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PREFACE

Dear readers,

We are happy to present the third newsletter of the FP-6 project Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (TTSRL).

This newsletter introduces the findings of the second deliverable from Work Package 6. The work package is aimed at promoting an understanding of the possible counter-terrorism measures the EU will be able and required to develop in the ongoing struggle against transnational terrorism. It therefore addresses some lacunae in the field's state of the art.

It is interesting to note that the study of counter-terrorism, as a subject matter itself, has been given relatively scant attention by scholars. Most seem to focus on subjects such as terrorist rationales, future threat scenarios and possible trends in terrorism. While these topics are very important to gain insight into the shady dynamics behind terrorism, it is equally important to increase across-the-board knowledge on measures that prevent, pre-empt, manage and reprise terrorist incidents.

The report *Mapping counterterrorism: a categorization of policies and the promise of empirically-based, systematic comparisons*, aims at addressing this specific void. It consists of an inventory of the counterterrorism strategies of eleven countries in the TTSRL sample. More importantly, the report is a first step toward developing a coherent framework for comparing counter-terrorism policy and to aid in the further conceptualization of the field's major subject: counter-terrorism policies. Below, we will briefly describe some of our findings and conclusions. The full report can be downloaded from the [TTSRL-website](#).

Earlier newsletters (click [here](#)) introduced the project and presented the results of deliverable 1, a study about threat perceptions and contemporary security debates. The second [newsletter](#) outlined the findings from our deliverable 10 of work package 6 (WP6), called *Theoretical treatise on counterterrorism* (Both of these publications can be downloaded from the [TTSRL-website](#)).

Kind regards on behalf of the consortium,

Erik Frinking

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FINDINGS OF THE REPORT

Introduction

Awareness of the full range of options is a vital element in the development of any sound policy. Ideally, an inventory of policy options would also come with an estimation of the effects, advantages and disadvantages of each policy and of the circumstances under which they might work. The field of counterterrorism studies seems, unfortunately, to fall short of even the first step, an overview of the options.

The report *Mapping counterterrorism: a categorization of policies and the promise of empirically-based, systematic comparisons*, has tackled this shortcoming. In its work, it provides a markedly different approach from most other research into counterterrorism:

- First, we developed a framework of generic counterterrorism policy measures that can be considered comprehensive of all conceivable measures in the field.
- Second, we used this framework to map the policy activity within the 11 countries in our sample and thus trying to construct the overall policy strategies and the various emphases applied in these countries.

This approach considerably lifts the discussion from the level of individual policy options to broader policy strategies. Consequently, rather than a more descriptive or mechanistic debate, it can provide a more insightful foundation for formulating effective counterterrorism approaches.

Using the four strands of the *European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, we categorized all measures, which allowed us to get an impression of which elements are important in their counterterrorism policies and which are not for all countries surveyed. These four strands are:

- Prevent (measures to keep people from turning to terrorism in the first place),
- Protect (target hardening and border control),
- Pursue (disruption of terrorist networks, i.e. intelligence, penal law, legal procedures, countering the financing of terrorism etc.) and
- Respond (crisis management).





To aid in the recognition of related counterterrorism policy approaches, we made radarcharts representing per strand the extent to which a country makes use of the available policy options. From this analysis, we distilled five distinguishable approaches. The remainder of this newsletter highlights these approaches and presents the broad conclusions. For more detail on measures, framework and methodology, we refer to the report and its underlying database of measures.



The maximalist approach

The first approach is characterized by an intensive and more or less evenly distributed development of measures in all four strands of counterterrorism policy. We labeled this the maximalist approach. Such an approach would suggest that terrorism is perceived as a multi-faceted phenomenon deserving of a widespread policy approach.



Within our sample, four countries could be classified by this approach. These countries are Denmark, Germany, the UK and the Czech Republic.



It is striking that the Czech Republic and Denmark, both countries that are not known for their histories with terrorism, are in this category. Clearly, states do not necessarily have to have experienced terrorism in order to be concerned about it. The UK's presence in this category should not come as a surprise, as it has a counterterrorism strategy that includes four pillars that are comparable to the four pillars of the EU's counter-terrorism strategy.

The antagonistic approach


Poland and Spain constitute the second category, as they are both countries that put relatively little emphasis on the strand that treats terrorism as a problem with societal roots and much emphasis on measures that treat terrorism primarily as a security threat.



Again, past experiences with terrorism do not account for this kind of policy. Spain's experience with terrorism is of course vastly different than Poland's, yet their current counterterrorism policies are similar, with Poland even scoring higher on Protect. It is surprising that Poland ends up in the same category as Spain, a country that has been involved in a fight against a terrorist organization for more than forty years now. Spain's relatively low score on Prevent could be the result of disappointment, both on the part of the government and the electorate, with instruments that address terrorists' underlying grievances, since they seem to have failed to appease the ETA.


The confrontational approach

France and Portugal clearly focus on instruments that affect the terrorists themselves, such as intelligence work, penal law, legal procedures and measures to counter the financing of terrorism. Since the three other strands are neglected in this strategy, we called it the confrontational approach.





France's pattern sits well with its reputation for dealing with terrorism using solely law enforcement instruments, which all fall in the Pursue category. The basis of the French approach to countering terrorism is the collaboration between the special counterterrorism courts and the security services responsible for bringing terrorists to justice. Both have broad powers to fulfill their duties.

Portugal, perhaps due to its modest experience with terrorism, does not have this reputation, but, in its report on counterterrorism capacities to the Council of Europe it does claim that it "deals with terrorism primarily from a criminal perspective and mainly through its judicial institutions". The data we collected for Portugal seem to confirm this.



The human agent approach


We put the Netherlands and Italy in one category because they both put stress on Prevent and Pursue, the strands that take terrorism as a matter of human agency, as opposed to terrorism as a potential for disaster. The Netherlands does more in all categories than Italy, but the pattern is similar.



Like Poland and Spain, the Netherlands and Italy are an unlikely duo. The most striking aspect in both cases is the low score on Respond. Perhaps Italy and the Netherlands are planning on using the same response capacities for terrorist and other incidents and therefore do not consider these response capacities part of their counterterrorism strategies.

Low intensity approach

We also mapped Sweden's counterterrorism policy, but its radarchart shows that it does not fall in one of the categories above.



The radar charts raise questions as to the drivers behind counterterrorism policies. The most obvious explanations for the differences between countries' counterterrorism policies (culture, past experiences with terrorism) clearly fail in accounting for the distributions of countries over the categories. Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic and the UK have little in common with each other in these respects, and neither do Poland and Spain and the Netherlands and Italy.

Conclusions

Our report presented a first step toward a systematic analysis of counterterrorism policy measures in Europe. This first step has resulted in an overview of policy



options that a number of European governments are currently applying. At the same time, this is only a first step that can not yet yield conclusions about the effectiveness of various policy options. More research will have to be conducted for this. However, our inventory of policy measures across 11 countries has resulted in an impressive albeit not necessarily comprehensive dataset. This dataset is a valuable asset that can support this additional research.

From the current dataset we can already draw some policy-relevant conclusions as well as number of observations about the methods applied.

Comparing the policies across countries, we distilled the following highlights:

- There is an unmistakable tendency among EU member states to stress the Pursue strand over all other strands. The average score of Pursue is significantly higher than the scores of the other strands.
- It is clear that the counterterrorism policies of the countries in our sample set differ substantially. We have four categories, five if we count Sweden as a category, in a set of eleven countries, which only goes to show that the EU has a long way to go if it wants all member states to adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism policy.
- Although the countries differ strongly in their approaches, they all score high on groups of measures for which the EU is often considered a driver, such as border control, legal prosecution capabilities and countering the financing of terrorism. This cannot be derived from the radarcharts, but only from our dataset, which can be downloaded from the [TTSRL-website](#).

On our method, we have observed the following:

The framework and the categories of measures that we applied can be considered a useful and insightful benchmarking tool. Not only was it possible to categorize measures in such a manner, the framework was instrumental in highlighting the differences across countries

- Our benchmark method of mapping counterterrorism policies yielded promising results, which suggests that counterterrorism research should move away from mere descriptions to more systematic comparisons.
- The analysis and the methods applied raise questions as to the drivers behind counterterrorism policies. The most obvious explanations for the differences between countries' counterterrorism policies (culture, past experiences with terrorism) clearly fail in accounting for the distributions of countries over the categories. Germany, Denmark, the Czech Republic and the UK have little in common with each other in these respects, and neither do Poland and Spain and the Netherlands and Italy.





UPCOMING EVENTS

Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law

www.transnationalterrorism.eu



Presents:

The Concluding Conference

February 2009, Brussels

- TTSRL Conference
In February 2009 our concluding TTSRL Conference will be held in Brussels. All our findings will be presented. Instructive workshops and interesting lectures will characterize this event.
- 15th World Congress of Criminology, 20-25 July 2008, Location: Barcelona, Spain
<http://www.worldcongresscriminology.com/index.asp?pagina=presen&idioma=en>
- International Disaster and Risk Conference, 25-29 August 2008, Location: Davos, Switzerland
<http://www.idrc.info/>
- International Terrorism Conference 2008, 2 - 3 Oct 2008, Location: London, United Kingdom
<http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E48454259CD2CD/>





THE READING CORNER

Not quite there yet: the state of the art of counterterrorism research

HCSS Report, August 2008

HCSS will publish the Report Not quite there yet: the state of the art of research into counterterrorism, written by Teun van Dongen, lead author of deliverable 11 of the TTSRL-project. Using 241 systematically selected articles about counterterrorism, this study shows us what terrorism-related research has produced up to now. What do we really know about counterterrorism? Where should we focus our attention? What has been neglected? Should we consider other ways of doing research? Although the study draws some interesting lessons from the literature, Van Dongen also convincingly demonstrates some major flaws in the field of counterterrorism studies that need to be addressed. For example, the report shows that knowledge is lacking about 'soft' counterterrorism measures and ways to counter terrorist finance, that publications about legal aspects and the US are heavily overrepresented and, most importantly, that there are not nearly enough comparative analyses and general theories and frameworks which would allow further insight into the effectiveness of measures. The report concludes with some suggestions as to the directions that future research on counterterrorism should take.

Leaderless Jihad. Terror networks in the Twenty-First Century

Marc Sageman

In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. It is now more a source of inspiration for terrorist acts carried out by independent local groups that have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name. Building on his previous groundbreaking work on the Al Qaeda network, forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman has greatly expanded his research to explain how Islamic terrorism emerges and operates in the twenty-first century. In *Leaderless Jihad*, Sageman rejects the views that place responsibility for terrorism on society or a flawed, predisposed individual. Instead, he argues, the individual, outside influence, and group dynamics come together in a four-step process through which Muslim youth become radicalized. First, traumatic events either experienced personally or learned about indirectly spark moral outrage. Individuals interpret this outrage through a specific ideology, more felt and understood than based on doctrine. Usually in a chat room or other Internet-based venues, adherents share this moral outrage, which resonates with the personal experiences of others. The outrage is acted on by a group, either online or offline. *Leaderless Jihad* offers a ray of hope. Drawing on historical analogies, Sageman argues that the zeal of jihadism is self-terminating; eventually its followers will turn away from violence as a means of expressing their discontent. The book concludes with Sageman's recommendations for the application of his research to counterterrorism law enforcement efforts.

The introduction of this book in the academic field of terrorism studies caused a lively discussion between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman (two important figures in the field of terrorism). For more information click [here](#).

