrimination. An action plan to counter discrimination has been revised and updated in 2008 and possibilities for complaining of discrimination are being improved.

Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prepared a plan for supporting developing countries in countering terrorism and radicalisation and there has been a support to dialogues with countries in the Middle East (The Arab initiative).

Spain

After the March 2004 attacks in Spain no new special counterterrorism measures have been taken. Even though it is argued by some human rights experts that "the measures taken by the Spanish government are not focused on the Muslim community [... because] the community is not perceived as a threat"³⁵, it has to be mentioned that some measures have been taken in order to prevent radicalization within those communities.

The Spanish authorities have carried out meetings between government officials and the Spanish Federation of Muslim Entities in order to improve communication and also to take note of the needs and perceptions of this community.

Also, a government funded program has been established to train imams working in prisons since many of the detainees after attacks in Madrid began their radicalization process while they were in prison. In order to avoid further problems this program was completed with special measures to detect radicalization nets in Spanish prisons (including isolation or dispersal of terrorist convicts to keep them from radicalizing other).

³⁴ The first draft of the action plan was submitted to a number of external institutions and organizations for comments in June 2008. The draft (in Danish) can be found here: http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/A797F73E-33E0-431A-9224-E8BC39C932B/0/en_faelles_fremitid.pdf (Last visited in August 2008)

³⁵ Interview with Esteban Beltran (Director Amnesty International, Spain)

Apart from these prison related measures Spain is one of the main supporters of the UN Alliance of Civilizations initiative, in fact the initiative is co-sponsored by Spain and Turkey.

After the 2004 terrorist attacks great effort was made to update anti-terrorist legislation without criminalizing the important Muslim community in Spain (almost 750.000 Muslims lives in Spain).

4. Conclusions

Generally, the country studies on the negative effects of counterterrorism measures show that there is no line of causation between counterterrorism measures and civil peace disturbances, see section 2 above.

However, counterterrorism measures might have contributed to strengthening the structural background factors where perceived or real discrimination is strengthened and where Muslim minorities feel threatened, under surveillance or pursued in media as well as in public policies. In this way, counterterrorism measures may have an indirect impact on the radicalization process and can thus in more general terms be said to contribute to a more radicalized society.

These trends, of which there are reports in all the countries examined, cannot be linked to any specific terrorist attacks.

None of the countries examined had adopted any specific initiatives with a view to mitigate possible discrimination and radicalization caused by counterterrorism measures. However, a number of general measures have been taken to counter radicalization in the five examined states. These measures can be categorized in the following groups.

Dialogue and information initiatives

A number of activities seeks to strengthen and improve the dialogue and understanding between the official systems and certain Muslim groups representing the Muslim population in the concerned area. Also, training and information on e.g. counterterrorism legislation and policies have been arranged for some Muslim groups.

It has, however, been questioned by some whether the targeted Muslim groups in reality represent the Muslim population. Instead it is proposed that dialogue meetings should be arranged directly with the target group, e.g. young male radicalized Muslims.

Community and policing initiatives

“Early warning” initiatives have been taken in some countries. School teacher, social workers, local police, etc. have been instructed to observe if youngsters change behavior and attitude with a view to identify radicalized persons.

Integration initiatives

There has in general been focus on how to strengthen and improve the integration of i.a. Muslim groups into societies.

Anti-discrimination

In order to counter radicalization the included countries have taken measures to counter discrimination. Action plans have been developed and better complaint mechanisms have been established.

As can be seen from the described anti-radicalization measures it is a mixture of positive measures (e.g. dialogue, training, anti-discrimination, better integration) and control (e.g. community and policing initiatives).

All counter-radicalization initiatives are of a general nature. None of the anti-radicalization initiatives have been directly connected to or target the possible radicalization stemming from or caused by counterterrorism measures. However, some counterterrorism measures, as concluded in section 2 above, are undoubtedly perceived as discriminatory in some Muslim quarters and might lead to more radicalized societies.

Against this background it can be proposed that states seek to ensure a stronger focus on the possible negative effects of counterterrorism measures – i.e. (perceived) discrimination and radicalization – when discussing and designing counterterrorism policies.

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