



TTSRL Final conference

Brussels, February 5-6, 2009

Workshop presentations



Key note

Prof. Dr. Alex Schmid

*Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism
and Political Violence, School of International
Relations, University of St. Andrews*



Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
at the University of St Andrews

Countering Terrorism – Beyond the Global War on Terror

*Presentation by Prof. Alex P. Schmid
University of St. Andrews*

*TTSRL Conference
Brussels, 5-6 February 2009*



From President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address:

“We will not apologise for our way of life, not will we waver in its defence, and for those who seek to advance by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast us and we will defeat you.” (...)

“Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred.”



Bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (1998)

“...in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty to every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip....”(...)We, with God's help, call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.”



War Crimes according to Art. 8 of the ICC Statute

- **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;**
- **Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;**
- **Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects**
- **Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;**
- **Taking of hostages.**



Forms of Political Violence other than Terrorism

- **Blockade/Public property damage/ looting/arson/sabotage**
- **Violent demonstration/Mob violence/rioting**
- **raid// brigandry/ warlordism**
- **Torture/mutilation/mass rape**
- **Summary extra-judicial execution/massacre**
- **Disappearances (= kidnapping + torture/maiming + murder)**
- **Ethnic cleansing/ purge/pogrom**
- **Rebellion/Revolt/Banditry/Peasant uprising/ urban insurrection/national liberation struggle/guerrilla warfare**
- **Resistance to invasion/occupation by partisan warfare**
- **(Elite) coup d'etat/(mass) revolution**
- **Civil war/armed intrastate conflict with, or without, state participation**
- **Ethnocide/Politicide/Genocide/Democide**



Rev. Acad. Consensus Definition of Terrorism

- 1. Terrorism refers on the one hand to a *doctrine* about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial *practice* of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;**
- 2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as a illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors.**



Al Qaeda's Media Strategy

- **“More than half of the battle is taking place on the battlefield of the media. We are in a media race for hearts and minds.”**
- **“It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.”**
- **“Obviously the most essential element of any revolutionary organization is putting forward a series of goals and slogans that attract the masses, and presenting itself as a revolutionary pioneering organization with crystal clear objectives....via a well crafted media campaignsuch an explanation was and still is the main pillar for attracting the masses and mobilizing the base members on an intellectual and ideological level to partake in this dangerous work (i.e. Jihad).”**



The “Single Narrative” of Al Qaeda

- **The Muslim world is in crisis, and only a rightly guided Islamic State (caliphate) ruled exclusively by the Shari'a can redeem it.**
- **Such a state can be created only through armed jihad, since Islam's enemies are allegedly occupying Muslim lands and exploiting its resources, aided by apostate Muslim governments.**
- **Jihad is an individual religious duty, and martyrdom in its cause leads directly to Paradise.**
- **Authoritative religious figures are the legitimizers of jihad, and they must sanction appropriate targets.**



Bin Laden on Media and Terrorism

“They become afraid of it and begin to cause harm to themselves. Terror is the most dreaded weapon in [the] modern age and the Western media is mercilessly using it against its own people. It can add fear and helplessness in the psyche of the people of Europe and the United States. It means that what the enemies of the United States cannot do, its media is doing that.”



Key Obligations arising from US Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001)

- **It obliges States not to provide any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts,**
- **It obliges States to suppress the recruitment of members of terrorist groups,**
- **It obliges States to eliminate the supply of weapons to such groups,**
- **It obliges States to improve exchange of information,**
- **It obliges States to provide mutual legal assistance,**
- **It obliges States to freeze terrorist assets,**
- **It obliges States to set up effective border controls,**
- **It obliges States to improve control on issuance of identity papers and travel documents.**



UN GA Strategy includes: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism

- 1. Initiatives and programmes to promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations;**
- 2. Promote a culture of peace, justice, and human development, ethnic, national and religious tolerance and respect for all religions;**
- 3. Strengthen UN capacities for conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, prevention, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peaceful resolution of prolonged unresolved conflicts;**
- 4. Promote international solidarity in support of victims and foster the involvement of civil society in a global campaign against terrorism;**
- 5. Eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development and global prosperity for all;**
- 6. To pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas... especially on youth unemployment;**
- 7. Scale up assistance in the fields of rule of law, human rights, good governance and to support economic and social development.**



- 1. Try to address the underlying conflict issues exploited by the terrorists and work towards a peaceful solution while not making substantive concessions to the terrorists themselves;**
- 2. Prevent radical individuals and groups from becoming terrorist extremists by confronting them with a mix of 'carrot and stick' –tactics and search for effective counter-motivation measures;**
- 3. Stimulate and encourage defection and conversion of free and imprisoned terrorists and find ways to reduce the support of aggrieved constituencies for terrorist organizations;**
- 4. Deny terrorists access to arms, explosives, false identification documents, safe communication, safe travel and sanctuaries; disrupt and incapacitate their preparations and operations through infiltration, communication intercept, espionage and by limiting their criminal- and other fund-raising capabilities;**
- 5. Reduce low-risk/high-gain opportunities for terrorists to strike by enhancing communications-, energy- and transportation-security, by hardening critical infrastructures and potential sites where mass casualties could occur and apply principles of situational crime prevention to the prevention of terrorism;**
- 6. Keep in mind that terrorists seek publicity and exploit the media and the Internet to propagate their cause, glorify their attacks, win recruits, solicit donations, gather intelligence, disseminate terrorist know-how and communicate with their target audiences. Try to devise communication strategies to counter them in each of these**



7. Prepare for crisis- and consequence-management for both 'regular' and 'catastrophic' acts of terrorism in coordinated simulation exercises and educate first responders and the public on how to cope with terrorism.
8. Establish an Early Detection and Early Warning intelligence system against terrorism and other violent crimes on the interface between organized crime and political conflict;
9. Strengthen coordination of efforts against terrorism both within and between states; enhance international police and intelligence cooperation, and offer technical assistance to those countries lacking the know-how and means to upgrade their counter-terrorism instruments.
10. Show solidarity with, and offer support to, victims of terrorism at home and abroad.
11. Maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice and by matching your deeds with your words;
12. Last but not least: counter the ideologies, indoctrination and propaganda of secular and non-secular terrorists and try to get the upper hand in the war of ideas – the battle for the hearts and minds of those terrorists claim to speak and fight for.



Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
at the University of St Andrews

Thank you for your attention.

Questions?

**Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
School of International Relations,
University of St. Andrews**



Workshop 1

Discourse analysis and threat perception

Tomáš Weiss, Erik Frinking, Rafael Benitez, Paulo Botta



Workshop 2

Measuring the impact of terrorism & counterterrorism

Vidal Martin, Teun van Dongen, Arjen Ronner




AON

Transnational Terrorism

Prof. Dr. Arjen Ronner (Aon/UvA) Director
Executive Master ERM (Msc)


February 2009

Interdependency Risk





Impact of External Risks





MAPPING COUNTERTERRORISM

A categorization of policies
and the promise of
empirically-based, systematic
comparisons

Teun van Dongen

Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law



Contents

- The idea
- Drawing up the framework
- Some results
- Some conclusions



The idea (1)

Unsystematic descriptions:

- Academic literature
- Country reports UN, CoE

CT policy frameworks:

- DHS
- UNODC
- EU


Categories of CT measures:

1. Target hardening

- 1.1 Maritime*
- 1.2 Aviation*

2. Penal law

- 2.1 Criminal procedures*



Pre-trial detention period for terrorist suspects (example)



The idea (2)

Combine the two into a CT checklist:

	Country A	Country B
1. Target hardening		
1.1 Maritime		
	A	
	E	
	F	
2. Penal law		
2.1 Criminal procedures		
	C	
	D	
	H	

Pre-trial detention period for terrorist suspects (example)



Putting together the framework (1)

European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy

PREVENT

MEASURES AGAINST RADICALISATION

PROTECT

TARGET HARDENING, BORDER CONTROL

PURSUE

DISRUPT TERRORIST NETWORKS

RESPOND

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT



Putting together the framework (2)

Examples of concrete measures

3. PURSUE

3.1 Pre-trial criminal procedures

- Communication interception allowed
- Anonymous hearing of witnesses allowed
- Taking DNA of terrorist suspects without suspect's permission allowed
- Body searches without permission suspect allowed
- Custody without official charge for terrorist offences allowed
- Preventive detention for terrorist offences allowed
- Questioning upon arrest before arrival lawyer allowed
- Undercover operations to investigate terrorist offences allowed




Data collection

- Partners checked 200 CT measures for their countries
- Uniform way of working
- Sources: policy documents, national strategies, laws



Measurement

- 'PAPER' MEASURES: 1 POINT
- CONTINUOUS ACTIVITIES: 2 POINTS
- LARGE-SCALE INITIATIVES: 3 POINTS





Disclaimer


- More is not necessarily better
- The charts show where countries have put the emphasis
- Meant as a tool to help once good practices have been identified




Results (1)

The maximalist approach


Czech Republic




Germany



Denmark



UK







Results (2)

The human agent approach

The Netherlands





Italy





Results (3)



The antagonistic approach





Results (4)


The confrontational approach





Results (5)

Sweden





General conclusions

1. About the set of countries: CT policies in Europe differ widely
2. For the EU: gaps should be formulated in terms of countries rather than in terms of policy options
3. For measuring the impact of CT: can show whether a 'good practice' is being applied



Workshop 3

Media and terrorism

*Uri Rosenthal, Flemming Rose, Rens Vliegenthart,
Ybo Buruma, Meryem Aksu, Henri Beunders*

Terrorism and Media

Prof. dr Ybo Buruma



“This is not so much the global village as the global theatre of war, with audience participation”.

(Gen. Rupert Smith)



Basic Questions

- A symbiotic relationship:
 - Are the Media the proverbial oxygen for Terrorists?
 - Promoting the cause of terrorism or its methods.
- Counter Measures:
 - Is Restricting the Media a solution?
 - impossible and against our fundamental values
 - Are there any other solutions



The changing content of “Terrorism”

- 1900: Anarchism – Regicide
- 1930: Fascism – Identity Groups
- 1950: National liberation – Colonial Powers
- 1970: Anti-Imperialism – Spectacular (not necessarily lethal) Acts
- 1995: Holy War – Catastrophe: killing the helpless



History of the Media

- 1900 Technological developments; leaflets
- 1930 Press Barons. Propaganda by radio
- 1950 Television. Professional standards
- 1970 Critical Press. Commercialization: scoops.
- 1995 Internet. No more gatekeepers. News as PR



How [Terror x Media] is Changing

- 1900 Performative acts of individuals
- 1930 Elites stirring identity groups
- 1950 Organizations informing a passive mass public
 - Winning the hearts and minds
- 1970 Splinter groups in a participatory democracy:
 - Blurring facts and comments
- 1995 Anonymous individuals in a veto democracy:
 - World wide voices on good and evil



Side line: Counter terrorism and media

- Intelligence agencies: difficult HUMINT and the rising tide of open sources
- However: diminishing data collecting activities of the classic media
- Operational contacts between journalists and spies
 - Posing as media personel; briefing journalists; paid service?



Symbiotic relationship: exploiting fear of death

- The terrorist: bearing witness (shadid)
 - Direct Uploading: decapitation and messages
 - “Good and Evil” : ‘sending the innocent to paradise’.
- Government: fighting for legitimacy
 - PR: the image of government (why we act/ what they do)
 - “War on Terror”: blurring of campaigning and actual bombing
- The Old Media: looking for scoops
 - Dramatization (glamour/horror)
 - Illustration instead of words – (troubling contexts – S.O.P.)
 - Do haunting pictures ultimately lead to indifference? – (Sontag)
 - Horror and the impossibility to flee (Cavarero)



The Oxygen

- Global Theatre of War
 - The Internet: the impossibility of actual restriction
 - Promoting terrorism v. freedom of speech: legal restrictions?
 - What's wrong with using old fashioned law? The necessity of local differentiation.
- Traditional Media v. the Internet
 - Softening the Cosmic War on Good and Evil
 - Delivering context:



“No, they were not inhuman. You know, that was the worst of it – this suspicion of their not being inhuman”

(J. Conrad)

Media and Terrorism: How terrorist acts impact media coverage

Dr. Rens Vliegenthart

Department of Communication Science


Amsterdam School of Communications Research

University of Amsterdam

TTSRL Final conference, Brussels


February 5, 2009

Changes in attention (1)




(Ruigrok & van Atteveldt, 2007)

Changes in attention (2)



(Roggeband & Vliegthart, 2007)

Changes in framing



(Roggeband & Vliegenthart, 2007)


TABLE 1 News exposure moderates impact of assassination on anti-immigration sentiment

		<i>Threat index at measurepoint t1</i>	
		<i>Pre-assassination</i>	<i>Post-assassination</i>
News exposure	High	2.56 (n = 48)	3.33 (n = 52)
	Low	2.58 (n = 80)	2.91 (n = 96)
Mean difference		0.02	-0.42*

Note: Cell entries are mean values and the mean difference within columns.

* $p < .05$ for difference within column.

Changes in parliament



(Roggeband & Vliegthart, 2007)



Workshop 4

Radicalization and de-radicalization

*Edwin Bakker, Marco Zannoni, Tore Bjørgo,
Jørgen Staun, Atef Hamdy*

Countering Radicalisation

A Local government approach: The Dutch Experience

Brussels, February 5

Marco Zannoni

COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management,
The Netherlands


Countering radicalisation


Combinations:

- Counter terrorism actions *and* dealing with other risks
- Islamic *and* Right Wing radicalisation
- Prevention *and* repression
- International, National *and* local
 - There is always a local context
 - Focus on local ‘signs’ of possible radicalisation
- Focus on violent *and* anti-integrative developments

- Government *and* Civil Society including Muslim community
- Creating opportunities *and* setting boundaries
- Increasing resilience *and* countering negative developments
- Legal actions *and* administrative actions
- Policy makers and front line workers (teachers, social workers, prison personnel, etc.)

Policy intervention points





The Big Questions

- How to deal with the boundaries between State and Religion?
- How to deal with non-violent/non-Jihad threats? What do we accept to fight the bigger Evil?
- How to deal with the internet and New Media?
- How to stimulate a more liberal Islam?
- How to formulate a credible 'Alternative Story'
- How to deal with freedom of speech and freedom of religion?


- But most of all: how to de-radicalize? What works? What are the intervention options?



**NORWEGIAN POLICE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE**

**Types of violent activists
and their diverse pathways
of radicalisation and disengagement**

**Presentation by
Dr. Tore Bjørgo
Professor of Police Science**



Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005

‘What we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that *there is not a consistent profile* to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Of the 4 individuals here, 3 were second generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin and one whose parents were of Jamaican origin; [one] was an Algerian failed asylum seeker; [another] had an English mother and Jamaican father. Others of interest have been white converts. Some have been well-educated, some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently well integrated in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with children. Some previously law-abiding, others with a history of petty crime. In a few cases there is evidence of abuse or other trauma in early life, but in others their upbringing has been stable and loving.’ (p. 31)

Lessons learned:

- ▼ No consistent profile of terrorists.
- ▼ No single root cause or process is behind radicalisation into terrorism.
- ▼ Profiling to identify potential terrorists from a larger population does not work - too many false positives and too many false negatives.
- ▼ Possible negative conclusion:
 - ▼ Is it futile to try to develop strategies for preventing these diverse radicalisation processes as no such measures will be able to fit them all?
- ▼ Possible positive conclusion:
 - ▼ If one size does not fit them all, tailor-made interventions might be developed.

Dimensions of radicalisation characterising different types of participants / activists

Ideological / political motivation $\leftarrow==\rightarrow$ Non-ideological / apolitical

Leader / high status in the group $\leftarrow==\rightarrow$ Follower/strong need to belong to group

Socially well adapted / resourceful $\leftarrow==\rightarrow$ Marginalised / weak social resources

Types of participants in groups involved in political violence: Motivations and characteristics

▼ Ideological activists

- ▼ Leaders; motivated by ideology and political issues
- ▼ Veterans; role models
- ▼ Protégé of the leader

▼ Drifters and fellow travellers

- ▼ Seekers of friendship, identity and protection
- ▼ Converts

▼ Socially frustrated youths

- ▼ Personal experiences of discrimination or other grievances
- ▼ Criminal and marginalised individuals

Types of participants in groups involved in political violence: Vulnerabilities and possibilities for prevention and disengagement

▼ Ideological activists

- ▼ Disillusionment
- ▼ Contradictions between means and ends
- ▼ Ideological and ethical doubts
- ▼ Loss of status, confidence and position within group

▼ Drifters and fellow travellers

- ▼ Alternative sources of friendship, identity and protection
- ▼ Devotion to a romantic partner or children

▼ Socially frustrated youths

- ▼ Reduction of grievances
- ▼ Education, job training, integration in mainstream society
- ▼ Positive role models

Conclusions:

- ▼ Different types of participant require different preventive measures to prevent radicalisation and encourage disengagement.
- ▼ One size does not fit them all!



DANSK INSTITUT FOR INTERNATIONALE STUDIER • DIIS

Radicalisation and de-radicalisation

By Jørgen Staun, Ph.D., Project Researcher

Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law



Post-9/11 terror in Europe

- Background: Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005
- New concepts came to the forefront of the public debate:
 - "Homegrown terror"
 - "Radicalisation"
- Focus on post-9/11 terror in Europe



Radicalisation

- “Radicalization can be described as a process, by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective”.

(Danish Security and Intelligence Services, Radicalisation, p.1.)



Danish Security and Intelligence Services (CTA, Radikalisering og Terror)

Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4
Contact between 'radicalisator' and a person open to radical ideas	Gradual change of behaviour – change in religious behaviour, new communication habits (internet)	Narrowing of social life to only include like-minded individuals – social bonds to family and former friends are cut or restricted	The radical often goes through a process of (moral) hardening – by watching very violent videos and combat scenes



NYPD

(Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, p. 67)

Pre-radicalisation	Self-identification	Indoctrination	Jihadization
Point of departure: Mostly "unremarkable", "ordinary jobs", "little, if any criminal history"	Individuals "begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals". Catalyst: cognitive opening or crisis. Triggers: economic, social (discrimination), political, personal	The individual "progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology" and concludes that militant "action is required"	Groups members "accept their individual duty to participate in jihad". The group begins operational planning"



- Knowledge is still limited
- Radicals are “ordinary people”, not insane psychopats: no socio-demographic or psychological profile of radicals
- No single explanation for radicalisation, rather a result of a complex interaction of factors



Radicalisation is an individual social process

- Processes of radicalisation are social processes which are inherently individual in nature and depend on the specific background, situation and personal characteristics of the person involved
 - Radicalisation processes can involve in many different directions, including non-violent ones
 - Focus of groups



- Division between
 - Causal factors (structural, root causes)
 - >> set the foundation
 - External
 - Social
 - Individual
 - Catalysts (situational factors, volatile, unpredictable)
 - >> abruptly accelerate an already ongoing radicalisation process
 - Trigger events
 - Recruitment



Causes vs. Catalysts

Level	Types of causes	Types of catalysts	
External	Political Economic Cultural	Recruitment Trigger Events	
Social	Social identification Network dynamics Relative deprivation	Recruitment Trigger Events	
Individual	Psychological characteristics Personal experiences Rationality	Recruitment Trigger Events	




Mohammad Siddique Khan

(Alleged ringleader of London-bombings 7/7-05)

Level	Types of causes	Types of catalysts	
External	Political: * resentment against Western powers in Middle East * "Ummah at war"		
Social	* Social identification with allegedly harmed groups * Network dynamics: Stratford Street mosque, Igra Islamic Bookshop, al-Qaeda gym, Beeston * (Relative deprivation)	Recruitment/trigger events : trips to Afghanistan	
Individual	Rational choice		



Causal factors of radicalisation





Foreign policy vs. poor integration

- **Western foreign policy**
 - The relationship between western foreign policies and radicalisation is moderated by social identification
 - The stronger people identify with the relevant social group, the stronger the radicalising effect
- **Poor integration**
 - The relationship between integration and radicalisation is moderated by social identification
 - The fact that Muslim communities are poorly integrated in European societies can lead to individual feelings of social exclusion and rejection



Social identification

- **Social identification**
 - Social identification with allegedly harmed groups is an important indicator of vulnerability to radicalisation
 - In particular for people for whom group membership of the relevant group is central to the individual's self-identity, threats of the group are likely to increase radicalisation tendencies.



Ideology

- In this study radical ideologies or radical interpretations of religion were not found as direct causes of radicalisation
- Instead, a person adhering to a radical ideology was seen as a sign that this person had undergone a process of radicalisation
- Radical ideology: a driving or guiding factor for an already radicalised person



Network dynamics

- Points of interest:
 - radical mosques or places of religious training
 - Prisons
 - internet



Concepts of interest

- Cognitive dissonance
 - When a person's behaviour is in sharp contrast to that person's attitudes and beliefs
 - » Leads that person to invest more in believing what he or she is saying
- Over-justification
 - » The more a person has invested in a radical group, the more that person choose to believe that membership is worth it



- EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy and the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism
 - focus on causal factors on the external level
 - Less attention is paid to the social level
 - Almost no mention is made of the individual level



Workshop 5

Decline of terrorism

Veronika Bilková, Ann Sophie Hemmingsen, Tore Bjørgo



Decline in Terrorism

Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen

Brussels, 6 February 2009



Three themes

- The trouble with looking at “terrorism” - not just the fact that we lack a commonly accepted definition...
- The trouble with “the terrorists” - its no fun being a Jihadi if you’re the only one...
- What is the problem? – alternative perspectives...



The trouble with looking at “terrorism”

- New versus Old?
- Top-down versus Bottom-up?
- Not mutually exclusive
- Organisation



The trouble with “the terrorists”

- Individuals who have been labelled as terrorists
- It's no fun being a Jihadi if you're the only one around
- Future ex-prisoners from Guantanamo



What is the problem?

- How radical is too radical?
- Is the problem the radical views, the violence or somewhere in between?
- Alternative perspectives?



How radical is too radical?

- Humanitarian Jihad?



Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement

Dr. Tore Bjørgo
Norwegian Police University College
and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

in collaboration with Dr. John Horgan
International Centre for the Study of Terrorism
Penn State University

Questions to address:

- ▼ How and why do participants in terrorist groups decide to leave the group and the path of terrorism?
- ▼ Why do sometimes entire groups involved in terrorism decide to abandon this strategy and opt for non-violent courses of action?
- ▼ What could governments and other actors do to make this disengagement from terrorism happen – sooner rather than later?
- ▼ And why is it important and useful to promote disengagement as an element in a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy?

Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.):
*Leaving Terrorism Behind:
Individual and Collective Disengagement*
(London: Routledge 2009)

▼ Contents

▼ *Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan*: Introduction

Part I: Processes

▼ *John Horgan*: The disengagement process for the individual

▼ *Tore Bjørgo*: Disengagement from violent right-wing groups

▼ *Audrey Kurth Cronin*: How terrorist campaigns ends

▼ *Donatella della Porta*: Leaving underground organizations:
A sociological analysis of the Italian case

▼ Rogelio Alonso: Leaving terrorism behind in Northern Ireland
and the Basque country: reassessing anti-terrorist policies and
the “peace processes”

▼ *Diaa Rashwan*: Collective disengagement from terrorism among
Egyptian Islamist groups

Contents (continued)

Part II: Programmes

- ▼ *Tore Bjørge, Jaap van Donselaar and Sara Grunenberg: Exit from right-wing extremist groups: Lessons from disengagement programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany*
- ▼ *Marcella Ribetti: De-mobilization of Colombian guerrillas*
- ▼ *Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari: De-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world: An overview*
- ▼ *Christopher Boucek, Shazadi Beg and John Horgan: The Yemeni Committee for Dialogue*
- ▼ *Zachary Abuza: The rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in Southeast Asia*
- ▼ *Christopher Boucek: Extremist reeducation and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia*
- ▼ *Shazadi Beg and Laila Bokhari: Pakistan - In search of a disengagement strategy*

Part III: Conclusions

- ▼ *Tore Bjørge and John Horgan: Conclusions*

Deradicalisation vs. disengagement

- ▼ *Deradicalisation* is a change in values and ideas away from embracing radical and/or violent policies
- ▼ *Disengagement* is a change in behaviour by breaking off participation in violent groups or engagement in political violence
- ▼ Individuals do not necessarily join extremist groups because they hold extremist views; they sometimes acquire extremist views because they have joined such a group for other reasons
- ▼ Some individuals dispose of their radical views as a consequence of having left an extremist group rather than as a cause for leaving the group
- ▼ Others distance themselves from the group and its terrorist means, but retain their radical views on society.

Individual disengagement from terrorism

▼ How do individuals disengage?

- ▼ Disengagement can be voluntary, involuntary or a combination
- ▼ Some leave the movement altogether, others move into other (less combatant) roles

Push factors for individual disengagement

- ▼ Disillusionment with the (unattainable) goals of the group
- ▼ Disillusionment with the violent methods and who are victimised by the group
- ▼ Disillusioned with the leaders of the group
- ▼ Disillusionment with the social relations within the group
- ▼ Loss of position and status within the group
- ▼ Cannot take the pressure any more
- ▼ Competing loyalties between group and family obligations

Pull factors for individual disengagement

- ▼ Availability of an exit from underground life
- ▼ Amnesty or reduced sentencing for crimes committed
- ▼ Education and job training
- ▼ Economic support
- ▼ New social networks
- ▼ Establishing a family
- ▼ Longing for a peaceful and ordinary life without the stress and pressure of illegal activism

Collective disengagement from terrorism

- ▼ How and why do entire organisations quit their involvement in terrorism?
 - ▼ The capture or killing of the leader
 - ▼ Failure to transition to the next generation
 - ▼ Achievement of the group's aims
 - ▼ Transition to a legitimate political process
 - ▼ Undermining of popular support
 - ▼ Repression
 - ▼ Transitioning from terrorism to other forms of violence

(Based on A. K. Cronin's chapter)

Challenges in promoting disengagement in counter-terrorism

- ▼ No magic bullet: Promoting individual and collective disengagement from terrorism can only be *one* element within a comprehensive policy against terrorism
- ▼ Risk of recidivism back into terrorism or other forms of crime. This risk can be reduced by
 - ▼ screening out insincere participants through a selection process
 - ▼ influencing their values and behaviour
 - ▼ monitoring ex-militants after their release, with severe sanctions for breaching conditions
 - ▼ providing the necessary skills, resources and social networks to enable them to re-integrate into society
- ▼ Amnesty to terrorists may mean that those having caused death and suffering sometimes get away with their crimes unpunished, causing more pain to victims and their families

Why should facilitating disengagement be a main element in counter-terrorism policies?

- ▼ Individual and collective disengagement from terrorism may reduce the economic and social costs of terrorism
- ▼ Promoting collective disengagement from terrorism may end terrorist campaigns
- ▼ Disrupting the process of violent radicalization early in a career is better than waiting until violence is committed
- ▼ Individual disengagement may reduce the number of active terrorists and the size of terrorist groups.
- ▼ Defectors from terrorist groups may serve as credible opinion builders against terrorism
- ▼ Defectors from terrorist groups may provide valuable intelligence and testify in court against other terrorists
- ▼ With no exit option but death or life in prison, terrorists may continue even if they realise that their struggle is lost

- ▶ **Lessons learned this far from deradicalisation and disengagement programmes;
and questions to address**

What are the objectives and expectations of the disengagement programme?

- ▼ Reduce number of active terrorists
- ▼ Reduce violence and victimisation
- ▼ Deradicalising the ideological views and attitudes of the participants
- ▼ Resocialise ex-members back to a normal life
- ▼ Acquire intelligence, evidence and witnesses in court cases
- ▼ Use ex-terrorists as opinion builders
- ▼ Sow dissent within the terrorist milieu
- ▼ Provide an exit from terrorism and underground life
- ▼ To reduce the dependency of repressive means and make more use of more humane means in counter-terrorism
- ▼ Reduce the economic and social costs of keeping a large number of terrorists in prison for a long time
- ▼ To increase the legitimacy of the government

Who will run the disengagement programme, and what are the consequences?

- ▼ Non-governmental organisation(s)
- ▼ Governmental organisation(s)
 - ▼ Security sector (police, security service)
 - ▼ Social sector (welfare agencies, education)

Who is the target group(s) for the programme?

- ▼ Activists at large
- ▼ Imprisoned activists
- ▼ Leaders and ideologues of terrorist groups
- ▼ Operational terrorists ('with blood on their hands')
- ▼ Peripheral members in supporting roles
- ▼ Sympathisers
- ▼ Parents and family members - and through them the activists (e.g. parental network groups)

What are the main challenges in re-socialising ex-militants?

- ▼ Criminal prosecution
- ▼ Avoiding recidivism to violent activism
- ▼ Avoiding recidivism to (organised) crime
- ▼ Avoiding revenge from former enemies or victims
- ▼ Avoiding revenge from former comrades in the militant movement
- ▼ Finding an alternative livelihood
- ▼ (Re-)establishing social networks

What will the programme offer to those entering the programme?

- ▼ Full amnesty for crimes committed
- ▼ Reduced sentencing
- ▼ Improved conditions in prison
- ▼ Serving in prison with other ex-members
- ▼ Ideological dialogue/training/indoctrination
- ▼ Job training and education
- ▼ Economic subsidies to participant
- ▼ Economic subsidies to family
- ▼ Assistance to get married
- ▼ New social networks
- ▼ New job
- ▼ New identity

What will the individuals in the programme have to offer in exchange?

- ▼ To stay away from terrorist or other violent activities
- ▼ To stay away from radical organisations and politics
- ▼ Accept to serve (reduced) sentences for committed crimes
- ▼ Provide intelligence and/or witness in court
- ▼ To meet victims, confess and ask for forgiveness
- ▼ Distance themselves (publicly) from terrorism (and extremism)
- ▼ Taking part in activities to reduce recruitment to extremist groups

How to deal with the risks of insincere participants and recidivism to terrorism/crime?

- ▼ Selection process for admittance to the programme
- ▼ Changing the values, world-views and behaviour of the participants during the programme
- ▼ Monitoring participants after being released
- ▼ Threats of severe punishment

How to deal with the risks and threats from terrorist organisations?

- ▼ Protecting participants against reprisals
- ▼ Countering attempts to discredit the disengagement programme

How to deal with critique

- ▼ from victims of terrorism
- ▼ from media and opposition
- ▼ from foreign governments
- ▼ from militant or terrorist organisations

How will the programme and the outcomes be evaluated?

- ▼ Internal evaluation
 - ▼ Will negative outcomes be made public?
 - ▼ Credibility
- ▼ External evaluation
 - ▼ Who will do it?
 - ▼ The need for access and transparency
- ▼ Make evaluation part of the programme!

What are the resources available?

- ▼ Qualified practitioners
- ▼ Reformed ex-members
- ▼ Economic resources
- ▼ Networks with other agencies, NGOs and civil society
- ▼ Families of participants
- ▼ Legitimacy



Workshop 6

Security and Ethics of Counterterrorism

*Hans-Otto Sano, Bibi van Ginkel, Peter Burgess,
Iain Cameron*



Ethical Justness of Counter- terrorism measures

An analysis of the EU and five
European sample states

Bibi van Ginkel



Research question

- How to evaluate ethical justness of European CT measures?
- Legality: legal basis, right procedure, respecting HR obligations
- Legitimacy: quality of the measure, pull to compliance, effectiveness



Indicators of legitimacy (1):

- Determinacy: clarity of wordings
- Symbolic validation/pedigree: authenticity, deep-rootedness, traditions, cultural anthropological dimension



Indicators of legitimacy (2):

- Coherence: horizontal nexus, distinction in treatment justifiable in principled terms
- Adherence: vertical nexus, rules about rule-making, ultimate rule of recognition, peer pressure



Case studies:

- EU
- UK
- France
- Germany
- Spain
- The Netherlands
- Total of 32 measures!



Ethical bottlenecks

- Ambiguity of criminality
- Ambiguity of power
- Divergence from good governance and the rule of law



Ambiguity of criminality

- Broad/vague definitions
- Preventive measures assigns criminality *ex ante*
- Shift in level of reasons needed to start prosecution



Ambiguity of power

- Link between CT objective and CT measure
- Vague/broad description of powers
 - E.g. evidence by intelligence agencies; moving from prosecution to administrative measures



Good governance/rule of law

- Access legal counsel
- Presumption of innocence
- Torture
- Privacy invasions
- Discrimination
- Fair trial principles/access to court



Workshop 7

Counterterrorism in practice

*Bibi van Ginkel, Rob de Wijk, Gilles de Kerchove,
James Kirkhope*

Counterterrorism In Practice

James T. Kirkhope

Think Tanks, Academia, and the Private Sector

- **Open Source Research / Intelligence**
- **Technical Assistance** – best practices, lessons learned, data fusion, and knowledge bases
- **Innovative Training** – targeting law enforcement, military, and intelligence community
- **Private Security** – Iraq, Afghanistan, maritime, aviation, international, regional, and domestic

James T. Kirkhope

- **Terrorism Studies Group and Terrorism Studies Network** (www.terrorism-studies.com) Principal and Founder
- **Council for Emerging National Security Affairs - CENSA** (www.censa.net) Executive Director



Open Source Research / Intelligence

- *Terrorism: An International Resource File – 1970-1990* (microfiche collection and index)
- *Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network* – Yonah Alexander & Michael Swetnam, May 2001 (media and academia)
- terrorism attack chronologies
 - St. Andrews – Paul Wilkenson
 - Rand Corp.
 - Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) - Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)
 - TRC
- Jane's, Control Risk, Terrorism Research Center/Total Intelligence Solutions



Technical Assistance

- best practices
- lessons learned - Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.LLIS.gov) – Detica DTI
- data fusion – Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEW) - LASD, MIPT, TRC
- knowledge bases – Responder Knowledge Base (www.rkb.us) – MIPT, TRC, SAIC



Innovative Training

- Developing training curricula outside the government training centers
 - law enforcement
 - Military
 - intelligence community
- Mirror Image training – TRC
- Homegrown Terrorism – Identifying Terrorist Cells in Your Jurisdiction - TRC



Private Security

- Iraq
- Afghanistan
- Nigeria
- Angola
- Maritime
- Aviation
- Humanitarian Aid - security
- international, regional, and domestic



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TTSRL Final conference

*Thank you for
participating*